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1. Market research by competition authorities in countries with CPP (‘calling party pays’) 
regimes indicates that wholesale call termination on a single mobile network can be 
defined as a relevant product market, and on such a market, an operator has 100% market 
share. Mobile operators face no (or very little) competitive pressure in the wholesale 
market for call termination. 
 
2. The root cause of these ‘call termination monopolies’ is the CPP regime, which gives 
rise to an externality: mobile operators can charge operators in the fixed market – instead 
of charging customers in the market in which they compete – for the termination of 
incoming calls from fixed subscribers. Fixed operators’ access charges are usually 
regulated (at ‘cost-oriented’ levels) so that they do not have countervailing bargaining 
power in the wholesale market for termination access. 
 
3. Intense (or even perfect) competition in the mobile retail market does not provide a 
reason to conclude that the call termination monopolies can be ignored by regulators and 
competition authorities. Even if termination profits are passed on to mobile customers (in 
the case of perfect competition: up to the point where each operator makes zero overall 
profits), welfare may be distorted. 
 
4. Mark-ups in mobile access prices stemming from call termination monopolies tend to 
inflate per-minute prices for off-net calls, especially for fixed-to-mobile (F2M) calls. This 
distortionary effect on retail prices is more severe when fixed and mobile markets are 
more ‘distinct’, that is, when there is a larger number of fixed users who are not 
customers in the mobile market but do make calls to mobile users. Therefore mobile 
access mark-ups effectively create a net money stream from the fixed to the mobile 
sector, subsidized by fixed subscribers who call mobile users. The problem in the mobile-
to-mobile (M2M) case tends to be less severe, since the effects of access mark-ups cancel 
out to some extent (in a more symmetric market, charging each other for call termination 
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makes much less sense, since access mark-ups would only lead to pumping around access 
revenues). 
 
5. The presence of call termination monopolies does not automatically imply that there is 
an overall welfare problem. On the one hand, (i) per-minute prices for F2M and off-net 
M2M calls are inflated, distorting the demand for these calls; and (ii) consumers who pay 
inflated prices subsidize consumers who benefit from handset subsidies or reduced 
mobile subscription fees, so that there may be overconsumption of mobile services (e.g. 
an inefficiently high turnover of phones by consumers). On the other hand, (i) access 
mark-ups may efficiently contribute to the recovery of fixed and common costs; and (ii) 
assuming that competition in the mobile retail market is sufficiently effective, mobile 
consumers benefit since overall mobile telephony becomes cheaper, an effect that 
contributes to fast market expansion. The net welfare effect is unknown (and hard to 
assess). 
 
6. If operators have to recover fixed and common costs of their networks, then Ramsey 
pricing (by definition) leads to a second-best welfare outcome (compared to the first-best 
outcome in which investments are covered by a lump-sum transfer from the government). 
A proper welfare analysis to derive Ramsey prices should include both the fixed and 
mobile market, each of them both at the retail and wholesale level. Whether the resulting 
pricing structure requires substantial mark-ups in mobile access prices is uncertain, in 
particular since they undermine the effectiveness of cost recovery through alternative, 
potentially superior instruments, such as subscription fees. Moreover, partial price 
controls with Ramsey elements (e.g. setting only mobile access prices but not fixed 
access prices at Ramsey levels, or leaving retail prices to be determined by competition) 
may not lead to a second-best welfare outcome. 
 
7. The current policy tendency is to restrict attention to the defined market, establish 
substantial market power (a dominant position), and regulate the prices in question. A 
shortcoming of this approach is that it is not based on an overall welfare analysis. Also, it 
is transitory only to the extent that regulators will have to continuously monitor whether 
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the ‘single network’ market definition has ceased to be valid, and if yes, withdraw the 
price controls. Thus a possible consequence is that regulatory intervention becomes a 
semi-permanent phenomenon, rather than a one-shot intervention that creates a 
fundamental change in the market. Overall, the strong focus on price controls that is 
observed in practice is hard to justify from a welfare perspective.  
 
8. Compared to price controls, there exist alternative, less heavy-handed, ways to 
intervene, which are directly aiming at the root cause of the problem and can make access 
regulation unnecessary.  
 
• First, as an eye-opener, consider the elimination of the regulatory asymmetry 
between the fixed and mobile sector, for instance by creating countervailing 
bargaining power for the fixed operator in the wholesale access market (while 
verifying that fixed end-users benefit from lower access mark-ups through 
reduced retail prices). Although this type of remedy may ultimately not be be 
feasible as regulators may be unwilling to deregulate fixed termination access, 
it points at the connections between the fixed and mobile sectors in relation to 
call termination monopolies.  
• Second, a remedy is to introduce RPP (‘receiving party pays’), that is, change 
the commercial agreements such that the price for receiving calls is not a 
priori fixed at zero because of some convention, while the calling party still 
pays a price for call originiation. This remedy can be implemented 
straightaway but requires regulatory intervention (to make it happen).  
• Third, an option is to introduce ‘call termination bypass’ by making it 
technically feasible that alternative mobile operators can deliver calls to other 
operators’ customers (e.g. on the explicit request of calling parties, for 
instance by dialling a ‘Carrier Select’ prefix). The latter solution may not be 




9. Remedies should always be compared to the possibility of refraining from intervention. 
Arguments in favor of laissez-faire are: (i) the cross-subsidy from the fixed to the mobile 
sector, which might be the most significant effect of call termination monopolies, are 
offset by the fact that most fixed customers also own a mobile phone, so that overall they 
may hardly be affected; (ii) changes will not lead to Pareto-improvements, as users and/or 
operators in the mobile sector will lose, regardless of the way in which F2M termination 
tariffs are reduced; (iii) mobile operators paid money for their licenses, arguably on the 
expectation that they could recover (part of) it with F2M termination charges – changing 
the rules of the game could be considered a regulatory taking; (iv) we do not yet have a 
good understanding of how CPP versus RPP may affect social interactions and how the 
two regimes are valued by consumers; and (v) call  termination termination may become 
viable in a few years, so there is no need to introduce structural reforms now. Perhaps 
except for the first one, these arguments are not very strong: (ii) one cannot realistically 
expect Pareto-improvements to be a requirement for regulatory intervention; (iii) even 
though regulatory takings may pose a serious risk for firms, licence-holders can 
realistically expect that competition authorities and regulators are ‘obliged’ to deal with 
major market failures; (iv) the potential negative effects of a switch to RPP seem to be of 
minor importance; and (v) without external pressure, operators will not have incentives to 
develop the technology for call termination bypass. 
 
10. The net welfare effect of access mark-ups due to call termination monopolies is 
unknown, but clearly call behavior is distorted as a result of inflated per-minute prices for 
off-net calls. If any, forcing mobile operators to apply RPP instead of CPP is a 
straightforward and simple remedy, as it instantaneously eliminates the root cause of call 
termination monopolies. 
 
11. To conclude, the current focus on price controls to deal with call termination 
monopolies is understandable within the context of the regulatory framework in the EU, 
but it ignores important elements of the broader picture and therefore risks to be 
misguided from a welfare viewpoint. Such an approach may eliminate the symptoms at a 
local level (namely within the narrowly defined market where an abuse of market power 
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is established), but it lacks a welfare diagnosis that looks at the root cause of the problem, 
which happens to be an externality that goes beyond the ‘relevant’ market of wholesale 
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Following the liberalisation of telecommunications markets, the ability to interconnect 
has become an essential prerequisite for successful market entry by new 
telecommunications operators, whether fixed or mobile. In connection therewith, 
incumbent fixed telecommunication operators have generally been put under relatively 
heavy regulatory obligations.1 In contrast to fixed operators, mobile operators have not 
been under similar obligations so far. Mobile operators have traditionally been presumed 
to be subject to vigorous competition. They were not considered generally as possessing 
market power. Moreover, their services were seen as a luxury which further reduced the 
incentive to regulate.2 However, with the explosive growth and development of the 
mobile markets, these assumptions have been challenged. 
 
In many countries, the number of mobile users and the call traffic that they generate have 
demonstrated steady growth during the last five years. In the European Union, the 
number of mobile subscribers increased from 69 million in 1998 to 306 million in 2003, 
and the average penetration rate increased from 18% in 1998 to 81% in 2003.3 In 
particular during the late 1990s, new customers contributed to rapid growth of second-
generation (‘2G’) mobile markets. At present, while growth rates have levelled off and 
operators have necessarily become more interested in customer retention than market 
expansion, European markets have started their transition to the third generation of 
mobile technology (‘3G’). 
 
The declining growth in mobile markets, the unprepossessing financial positions of 
several operators resulting from the 3G auctions, and the need for capital to roll out 
UMTS networks, have increased the pressure in the mobile industry to generate cash. 
                                                 
1 Markets for fixed telephony are not yet sufficiently competitive (former incumbents still have 
‘significant market power’). 
2 Intven et al. (2000, ch. 3, p. 33).  
3 European Commission (2003b). 
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Mobile operators try to make revenues across the whole range of services that they offer. 
One of these services, ‘termination access’ or ‘terminating access’ to mobile users, has 
come under close scrutiny recently from regulators and competition authorities alike. 
 
If a subscriber to one network wants to call a subscriber to another network, the two 
networks must be ‘interconnected’, so that the first user can reach the other one. The 
operator of the user initiating the call has to purchase termination access from the other 
network in order to complete the call. The key policy issue concerns the level of 
wholesale prices that operators charge for this service, known as termination access 
prices. In a number of countries it has been noticed that, while other interconnection rates 
had steadily declined, the fixed-to-mobile termination access rates had remained at high 
levels, exceeding by far the rates for mobile-to-fixed or fixed-to-fixed interconnection 
and, arguably, the costs of providing interconnection. 
 
Several regulators have assessed the reasonability of mobile termination access prices. In 
a nutshell, the typical reasoning is as follows. Calling parties, instead of receiving parties, 
pay the price of calling a mobile phone. This arrangement is known as the ‘calling party 
pays’ (CPP) principle: the subscriber making a call – not the one receiving it – pays for it 
(this regime is typically applied throughout Europe). Furthermore, the calling party, when 
making a call, cannot change or influence the receiving party’s choice of subscription, 
nor does he have an alternative when making a call. Fixed operators’ access prices are 
typically regulated, so they do not have countervailing bargaining power in the wholesale 
market for termination access. Therefore, mobile operators can exercise monopoly power 
with respect to call termination on their networks.4 While operators’ costs have decreased 
and call volumes have increased, it is believed that termination charges have not been 
reduced in line with efficiency gains, so that consumers have not benefited from cost 
reductions. 
 
                                                 
4 This would also be the case for fixed operators if their termination charges were not regulated. 
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In the United Kingdom, for example, Oftel had proposed in 2001 to put a price cap on the 
termination access price, in order to protect consumers. Because the operators rejected 
Oftel’s proposal, it was subsequently referred to the Competition Commission (CC). The 
findings of the CC supported Oftel’s claim that mobile operators had monopoly power 
and significantly overcharged consumers for connecting calls to their networks. As a 
result, Oftel recommended substantial, stepwise reductions: an initial cut of 15% and 
further cuts of the same percentage in each year for the next three years. Three mobile 
operators (Vodafone, T-Mobile and Orange) lodged an appeal with the High Court to 
have the proposals overturned, which was rejected by the court. In order to implement the 
new EU Communications Directives, Oftel published a consultation document on 
wholesale call termination that included proposals for defining markets and imposing 
conditions related to significant market power (SMP) on mobile operators.5 Ofcom, the 
successor of Oftel, concluded that each mobile operator has SMP in the market for 
wholesale call termination on its individual network.6 
 
The Netherlands provides another illustration. Telecoms and post regulator OPTA and 
competition authority NMa have jointly investigated termination charges for fixed-to-
mobile calls. The NMa (2002) had already determined that there exists a relevant market 
for termination services for each operator, and that there is no significant competitive 
pressure on the tariffs for call termination.7 At a certain point, the NMa decided to use 
competition law (abuse of dominant position) as a basis for intervening. In the light of 
these developments, the Dutch mobile operators ‘voluntarily’ offered to lower their 
mobile access tariffs, whereupon the NMa terminated its case.8 The proposed stepwise 
reduction of these charges came into effect at the start of 2004 and will ultimately lead to 
a decrease of almost 50% in two years time. According to OPTA, the benefits for fixed 
                                                 
5 Review of mobile wholesale call termination markets, Oftel, 15 May 2003. 
6 Wholesale Mobile Voice Call Termination, Statement, Ofcom, 1 June 2004. 
7 OPTA held a similar view (“Policy rules regarding the regulation of mobile terminating tariffs”, 
28 March 2002, OPTA/IBT/2002/2200802). 
8 See “OPTA en NMa: bellen naar mobiel wordt fors goedkoper”, Press Release (5 December 
2003), available at www.nmanet.nl. 
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callers who call mobile users will account at least to ¼PLOOLRQLQ– effects on 
other consumers (in particular mobile subscribers) are not mentioned.9  
 
The following table exhibits access prices and rough guesses of mark-ups in the 
Netherlands, as well as the stepwise reduction of access prices that the mobile operators 
have agreed upon (not all of the proposed steps are included in the table).10 Although the 
numbers may be different, the range and order of magnitude of the mark-ups may be 
representative for other countries as well. As cost data is virtually inexistent, the marginal 
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18.9 cents approx. 
89 - 278% 
15.5 cents 11.0 cents approx. 







21.3 cents approx. 
113 - 326% 
17.5 cents 12.4 cents approx. 
19 - 60% 
Table 1.1: Access prices, costs of access and mark-ups in the Netherlands (prices are per 
minute and in ¼ 
 
                                                 
9 Press release “OPTA en NMA: bellen naar mobiel wordt fors goedkoper”, OPTA, 5 December 
2003. The underlying document “Mededeling inzake beleid OPTA ten aanzien van mobiele 
terminating tarieven”, OPTA/IBT/2003/204693, does not provide further details. 
10 Marginal costs are estimated by the notion of ‘long-run incremental cost’ (LRIC). Mark-ups are 
defined as (access price – marginal cost) / access price. The estimates of marginal costs are in line 
with some experts’ views, or perhaps somewhat overstated (private communication). 
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Table 1.1 suggests that the margins from call termination are very high. In itself this does 
not imply that there is a competition problem or that welfare is reduced. The immediate 
policy concern is the supposed presence and exploitation of (excessive) market power. 
 
Another example, in line with the data in table 1.1, comes from Australia, where the 
competition watchdog ACCC (2004) observed that mobile access prices appear to be at 
least twice as high as the underlying cost of providing the access service, based on 
observations that the average access price is 22.5 cents (Australian dollars) per minute 
while the cost of access is estimated between 5 and 12 cents.11 To deal with these mark-
ups, the ACCC made a ‘declaration’ of the mobile termination access function, which 
creates a requirement for the suppliers of the service to provide it, upon request, to other 
firms at a quality similar to that which the supplier provides to itself. The access price can 
be determined through commercial negotiations; if they fail, the ACCC can make an 
arbitration decision. The declaration was based on the view that all mobile operators have 
market power to terminate F2M and M2M calls on their network and have the ability to 
set mobile access prices above its underlying cost. 
 
The central question that is addressed in this report is the following one. Do mobile 
operators have (and exercise) monopoly power with respect to call termination, and if so, 
can this be seen as a market failure, and is regulatory intervention desirable? We will 
adopt a welfare-perspective to address this question. We remark that the question is 
complicated by the presence of a segment of fixed subscribers, which is (to some extent) 
separate from the mobile market. Competition among mobile operators to attract 
                                                 
11 According to the Australian competition authority ACCC (2004), the ‘total service long-run 
incremental cost’ (TSLRIC) of call termination is in the range of 5-12 cents per minute (roughly 
3-7 ¼-cents), which includes a normal return on investment. If one includes a a contribution to 
common organization-level costs, the cost range becomes 10-17 cents (roughly 6-10 ¼-cents). 
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customers may therefore be intense, while there is little competitive pressure with regard 
to the access charge for incoming calls.12 13 
 
The policy debates on mobile call termination are particularly heated because of the 
apparent importance of revenues from incoming calls for mobile operators. The declining 
growth in mobile markets, the unfavorable financial positions of several operators 
resulting from participating in 3G auctions, and the need for capital to roll out UMTS (the 
European standard for 3G) networks, have increased the pressure in the mobile industry 
to generate cash. Given the current business models in mobile telecoms, it may even be 
the case that mobile operators need the termination revenues to keep their business afloat.  
 
The structure of the rest of this report is as follows. Chapter 2 provides relevant 
information. In order to provide some perspective, section 2.1 gives an overview of 
recent market developments. Section 2.2 gives a description of the technologies of fixed 
and mobile telecommunications. It introduces the reader to common terminology and 
provides basic explanations of network interconnection and access to networks. Also, ti 
contains a short overview of different access situations, namely one-way access and two-
way access. Chapter 2 can be skipped by readers who are familiar with 
telecommunications technology and market developments. 
 
                                                 
12 Early papers that define the relevant issues within the Dutch context and provide some first 
suggestions for dealing with the ‘problem’ are Haan (2002) and Van Damme (2002). 
13 Armstrong (2002) coined the term ‘competitive bottlenecks’ to describe the situation in which 
several networks compete for the same pool of customers, while network operators have 
monopoly power in the wholesale market for call termination to their customers. The problem of 
monopoly power (or its supposed presence) with regard to call termination does not only occur in 
mobile telecommunications markets, as it is also present in fixed telecoms. An example outside of 
telecoms is Internet. Consider a consumer subscribing to a certain Internet service provider (ISP), 
who wants to visit a website hosted by another ISP. One can ask, for instance, whether the former 
ISP should charge the latter one or vice versa, given that both the consumer and the web-site 
benefit from the visit. 
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Chapter 3 provides a background of the regulatory and legal framework that applies to 
the member states of the European Union. Section 3.1 starts with a historical overview. 
Section 3.2 discusses policy objectives. Section 3.3 zooms in at specific elements in the 
regulatory framework that are relevant for interconnection and call termination access. It 
contains an extensive discussion of interconnection and the designation of operators with 
significant market power (SMP; 3.3.1), both under the old (3.3.2) and new regulatory 
framework (3.3.3). It also discusses potential remedies (3.3.4) and procedural provisions 
related to the imposition of ex ante obligations on operators designated with SMP (3.3.5). 
Section 3.4 concludes. 
 
Chapter 4 summarizes and discusses the recent policy debate on mobile call termination. 
In particular, it addresses the question whether mobile operators have market power with 
respect to termination access – the question whether exercising market power is bad for 
welfare or consumers will be treated in subsequent chapters. It is organized as follows. 
Section 4.1 introduces the antitrust notion of defining the relevant market, which is the 
usual starting point for policy makers. Using the recent policy discussion in the United 
Kingdom (UK) as a general example, section 4.2 applies the concept of market definition 
to mobile call termination and discusses whether mobile operators have market power. 
Section 4.3 describes similar debates that have taken place in the Netherlands and in 
Australia. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter by pointing out that the exercise of market 
definition, which naturally leads to the conclusion that call termination on individual 
networks are relevant markets on which mobile operators have 100% market share, 
should – from a welfare viewpoint – not automatically lead to the conclusion that 
termination charges should be regulated. Why this is the case, is discussed in the 
subsequent chapters. 
 
Chapter 5 contains an economic analysis of fixed-to-mobile network interconnection 
based on economic models. Section 5.1 summarizes some central results from the 
literature on access in telecommunications markets and surveys the literature on call 
termination on mobile networks. Section 5.2 provides additional results from numerical 
simulations. The model is presented in subsection 5.2.1, while results are presented and 
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discussed in subsection 5.2.3. In the models discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2, the issue of 
cost recovery was ignored. To address this issue, section 5.3 extensively deals with 
Ramsey pricing and the recovery of fixed and common costs. Section 5.4 concludes the 
chapter.  
 
Using the insights of the previous chapters, in chapter 6 we focus on the welfare effects 
of call termination monopolies and discuss potential remedies. Ths chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 6.1 gives a general overview of potential welfare effects. Section 6.2 
discusses structural remedies that are more or less straightforward: eliminating the 
asymmetry between the fixed and the mobile sector (subsection 6.2.1), changing from 
‘calling party pays’ (CPP) to ‘receiving party pays’ (RPP; subsection 6.2.2), and 
implemeting the technical remedy of ‘call termination bypass’ (subsection 6.2.3). Section 
6.3 revisits access prices regulation and cost recovery, which was the topic of section 5.3. 
Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
 
Chapter 7 concludes the report. It contains a summary of the outline of the reasoning 
throughout the different chapters, and recapitulates the policy implications. 
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2. Overview of telecommunications 
 
This chapter provides an introductory background to telecommunications markets. It 
summarizes relevant market developments and contains a basic and simplified 
description of the principles (and terminology) underlying the operation of 
telecommunications technologies – in particular fixed and mobile telecommunications – 
and types of access to networks.  
 
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In order to provide some perspective, section 
2.1 gives an overview of recent market developments. Section 2.2 gives a description of 
the technologies of fixed and mobile telecommunications. It introduces the reader to 
common terminology and provides basic explanations of network interconnection and 
access to networks. Also, ti contains a short overview of different access situations, 
namely one-way access and two-way access. Chapter 2 can be skipped by readers who 
are familiar with telecommunications technology and market developments. 
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2.1 Recent market developments14 
 
In the past five years, the number of mobile users, as well as traffic volume from mobile 
phones, have demonstrated steady growth in western European and many other countries. 
For instance, the number of mobile subscribers in the EU increased from 69 million in 
1998 to 306 million in 2003 (EC, 2003b). In particular during the late 1990s, new 
customers contributed to rapid growth of second-generation (2G) mobile markets (the 
GSM standard in Europe). 
 
A substantial number of the new mobile users entered the market under prepaid 
arrangements in combination with handset subsidies. However, prepaid users contributed 
relatively little to the growth in the number of call minutes, compared to users with 
subscriptions. Reasons for this difference are, for instance, that prepaid users include 
people who want to control their budget more tightly (e.g. adolescents) and people who 
expect to use their phone relatively little (e.g. compared to corporate customers). 
Moreover, per-minute prices charged to prepaid users are typically higher than those 
charged to subscribers. Since the strategic focus of mobile operators gradually shifted 
away from attracting new users as the market matured, prepaid offerings have become 
less prominent in their marketing tactics. 
 
In the last couple of years, the steep rise in penetration and revenues from usage of 
mobile phones has levelled off to a more modest growth level. For instance, the average 
penetration rate in the EU increased from 18% in 1998 to 70% in 2001, and 81% in 2003 
(European Commission, 2003b). The average monthly expenditure for a typical personal 
user decreased with 23%, and for a typical business user with 20%, during the period 
2000-2002 (European Commission, 2002b). Therefore, instead of selling phones and 
subscriptions to new users, mobile operators must now rely more and more on retention 
of existing customers and stimulating the use of mobile phones in new ways. In 
                                                 
14 This section is partly based on CC (2003) and EC (2002b). 
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particular, operators have become less keen on offering rebates or subsidizing handsets to 
prepaid users, since these customers generate a lower ‘average revenue per user’ 
(ARPU). Operators’ marketing efforts have been redirected to new tariff packages and 
services other than voice telephony, in particular data services. The short message service 
(SMS) has been a very successful one, for instance because of its popularity among 
schoolkids. More recent services include transmission of multimedia messages (including 
soundbites or images) and Internet-type services. An examples of the latter is a packet-
switched technology (i.e., data is split into small packets that are separately transmitted, 
as is also the case for the Internet) known as GPRS.15 An example of the latter is NTT 
DoCoMo’s i-mode, marketed and sold in the Netherlands by KPN. 
 
In several countries in Western Europe, governments set up auctions to award licences 
for the next generation (3G) of mobile telephony, known as UMTS. Several multinational 
operators paid very substantial amounts of money for 3G licences, especially in the 
United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands.16 After the dust of the auctions 
had settled, doubts started to rise about the future revenues to be obtained with 3G 
services. With hindsight, it seems that operators participating in the auctions, and also the 
banks that were financing the bids, were overly optimistic, perhaps blinded by the hype 
of the ‘new economy’. As a result, several operators ended up being debt-ridden without 
having favorable prospects of recovering their licence fees with future revenues from 3G 
services. 
 
The declining growth in mobile markets, the unprepossessing financial positions of 
several operators resulting from the 3G auctions, and the need for capital to roll out 
UMTS networks, have increased the pressure in the mobile industry to generate cash. 
Mobile operators try to make revenues across the whole range of services that they offer. 
                                                 
15 GPRS: General Packet Radio Service, also denoted by 2.5G, as it is an intermediate step 
between the current, second generation of mobile technology, and the third generation (UMTS in 
Europe). WAP, although circuit-switched instead of packet-switched, was meant to provide 
access to “sites” resembling bare-bones websites. 
16 See e.g. Van Damme (2002). 
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One of these services, termination access to mobile users, has come under close scrutiny 




2.2 Fixed and mobile networks17 
 
Telecommunications networks permit transmission of information (e.g. voice or data 
communication) between terminal devices such as telephones. This is done by 
establishing a connection, through a network, between the devices of different parties. A 
network typically consists of: 
 
• Transmission systems: the means by which information travels through the 
network. An important element is the transmission medium (e.g. wire or a 
wireless radio system). 
• Switching systems (also called switches): the means by which temporary 
connections between subscribers are established. 
• Signaling systems: the means by which information about connections (e.g. the 
phone number of the called party, and whether a call is toll-free or not) are 
conveyed. 
 
Moreover, at a stylized level one can distinguish two types of transmission systems, 
which are complementary to each other: 
 
• A customer access network (also known as local network), which connects end-
users’ devices to local switches. The transmission medium typically consists of 
wire (e.g. copper wire or optical fibre) or radio spectrum. 
• A long-distance network (also known as backbone), which enables calls to be 
routed between local switches, possibly through switches at a higher level in the 
hierarchy of a network. The transmission medium usually consists of copper wire, 
cable, and optical fibre. 
 
                                                 
17 This subsection is based on CC (2003, chapter 3) and De Bijl and Peitz (2002, chapter 2). It is 
restricted to the current, second generation of mobile telecommunications in Europe, which is 
known as the GSM standard. For a description of the mobile industry, see also Hausman (2002). 
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The most prominent difference between a fixed and mobile network is the nature of the 
transmission medium of the customer access network. A telephony network is called a 
fixed network if the connections to end-users, either wired or wireless, are fixed in 
location. Hence, users cannot move around with their devices, except in the range 
allowed by the wire between handset and socket, or, in the case of a wireless telephone, 
by the reach of the wireless connection (with a range typically in the order of magnitude 
of a house and its immediate surroundings). 
 
Mobile telephony is characterized by the feature that telephones use radio connections 
allowing users to move around in a much larger range, in the order of magnitude of a 
country or parts thereof. The long-distance part of a mobile network, that is, all 
connections except those that establish links with end-users’ mobile phones, is similar to 
a fixed network. In fact, mobile operators may use existing long-distance networks of 
fixed operators to transport calls. The links between radio signals transmitted by handsets 
and the long-distance network are formed by ‘base stations’, which can often be 
recognized by radio antennas on high buildings and towers. In order for a mobile phone 
to operate, it must be within the coverage of a base station.  
 
The coverage pattern formed by several base stations typically resembles a honeycomb 
structure, which is why the coverage areas of base stations are known as cells and mobile 
telephony is also called cellular telephony. Coverage from neighboring cells usually 
overlaps: the call made by a subscriber traveling from one cell to another can be handed 
over to the new cell (a process known as ‘handoff’ between adjacent cells), while 
coverage is not lost inbetween cells. 
 
The current generation of mobile technology in Europe is known as the GSM standard. A 
typical GSM network can be broken down into three ‘layers’: 
 
• The radio layer, comprising base stations and base station controllers 
(BSCs). The base stations provide the radio coverage, while the BSCs 
 15 
concentrate calls from various base station in order to pass them on to a 
switch. This layer can be viewed as the local access network. 
• The mobile switching center layer, comprising mobile switching centers 
(MSCs) and databases that store information about the network’s 
subscribers and current locations of phones. Each BSC is connected to one 
MSC. 
• The transit layer, comprising transit switching centers (TSCs). These are 
switches that are connected with MSCs and carry calls between different 
TSCs. Each TSC is connected to neighboring TSCs; together they form 
the long-distance backbone of the network. 
 
The databases in the switching center layer that are used for storage and management of 
subscriptions are the home location registers (HLRs). An operator’s HLR stores 
information about its subscribers, such as customers’ service profiles, information about 
locations, and activity status. Each subscriber is registered in the HLR of the operator to 
which he or she subscribes. 
 
The transit layer is usually also connected to other networks (‘interconnection’). Some 
mobile networks do not use a transit layer, but instead have interconnected MSCs and 
directly interconnect with other networks. Figure 2.1 illustrates interconnection of fixed 














Figure 2.1: Network interconnection between fixed and mobile networks 
 
 
From an operator’s viewpoint, a crucial difference between a call to a fixed and a mobile 
subscriber is the need to locate the latter’s phone. To know where (i.e., in which cell) a 
mobile phone is at each moment, the databases at the mobile switching center layer are 
automatically informed by a mobile phone (given that it is switched on and within radio 
coverage) of its present location. This process, known as location update, occurs when a 
phone is switched on or off, if it moves from one area (consisting of a certain number of 
neighboring cells) to another, and after a preset duration (typically about 30 minutes). 
 
For a typical telephone call, a temporal connection is established that ‘originates’ from 
the calling party’s phone and ‘terminates’ at the called party’s phone. A particular feature 
of a liberalized telephony market is that the calling and called party do not always 
subscribe to the same network. From the viewpoint of a given network and its 
subscribers, one can therefore distinguish two kinds of phone calls: 
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• On-net calls, which originate and terminate on the same network, that is, calls 
between subscribers of the same network. 
• Off-net calls, which terminate on another network, that is, calls to subscribers to 
another network than the one that the calling party subscribes to. 
 
Note that one operator’s off-net call is another operator’s incoming call, which can be 
defined as a received call originating from another network’s subscriber.  
 
Off-net calls can occur between different fixed networks, different mobile networks, as 
well as fixed and mobile networks. A necessary condition is, however, that the networks 
are interconnected (i.e., connected to each other). Interconnection takes place at a ‘point 
of interconnect’ (POI). As already mentioned above, in a mobile network, the POI may 
be at a TSC on the transit layer, or, if it has no transit layer, directly at an MSC at the 







Figure 2.2: A fixed-to-mobile call 
 
 
In the past, fixed subscribers often rented their handsets from the incumbent. When the 
equipment market was liberalized, consumers could, as an alternative, purchase a handset 
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in the market (in general, former incumbents cancelled the possibility for equipment 
rental shortly after that). A fixed handset can be plugged into any telephony socket, and 
hence be used in combination with a subscription to any fixed operator. A user of a fixed 
connection usually subscribes to the operator that owns the connection to that user. 
Alternatively, in the case of local loop unbundling, local switches are programmed to 
‘know’ to which operator the user of a certain connection subscribes to. In both cases, 
subscriptions are independent of the handset.  
 
In mobile markets, subscriptions often depend on the handset. Mobile phones are either 
offered in a bundle with a subscription contract or sold separately. In the former case, the 
handset may be subsidized, sometimes to the extent that it is given away for free, by 
revenues from subscriptions and call minutes. In both cases, a small card with a chip on 
it, the ‘SIM’ (subscriber identity module) card, has to be slotted into the back of the 
phone, providing it with the information about the network to which it should connect to. 
It also contains information about the subscriber, such as personal phone numbers and 
text messages. Note that it is the SIM card that contains subscriber information, not the 
phone. The mobile operator that issues a SIM card remains the formal owner for an 
indefinite period of time, according to the typical contract between an operator and a 
mobile user. 
 
To make sure that a mobile handset subsidy can be recovered, a mobile phone can be 
‘locked’ for a certain period of time, in the sense that it cannot be used to subscribe to 
other operators. This can be done by programming the phone such that it only works with 
a specific operator’s SIM card. Without such a ‘SIM-lock’, a mobile user can slot any 
SIM card into his or her phone, and hence connect to any operator. In order to obtain a 
SIM card, however, the user must purchase either a subscription or a prepaid contract 
from an operator.18 
 
                                                 
18 Alternatively, mobile phones may be permanently locked, without a separate card or card slot. 
This situation occurs in the US. 
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The product and services bundle that a mobile user typically purchases consists of a 
mobile phone in combination with a SIM card corresponding to a unique telephone 
number, the ability to make calls, the ability to receive calls, and various other services, 
(e.g. voicemail, international roaming, the ability to send and receive short message 
services (SMS) or more advanced multimedia services). Mobile network technology is 
such that by default, only the operator to which a consumer subscribes can deliver calls to 
that consumer. Hence, call delivery is necessarily a part of the bundle offered to end-
users. Given the current state of technology, which implies that a mobile phone can only 
be attached to one network at a time, and changing to another network takes considerable 
time, ‘call termination bypass’ is not a realistic option. In chapter 6 we will further 
discuss the prospects of introducing competition in call termination by technical means. 
 
We conclude this section by introducing some notions that surface elsewhere in this 
report. In a one-way access situation, only the incumbent firm has a network with access 
to end-users. Hence the incumbent has a monopoly over an essential input – access to 
consumers via its network – needed by entrants, while the incumbent itself needs no 
inputs from its rivals. Accordingly, access to end-users is often viewed as a bottleneck or 
essential facility, especially if there are sunk costs involved and the network element 
cannot be duplicated in an economically viable way. In order to offer telephony services, 
entrants without local-access networks must purchase access to end-users from the 
incumbent. Typically, the incumbent operator is vertically integrated: it offers wholesale 
access to entrants and also competes with them in the retail market for telephony 
services. Entrants operate only in the retail market. In practice, it may be the case that an 
entrant has a long-distance network at its disposal, but no connections to end-users (the 
‘local loop’ or ‘local access network’). 
 
Note that in a situation of one-way access, entrants need to buy both originating and 
termination access on the wholesale market to be able to offer telephony services. This 
terminology is derived from the notion that for a typical telephone call, say from 
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subscriber A to subscriber B, a connection is established that originates from the network 
that A subscribes to, and terminates at the network that B subscribes to.19 
 
In a situation of two-way access there are several operators, each one with its own 
network, who need one another to terminate calls between their networks. The feature 
that distinguishes such a situation from one-way access is reciprocity. Since subscribers 
of one operator may want to call subscribers of another one, all operators need access to 
each others’ subscribers, and hence termination access to each others’ networks. This 
situation may correspond not only to a mature market, in which entrants have their own 
local networks, but also to an infant market, in which entrants are still building up market 




                                                 
19 The economics literature on one-way access typically simplifies this picture, in most cases 
without loss of generality, by viewing access as a joint service that consists of both originating 
and terminating access. 
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3. The legal framework in Europe 
 
Interconnection (see the previous chapter for explanations of this and other terminology) 
is one of the vital elements for a competitive telecommunications sector. Interconnection 
ensures interoperability of networks. Its primary objective is to enable any subscriber of 
one network to communicate with any subscriber of another. For this purpose, an 
operator whose subscriber initiates a call to a subscriber of another network should be 
able to terminate the call on this other network. In other words, the operator from which 
the call originates should have access to the network of the other operator to terminate the 
call. Interconnection is thus a special type of access. Telecom operators typically have a 
right and an obligation to interconnect, which they realise by entering into 
interconnection agreements which are subject to commercial negotiations. The cost of 
call termination is a decisive component of the interconnection rate charged by operators 
under the terms of the negotiated interconnection agreement.  
 
The regulation of European telecommunications – or electronic communications, as they 
are not designated in regulatory terminology – markets takes place within a framework of 
harmonized rules agreed at European Union level. This framework is then implemented 
by the EU Member States. Problems of market failure and potential remedies have to be 
assessed within this framework. In addition, EC and national competition law remains 
applicable to issues arising in the telecommunications markets; as will be seen below, the 
regulatory framework is meant to be streamlined with competition law, in order to ensure 
a coherent and consistent policy approach. 
 
This chapter provides a background of the regulatory and legal framework that applies to 
the member states of the European Union. It is organized as follows. Section 3.1 starts 
with a historical overview. Section 3.2 discusses policy objectives. Section 3.3 zooms in 
at specific elements in the regulatory framework that are relevant for interconnection and 
call termination access. It contains an extensive discussion of interconnection and the 
designation of operators with significant market power (SMP; 3.3.1), both under the old 
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(3.3.2) and new regulatory framework (3.3.3). It also discusses potential remedies (3.3.4) 
and procedural provisions related to the imposition of ex ante obligations on operators 
designated with SMP (3.3.5). Section 3.4 concludes. 
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3.1 Historical overview 
 
To achieve liberalization of the telecommunications market, a regulatory framework 
comprising a number of directives and related instruments came into place on 1 January 
1998.20 The key regulatory instruments that were used were control of retail prices, 
control of access prices, and universal service obligations. The framework set up by the 
directives was designed to manage the transition toward competition, and therefore 
included several regulatory asymmetries with respect to incumbents versus entrants. It 
was meant to be transitional and was subject to review after a relatively short term. The 
1999 Review then proposed a new, simplified legislative framework that became 
applicable as of 25 July 2003. 
 
The new framework can be seen as a response to the changing and ‘converging’ world of 
electronic communications, where data can be delivered over a variety of different, 
interconnected networks, including the Internet. It aims at ensuring harmonisation and 
                                                 
20 The main directives are: (i) based on Article 95 EC: Directive 90/387 of 28 June 1990 (Open 
Network Provision (ONP) Framework Directive) [1990] OJ L 192/1 (as amended by Directive 
97/51 of 6 October 1997 [1997] OJ L 295/23), Directive 92/44 of 5 June 1992 (ONP - Leased 
Lines) [1992] OJ L 165/27 (as amended by Directive 97/51 of 6 October 1997 [1997] OJ L 
295/23), Directive 97/33 of 30 June 1997 (ONP - Interconnection) [1997] OJ L 199/32 (as 
amended by Directive 98/61 of 24 September 1998 [1998] OJ L 268/37), Directive 98/10 of 26 
February 1998 (ONP - Voice Telephony) [1998] OJ L 101/24, Directive 97/13 of 10 April 1997 
on a common framework for general authorizations and individual licenses in the field of 
telecommunications services [1997] OJ L 117/15 and Directive 97/66 of 15 December 1997 
concerning the processing of personal data and the protection of privacy in the 
telecommunications sector [1998] OJ L 24/1 and (ii) based on Article 86 EC: Directive 90/388 of 
28 June 1990 on competition in the markets for telecommunications services [1990] OJ L 192/10 
(as amended by Directives 94/46 of 13 October 1994 [1994] OJ L 268/15, 95/51 of 18 October 
1995 [1995] OJ L 256/49, 96/2 of 16 January 1996 [1996] OJ L 20/59, 96/19 of 13 March 1996 
[1996] OJ L 74/13 and 1999/64 of 23 June 1999 [1999] OJ L 175/39). 
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legal certainty accross the EU. This is, for instance, achieved by ensuring that the same 
markets are analyzed in all member states, and that market parties are informed of this in 
advance. Moreover, specific conditions necessary for regulatory intervention by NRAs 
have been specified (possibly justified by national circumstances). 
 
The new regime also relies more on general competition rules and less on ex ante, sector-
specific regulation. The envisaged end-state is one that is completely governed by 
competition law. The new framework is made up of a package of six “electronic 
communications” directives,21 of which the Framework Directive and the Access 
Directive are most relevant for this study, and furthermore a Recommendation on 
relevant product and service markets,22 and Guidelines on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power.23 The central plank of the new framework is a 
revamped regime of heavier regulation for firms holding Significant Market Power 
(SMP). 
                                                 
21 The new framework is made up of the following directives (i) based on Article 95 EC: 
Directive 2002/19 of 7 March 2002 (Access Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/7, Directive 2002/20 of 7 
March 2002 (Authorization Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/21, Directive 2002/21 of 7 March 2002 
(Framework Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/33, Directive 2002/22 of 7 March 2002 (Universal 
Service Directive) [2002] OJ L 108/51 and Directive 2002/58 of 12 July 2002 (Privacy Directive) 
[2002] OJ L 201/37 and (ii) based on Article 86 EC: Directive 2002/77 of 16 September 2002 on 
competition in the markets for electronic communications networks and services [2002] OJ L 
249/21. 
22 Recommendation 2003/311 of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21 [2003] OJ L 114/45.. 
23 Guidelines on Market Analysis and the Assessment of Significant Market Power under the 
Community Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communications Networks and Services 
[2002] OJ C165/6. 
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3.2 Policy objectives 
 
From a legal perspective, it is useful not to forget that the starting point is freedom of 
contract and the commercial freedom of firms to conduct their business. Accordingly, 
since interconnection involves two firms deciding to provide access to each other’s 
network, it would prima facie be a private matter for these two firms to discuss and agree 
among themselves. There needs to be a good justification for the law to interfere with 
these freedoms and impose constraints on whether firms may refuse to grant 
interconnection or on the conditions under which they do so. 
 
In essence, the law concerning interconnection of telecommunications networks 
evidences two lines of justification for regulatory intervention: 
 
- public policy objectives relating to the greater good, according to which the State 
can interfere with the freedom of private firms in interconnection matters in order 
to ensure the fulfillment of a public policy objective whose significance exceeds 
the private interests of the parties. This would typically be the case where, for 
instance, a failure to interconnect two networks would inflict significant losses on 
society and the economy, because users of the respective networks would find 
themselves unable to communicate across networks. State intervention in such 
cases occurs through sector-specific regulation; 
- economic regulation, where the operation of market forces is unlikely to lead to 
an optimal result. For example, if one of the firms involved enjoys market power, 
it can either refuse to grant interconnection to smaller firms or – perhaps more 
likely – grant it on abusive terms. Here State intervention is not so much 
concerned with ensuring that interconnection is taking place, but rather with 
ensuring that interconnection is not used to influence adversely the functioning of 
the market. The State has a choice of means through which to intervene: this type 




Intervention on both grounds (public policy, economic regulation) is provided for in EC 
communications law. Historically, the first major piece of legislation dealing with 
interconnection was Directive 97/33,24 found in the ONP framework as it was 
reformulated ahead of the full liberalization of the telecommunications sector in 1998. A 
number of soft-law instruments were adopted under the said Directive. This is known as 
the old framework.  
 
Since 25 July 2003, a new EC regulatory framework for electronic communications 
replaced the old ONP set of directives. Together, the Framework and Access Directives 
set out a regulatory framework determining the rights and obligations of undertakings 
seeking interconnection and the powers of the national regulatory authorities to regulate 
interconnection issues. The Framework Directive specifies the following, general goals of 
regulatory intervention: 
 
1. to promote competition in the provision of electronic communications networks, 
services and associated facilities and services (by, inter alia, ensuring that users 
derive maximum benefit in terms of choice, price and quality); 
2. to contribute to the development of the internal market (by, inter alia, removing 
obstacles to the provision of networks and services, and by encouraging 
interoperability of pan-European services and end-to-end connectivity); 
3. to promote the interests of the citizens of the EU (by, inter, alia ensuring that all 
citizens have access to a universal service). 
 
The Access Directive contains a provision bridging the gap between the old and the new 
framework. As stipulated in Article 7 (1) of the Access Directive, the obligations with 
regard to interconnection which were imposed on the telecom operators pursuant to the 
ONP Interconnection Directive are to remain in force until national regulatory authorities 
(NRAs) will have conducted the market analysis in accordance with the new framework 
                                                 
24 Supra, note 20. 
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to determine whether to maintain, amend, or withdraw the obligations.25 Since the new 
framework has not yet been fully implemented and applied (especially as regards the new 
SMP procedure, discussed below) by all the Member States, references to both old and 
new legislation will be made with a special emphasis on changes which were brought 
about by the new framework into the interconnection regime. 
 
 
                                                 
25 Access Directive, Article 7. 
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3.3 Specific elements of the EC regulatory framework as it applies to MTA 
 
3.3.1 The general obligation to interconnect 
 
The Access Directive defines interconnection as ‘the physical and logical linking of 
public communications networks used by the same or a different undertaking in order to 
allow the users of one undertaking to communicate with users of the same or another 
undertaking, or to access services provided by another undertaking.’26 Thus, apart from 
regulating interconnection of fixed and mobile telecommunications networks, the 
Directive is equally applicable to interconnection of other electronic communications 
networks such as cable television networks, satellite and Internet networks, etc. 
 
The Access Directive provides for the differentiated regulation of interconnection 
depending on the market position of the operators. While there are some general 
obligations which are applicable to any operator, the Directive establishes a system 
according to which a number of specific ex ante obligations can be imposed on operators 
with significant market power (SMP). As will be seen below, in contrast to the old 
framework, the designation of an operator as an operator with SMP has to be made 
following a market analysis, and the imposition of specific obligations is no longer 
automatic. In this respect, the new framework brings sector-specific regulation very much 
in line with competition law (which is also based on economic analysis). 
 
The part of the regulatory framework on the general obligation to interconnect reflects 
the first justification for intervening in interconnection matters set out above (relating to 
public policy). One of the main objectives of the regulatory framework for electronic 
communications is to ensure end-to-end connectivity,27 which is achieved, inter alia, by 
means of interconnection.  
                                                 
26 Ibid., Article 2. 
27 Framework Directive, Article 8 (3b). 
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There are different types of interconnection, depending on the type of interconnected 
operators: fixed-to-fixed, fixed-to-mobile, mobile-to-mobile, interconnection of leased 
lines, etc. Depending on how networks are linked, interconnection can be direct, i.e., if 
the network of operator A is linked at the point of interconnection directly to the network 
of operator B, or indirect, if the networks of operators A and B are linked via a third 
operator’s network. The Access Directive establishes a single regulatory regime for all 
types of interconnection.  
 
The Access Directive formulates a general obligation addressed to all operators of public 
communications networks to interconnect. What is implied in this interconnection 
obligation is the commitment to negotiate interconnection. In most cases, it will be an 
interconnection agreement between operators.28 Article 3 of the Access Directives 
requires that the Member States do not hinder the interconnection negotiations between 
operators. 
 
As is clear from the Preamble to the Access Directive,29 what is important is the ability of 
customers of different networks to reach each other and to communicate, and 
interoperability in general, and not the way in which they are achieved. Thus, the 
obligation to interconnect extends to direct and indirect interconnection. However, in the 
case of indirect interconnection, the actual bilateral interconnection agreement between 
the operators may be absent.30 Therefore, the obligation to interconnect in this context 
would probably mean a mutually agreed arrangement to use a certain third party for the 
purposes of establishing interconnection. For example, in the Netherlands, indirect 
                                                 
28 Access Directive, Article 4 (1). 
29 Access Directive, Recital 8, . 
30 For the Dutch example of this situation, see The Regulation of Mobile Terminating Tariffs, 
Consultation document, OPTA, 19 December 2001, OPTA/IBT/2001/203784, Appendix I, text at 
footnote 28, p. 33. 
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interconnection of mobile operators (via the transit fixed line network of KPN) is the rule 
rather than the exception.31  
 
The compliance with the general obligation to interconnect is reinforced by the powers of 
NRAs in the field of ex ante regulation and dispute resolution. First of all, the NRAs may 
impose an ex ante obligation to interconnect on those undertakings that control access to 
end-users (regardless of their market power).32 For instance, the Dutch TA already 
contains an article to this effect.33 Secondly, where commercial negotiations for 
conclusion of the interconnection agreement fail,34 the NRAs have the competence to 
intervene in an interconnection dispute at the request of a party involved in the 
negotiation of the interconnection agreement and to issue a binding decision.35 
Presumably, by such a binding, decision an interconnection agreement may be imposed 
on one of the parties. For example, the Dutch TA states that if parties are unable to reach 
an agreement on interconnection, OPTA may be requested by one of the parties to lay 
down rules which will be applicable to both/all parties involved.36  
 
 
3.3.2 The SMP regime 
 
The part of the regulatory framework on SMP (significant market power) designation, 
which is the ‘labeling’ of operators so that they can be subject to specific ex ante 
obligations, concerns the second rationale for intervention set out above (economic 
regulation). The new framework is built on the presumption that the ex ante regulation of 
specific electronic communications markets is only warranted if markets are not 
                                                 
31 Ibid., Appendix I, text at footnote 28, p. 32. 
32 Access Directive, Article 5(1a). 
33 Article 6.1 (1), TA. 
34 Access Directive, Recital 6. 
35 Framework Directive, Article 20. 
36 Section 1, Article 6.3, TA. 
 31 
competitive and, as a corollary to that, where there is at least one firm with SMP. The aim 
of obligations imposed on operators enjoying SMP is to compensate through regulatory 
measures the lack of competitive pressure and market forces that should normally ensure 
the development of a competitive market.  
 
SMP under the old ONP framework 
 
At the outset, it is useful briefly to set out the SMP regime of the old ONP framework. It 
helps to understand better the changes brought about with the new electronic 
communications framework. At the same time, the obligations imposed under the old 
ONP framework are still in force in many Member States where the NRA has not 
completed its first market definition and analysis exercise under the new framework.37 
 
The SMP regime under the old framework provided that NRAs were to impose specific 
obligations on operators which were found to enjoy SMP on certain markets. For each of 
these markets, the applicable directives provided which obligation was to be imposed on 
SMP operators. 
 
The Interconnection Directive is the most relevant for the purposes of this paper. The 
particular markets (or rather market areas) which it had in view for the purposes of an 
SMP designation were 1) fixed public telephone networks and services; 2) mobile public 
telephone networks and services; 3) leased lines services, and 4) interconnection.38 
 
The old framework did therefore contain references to “markets”, but those were not 
relevant markets in a competition law sense. For example, “interconnection” was one of 
the “markets” which could be regulated under the old ONP framework; under the new 
electronic communications framework, with a market definition exercise inspired by 
                                                 
37 Access Directive, Art. 7. 
38 Freund (2001, p. 4). 
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competition law, this “interconnection” market has been broken down into a number of 
separate smaller relevant markets.39  
 
Furthermore, under the old framework, significant market power was presumed if an 
operator’s market share was above 25% of the particular telecom “market”. NRAs could 
deviate from the strict compliance with the 25% threshold.40 
 
As the list above made clear, the old ONP framework distinguished between fixed and 
mobile markets. The only obligations which could be imposed on mobile 
communications operators were: 
 
- if they were found to enjoy SMP for “mobile public telephone networks/services”, 
an obligation to grant special network access to other operators as well as 
transparency and non-discrimination requirements;41 
- if they were found to enjoy SMP for “interconnection”, an obligation of 
transparency and cost-orientation regarding interconnection charges.42 Because of 
the way in which SMP on this “national market for interconnection” was to be 
assessed,43 few mobile operators were subjected to this obligation.44 
 
                                                 
39 See the Access Directive, Annex I, for an indication of how the markets of the old ONP 
framework were going to be broken down.  
40 ONP Interconnection Directive , Article 4 (3). 
41 Ibid., Article 4(2) and 6. 
42 Ibid., Article 7(2). 
43 See Commission document “Determination of Organisations with Significant Market Power 
(SMP) for implementation of the ONP Directives” (1 March 1999).  
44 See the list of designated SMP operators under the old framework, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/all_about/implementation_enforcement/in
dex_en.htm. See also Eighth Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory package, European telecoms regulation and markets 2002, 
03.12.2002, COM (2002) 695 final; Freund and Ruhle (2002). 
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Accordingly, as will appear from the case studies in Chapter 4, NRAs who wanted to 
intervene against high mobile termination rates under the old ONP framework had 
limited means at their disposal. Some used competition law powers (Oftel in the UK), 
others used their power to settle interconnection disputes under the general 
interconnection regime mentioned above (OPTA in the Netherlands), others yet 
introduced specific national interpretations of the old ONP framework which they had to 
defend before national courts (PTS in Sweden). 
 
SMP under the new electronic communications framework 
 
Under the new framework, the NRAs have to conduct a market analysis before any 
specific ex ante obligation can be imposed on the operators. Note that the new framework 
does not at the outset differentiate between the types of operators, whether fixed or 
mobile, that is, all operators can be subject to the same sort of regulatory obligations. If a 
particular electronic communications market is not effectively competitive, NRAs must 
identify an operator with SMP. Both the market analyses and the designation of an 
operator as an operator with SMP is carried out by the NRAs in accordance with soft law 
instruments,45 the Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets,46 and the Commission Guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of 
significant market power.47 The Framework Directive expressly requires that NRAs take 
the utmost account of the Commission Recommendation and the Guidelines when 
defining and assessing relevant markets under the Directive.48 The choice for the use of 
soft-law instruments instead of the legally binding acts49 can be explained by reference to 
                                                 
45 That is, ‘instruments which have not been attributed legally binding force’, Senden (2003), p. 
104. See Article 249 EC on the lack of the binding force of recommendations. 
46 Recommendation 2003//311, supra, note 22. 
47 Supra, note 23. 
48 E.g., Framework Directive, Article 15 (3) and 16 (1). 
49 At earlier stages of the legislative process, the draft of the Framework Directive provided for 
the adoption of a Commission decision (which is legally binding) which would identify relevant 
product and services markets for the purposes of ex ante regulation.  
 34 
such factors as the speed and flexibility in the adoption and amendments of the former as 
well as the fact that they are not susceptible to judicial review.50  
 
The new framework continues to use the concept of SMP, but, it is now aligned with the 
general concept of economic dominance,51 developed in the context of EC competition 
law.52 An undertaking is deemed to have SMP if ‘either individually or jointly with 
others, it enjoys a position equivalent to dominance, that is ... a position of economic 
strength affording it the power to behave to an appreciable extent independently of 
competitors, customers and ultimately consumers.’  
 
With the alignment of SMP with dominance, the SMP regime, which is a central part of 
sector-specific regulation in the electronic communications sector, becomes a means of 
policing market power, in addition to the means found in general competition law, 
namely the prohibition on abuses of dominant position53 as well as merger control.54 
Before exploring the new SMP regime in greater detail, it might be useful to briefly 
compare it with those two elements of competition law in the following table. 
 
                                                 
50 Article 230 EC. 
51 I.e., the concept of dominance developed in the context of Article 82 EC in the case law of the 
ECJ and the CFI. However, an undertaking designated as an SMP operator for the purposes of the 
imposition of sector-specific obligations would almost automatically also fall under the scope of 
Article 82 EC, which prohibits however not dominance as such but abuses of a dominant 
position. The assessment of SMP is based on the model forecasting how competition in the 
markets for electronic communications is likely to develop in the future. The appropriate ex-ante 
measures should then be selected to match the anticipated market failure.   
52 Framework Directive Article 14 (2). 
53 Article 82 EC, together with supporting secondary legislation, first and foremost Regulation 
1/2003 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 EC 
[2003] OJ L 1/1. 
54 Regulation 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings [2004] Oj L 24/1, 
with supporting secondary legislation. 
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market definition relevant market definition: product and geographical 







triggering factor abuse merger characteristics of 
market, leading to 
selection in 
Recommendation 
prohibition decision  
fines divestiture  
remedies 
transparancy, non-discrimination, supply/access requirements, 
obligations relating to pricing and cost accounting 
Table 3.1: Comparison of different regimes. 
 
 
The Framework Directive establishes the procedure for the SMP designation, which 
consists of a number of steps which are explained in greater detail below.55  
 
First of all, NRAs should define the specific markets whose characteristics may be such 
as to warrant the imposition of regulatory obligations. Under general competition law, 
both the relevant product and geographical markets should be identified.56 Here the 
Commission sets out the relevant product markets in a recommendation, which should be 
reviewed regularly reflecting the changing market conditions. The Directive itself 
                                                 
55 Framework Directive, Article 15.. 
56 See the Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community 
competition law [1997]OJ  C 372/5. 
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contains in Annex I a list of relevant product and service markets to be included in the 
first recommendation.57 The Commission is also empowered to adopt a decision by 
which it will define transnational markets. The Commission issued the first 
Recommendation on relevant product and service markets at the beginning of 2003.58 
The NRAs are to follow the Commission Recommendation. While NRAs are not 
precluded from defining product/service markets for the purposes of SMP designation 
that differ from those listed in the Recommendation, they can only adopt a measure 
affecting this market after they have submitted its draft to the Commission and the latter 
does not object.59  
 
The Framework Directive states60 that the relevant product and services markets are 
identified on the basis of EC competition law criteria. The general approach of the 
Commission to market definition in competition law matters is set out in a Notice on 
Relevant Market Definition from 1997.61 The Commission restated it for the purposes of 
the new electronic communications framework in its Guidelines on Relevant Market 
Analysis and the Assessment of SMP of 2002.62 It can be argued whether market 
definition under the new regulatory framework is truly the same type of exercise as 
market definition under competition law.63 Even if it were, when the new framework 
                                                 
57 It appears that notwithstanding the title of Annex I to the Framework Directive, “List of 
markets to be included in the initial Commission recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets referred to in Article 15”, it nevertheless lists not only separate markets but also so-called 
market areas consisting of smaller markets. This is rather confusing. See  Recommendation 
2003/311, supra, note 22, Recital 8..  
58 Ibid. 
59 See Framework Directive, Articles 7 (4) and 15(3).  
60 Article 15 (1), ibid. 
61 Supra, note 56. 
62Supra, note 22. 
63 Market definition under competition law is always about ascertaining the competitive 
constraints on the firm(s) under examination, whereas under the new regulatory framework it 
appears to be more of a market segmentation exercise. See Larouche (2002, p. 137). 
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speaks of “market definition”, in fact the exercise comprises an extra step in comparison 
with competition law, namely the selection – amongst the various relevant markets – of 
those markets “the characteristics of which may be such as to justify the imposition of 
regulatory obligations”.64 The criteria for the selection amongst relevant markets were set 
out in Recommendation 2003/311, the first recommendation issued pursuant to the 
Framework Directive. These are, firstly, the presence of barriers to entry and 
development of competition of a legal, structural or regulatory nature, secondly, the 
dynamic aspects of the market structure, that is, the evidence that the market does not 
tend to become effectively competitive, and thirdly, the insufficiency of competition law 
remedies in the absence of ex ante regulation.65  
 
As mentioned before, under the new framework, instead of defining a vague and broad 
“interconnection” market (as was the case under the old ONP framework), the 
Commission Recommendation identifies much smaller separate markets which can be 
subject to regulation, namely, in the case of mobile communications, access and call 
origination on public mobile telephone networks and voice call termination on individual 
mobile networks.66  
 
NRAs have to undertake a further analysis to identify the geographical dimension of the 
relevant product/service market.  
 
Once the relevant product and geographical market is established, the NRAs should 
assess the competition in this market. If following the market analyses in accordance with 
the Commission Guidelines, the NRAs come to the conclusion that the market is 
effectively competitive, they should refrain from the imposition of any specific 
                                                 
64 Framework Directive, Art. 15. 
65 See Recommendation 2003/311, supra, note 22, Recitals 9-16  
66 Recommendation 2003/311, supra, note 22, paras. 15 and 16 of the Annex. 
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obligations on the undertakings in that relevant market or withdraw the obligations 
previously enforced.67  
 
If, following the market analyses, NRAs find out that a market is not competitive, they 
should proceed to identify an undertaking which individually (or jointly with others) is 
dominant in this market. In particular, in assessing whether an undertaking is dominant, 
not only its market share on the relevant markets is considered decisive but other factors 
such as countervailing buying power, technological developments, absence of the 
potential competition, etc., are taken into account.68 With regard to the assessment of the 
market share of the undertaking in the interconnection market, the Guidelines suggest 
using the revenues generated for terminating calls to customers on fixed or mobile 
networks as an appropriate yardstick to measure the market share.69 
 
In its Recommendation, the Commission identified “voice call termination on individual 
mobile networks” as a relevant market which came into consideration for sector-specific 
regulation. It might be useful to set out the main reasons put forward by the Commission 
to reach that conclusion:70 
 
“At a retail level a call to a given user or user’s terminal is not a substitute 
for a call to another user and this limitation on demand substitution follows 
through at the wholesale level. In addition there is a legal obligation at the 
wholesale level to supply any to any interconnection so operators are 
legally obliged to conclude interconnect agreements. In respect of supply 
substitution, if the supplier of call termination raises its price, it is not easy 
for alternative suppliers to switch to supply that market because they 
                                                 
67 Framework Directive, Article 16 (3). 
68 Guidelines on SMP, supra, note 23, para 78. 
69 Ibid., para 77. 
70 See the Explanatory memorandum to Recommendation 2003/311, supra, at pp. 32-34, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/useful_information/library/ 
recomm_guidelines/index_en.htm. 
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would need the SIM card details of that user to do so. However, the market 
is wider than call termination on a given user terminal because it is not 
possible for an operator to readily price discriminate between termination 
charges to different users across their network. Therefore the relevant 
market is at least as wide as termination for each operator. 
 
However, with such a starting point in market definition, the supplier and 
the product are perfectly linked. It is important therefore to consider the 
possibilities for demand and supply substitution that might constrain 
termination charges and also the behaviour of network operators in setting 
termination charges.  
[The Commission finds that there are no realistic possibilities for 
substitution at either the wholesale or retail level]. 
 
Another possible constraint on the ability of operators to set excessive 
termination charges may come from buyer power at the retail level.  
[The Commission finds that there is no evidence to support this 
hypothesis.] 
 
In general therefore, whilst it is apparent that end-users who subscribe to 
mobile services have a choice about the network to which they subscribe 
and that it is relatively easy to switch between networks, there is limited 
evidence of widespread constraints on the pricing of wholesale call 
termination. The first option for market the scope of the market definition 
is one for call termination on each mobile network. This would imply that 
currently each mobile network operator is a single supplier on each 
market. However, whether every operator then has market power still 
depends on whether there is any countervailing buyer power, which would 
render any non-transitory price increase unprofitable. 
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Another option for the scope of the market definition would be a national 
market for (mobile) call termination but the supply side substitution 
necessary for such a definition does not currently exist. 
 
A third option for the scope of the market definition would consist of 
linked national markets for mobile services. For this definition to be valid, 
mobile subscribers must be concerned about the price of calling mobiles 
and therefore termination charges (as an important determinant of such 
charges). It is also necessary that the services are strong complements so 
that subscribers do not consider the prices of the services separately when 
choosing a network but rather the price of the overall bundle or package. 
This would mean that a mobile operator could only raise termination 
charges and thereby the retail price of incoming calls, (without losing 
subscribers) if at the same time it reduced prices for other services in the 
bundle. In this case the assessment of market power in call termination 
would be similar to that for other services in the bundle. If call termination 
were less important, there might be scope for a higher degree of market 
power in call termination. 
 
The conclusion at the current time (under a calling part[y] pays system) is 
that call termination on individual networks is the appropriate relevant 
market. However, such a definition would be undermined by (i) technical 
possibilities to terminate via other networks (this would broaden the 
market definition to call termination on all networks) (ii) evidence that 
users employ alternative means to circumvent high termination charges or 
(iii) evidence that users subscribe to networks on the basis of what it costs 
to be called (the last two would imply a linked market definition, 
comprising access, call origination and termination).” 
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For the purposes of the present survey, it should be emphasised that the narrow definition 
of “voice call termination on individual mobile networks”71 as a relevant market implies 
that each mobile operator is very likely to be a monopolist on its own termination market 
and therefore each mobile operator has a great potential of being designated an SMP 




When the NRA has identified an operator with SMP, it must decide which measure out of 
the whole range of possible obligations should be chosen to remedy a particular problem. 
For those operators who were designated operators with SMP under the old framework 
and whose SMP status was reaffirmed on the basis of the new framework, it might mean 
that their current obligations will continue to apply or will be altered, or that new 
obligations will be imposed.  
 
These ex ante obligations need not be imposed in total. However, at least one obligation 
should be imposed on the SMP operator.73 In selecting the remedy, the NRAs have to 
bear in mind the regulatory objectives outlined in the Framework Directive, such as 
fostering competition in the electronic communications sector, development of the 
                                                 
71 For criticism of the narrow market definition, see Gual (2004) and Larouche (2002). 
72 This is in line with an unfortunate trend in competition law to allow the definition of “access 
markets”, where the relevant market essentially consists of a physical facility or intellectual 
property to which competitors of a given firm would like to obtain access. As the CFI judgment 
of 15 September 1998 in Case T-374/94, European Night Services [1998] ECR II-3141, shows, 
the risk of error is greater in such cases than in “classical” cases where market definition is 
conducted on the basis of market data. In addition, the holder of the facility or intellectual 
property will invariably hold a dominant position of that market, thereby shortcircuiting another 
element of the analysis. The Court of Justice endorsed the “access market” approach recently in 
Case C-418/01, Judgment of 29 April 2004, IMS Health (not yet reported). 
73 Guidelines on SMP, supra, note 23, para 114, and Larouche (2002). 
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internal market and promotion of the interests of European citizens.74 Furthermore, they 
have to be guided by the principles of appropriateness and proportionality.75  
 
The list of regulatory obligations includes the following obligations. 
 
• Transparency76  
The scope of this remedy may include the requirement of making public specific 
information regarding accounting, technical specification, interconnection tariffs, etc. 
It may also encompass a duty to publish an (unbundled) reference interconnection 
offer (RIO) containing general terms and conditions for interconnection services. The 
SMP undertaking may be requested to modify the RIO in accordance with the 
instructions given by the NRAs. Annex II to the Access Directive enumerates 
minimum items which should in any case be covered by the RIO published by the 
operator who ensures unbundled access to the twisted metallic pair local loop. In 
other instances, NRAs possess significant freedom in employing transparency as one 
of the possible remedies. They are competent to define the precise scope of the 
transparency requirement, such as what information should be published, how full it 
should be, and how it should be published. For example, transparency may be used by 
the NRA in combination with other remedies to address the problem of high mobile 
termination charges. Making information available to consumers, e.g., on how much 
it costs to call a mobile phone user, may improve the consumer awareness. This will, 
in some instances, induce mobile subscribers to make a more informed choice in 
favour of a mobile network with lower termination rates. It may also encourage fixed 
network subscribers to change their calling pattern,77 putting competitive pressure on 
the fixed-to-mobile charges.  
 
                                                 
74 Framework Directive, Article 8.  
75 Access Directive, Recital 15. 
76 Ibid., Article 9. 
77 Such as, keeping calls to mobile subscribers short or calling to request a call back.  
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• Non-discrimination78  
This is a requirement which demands, firstly, non-discrimination between various 
categories of operators who seek interconnection, that is, an operator under the non-
discrimination obligation should interconnect applying equivalent conditions in 
equivalent circumstances to other undertakings providing equivalent services. 
Secondly, there should be no discrimination in treatment between the undertaking 
providing interconnection and its affiliates, on the one hand, and third operators, on 
the other hand, i.e., interconnection services should be supplied to third parties under 
the same conditions and of the same quality.  
Price discrimination is the most common form of discrimination. However, other 
forms of discrimination can manifest themselves through unfavourable conditions for 
interconnection (at a non-optimal level), delays, limited use of facilities, etc. 
It may be difficult to establish whether an operator breaches a non-discrimination 
obligation since interconnection agreements are concluded in the first place as a result 
of commercial negotiations. The agreements might reflect differentiation in treatment 
dictated by the specific needs of the parties. The compliance with the principle of 
non-discrimination should, therefore, be assessed on a case-by-case basis.79 In 
practice, the non-discrimination obligation will often translate into a requirement that 
the firm set out a reference offer of which every party can avail itself.80 
 
• Accounting separation81  
Under this obligation, an SMP operator should keep separate accounts of its 
interconnection services from other activities, so that its costs and revenues related to 
interconnection activities become transparent. Thus, accounting separation supports 
other remedies, such as transparency and non-discrimination. NRAs have a power to 
                                                 
78 Access Directive, Article 10. 
79 Ng (1997). 
80 Access Directive, Art. 9(2). 
81 Ibid., Article 11. 
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access accounting records and data of the regulated companies which should be 
provided to them on request. 
 
• Obligation to give access to network facilities, including interconnection82  
This obligation goes beyond the mere requirement that an undertaking should 
negotiate interconnection agreements if so the entitled party requires. The NRA may 
require that the undertaking with SMP should meet “reasonable requests for access … 
inter alia in situations where it considers that denial of access or unreasonable terms 
and conditions having similar effect would hinder emergence of a sustainable 
competitive market at the retail level, or would not be in the end-user’s interest.”83 
The NRA can accompany the obligation to interconnect by conditions covering 
fairness, reasonableness and timeliness. Under this heading, the NRA might, for 
example, impose strict time limits for negotiating interconnection an agreement or 
formulate certain conditions to be included in the agreement. 
It is also interesting to note that the Access Directive allows NRAs to factor in 
longer-term considerations, such as “the initial investment by the facility owner, 
bearing in mind the risks involved in making the investment” and “the need to 
safeguard competition in the long term.”84 This marks a departure from the old ONP 
framework, as well as from competition law, both of which tend to focus more on the 
short term (and thereby favour so-called “service competition” at the expense of 
“infrastructure competition”). 
 
• Price control and cost accounting85  
According to the Access Directive, price control and cost accounting as a remedy 
should be resorted to when a lack of competition makes it possible for an SMP 
                                                 
82 Ibid., Article 12. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid., Article 12(2)(c) and (d). 
85 Ibid., Article 13. 
 45 
operator to maintain excessively high prices or apply a price squeeze, that is, further 
distort price competition to the detriment of end-users. 
This remedy can be implemented by national regulators in a variety of ways as will 
be seen later in the comparative survey of the national approaches. Interconnection 
prices can be regulated by direct imposition of tariffs, or by using price caps, best 
practices (benchmarking), and other pricing methods on the basis of which SMP 
undertakings are required to adjust their charges.  
Price control is supported by the requirement of cost orientation and cost accounting. 
Indeed cost orientation is the basic principle for pricing remedies, according to the 
Directive. Cost-oriented pricing must allow a reasonable return on the adequate 
capital employed. The Access Directive leaves the issue of choosing the method of 
cost recovery to the NRAs; here as well, it allows NRAs to take a longer-term view 
(favourable to “infrastructure competition”), since the remedy should be “appropriate 
to the circumstances taking into account of the need to promote efficiency and 
sustainable competition and maximise consumer benefits.”86 
NRAs can authorise a particular cost recovery system to be used by SMP 
undertakings and monitor compliance by means of an audit. The cost accounting 
methodology is not uniform. It may differ significantly from one Member State to an 
other since a wide spectrum of cost accounting systems has been developed for this 
purpose using differing cost bases (e.g., historic, current, forward-looking, best 
practices) and cost standards (e.g., FDC, LRAIC, LRIC, ECD).87 Which cost 
accounting methodology is the most appropriate one for determining of termination 
rates remains a matter of controversy.88  
 
 
                                                 
86 Ibid. 
87 See Annex 2, Table 2, Eighth Report from the Commission on the Implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Packages, European telecoms regulation and markets 2002, 
03.12. 2002  
88 Samarajiva, Melody & Srivastava (2000), p. 20. 
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• Other obligations89 
Regulatory obligations envisaged by the Access Directive are meant to operate as a 
exhaustive set.90 In exceptional cases, however, ex ante obligations which are not 
explicitly listed in the Access Directive can be imposed by the NRAs but only after 
specific approval of the decision by the Commission.   
 
The ex ante obligations are listed in the Access Directive in accordance with the weight 
of their regulatory burden on the undertakings. Thus, the regulation of interconnection 
charges seems to constitute one of the heaviest regulatory measures in particular where 
this remedy takes the form of the requirement that interconnection tariffs are cost-
oriented.91  
 
Overall, the Access Directive is not very explicit on the issue of what sort of obligation 
among those envisaged by it should be preferred to remedy a particular problem related 
to interconnection. NRAs of the different Member States may have divergent views on 
what remedy will be the most appropriate and proportionate in the national 
circumstances.92 To ensure that this flexibility does not endanger uniformity in the 
application of the new regulatory framework across the Community, the European 
Regulators Group (regrouping all National Regulatory Authorities (NRAs) designated 
under the new framework) recently issued a Common Position on the approach to 
appropriate remedies in the new regulatory framework.93 The ERG elaborated this 
document in close contact with the Commission and consulted interested parties. 
 
In its Common Position, the ERG outlines which remedies appear suitable to deal with 
the various competition problems identified in the electronic communications, among 
                                                 
89 Access Directive, Article 8 (3). 
90 Ibid., Recital 4.  
91 Ibid., Recital 20. 
92 On the different national approaches (including overview of the conceptual differences) to 
regulation of interconnection, see Freund and Ruhle (2002).  
93 ERG (2004). 
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which excessive pricing in “termination markets”.94 The ERG is of the opinion that 
transparency or non-discrimination obligations cannot suffice to address the competition 
problems at play on termination markets, and concludes that only price control 
obligations (i.e. cost-orientation) will do. It then suggests to apply a price cap or a glide 
path on the way to cost-oriented termination tariffs, in order to mitigate the shock to the 
operators. It also indicates that new entrants might benefit from a limited “grace period”. 
 
Procedural provisions related to imposition of ex ante obligations on SMP operators 
 
The NRAs are under an obligation to notify the Commission of the names of 
undertakings designated as undertaking with SMP and the specific obligations imposed 
on them.95 This is to enable the Commission to ensure the proper application of 
Community law.96  
 
According to the Framework Directive, decisions of NRAs concerning SMP designation 
and imposition of ex ante remedies are subject to an effective review of the merits 
(appeal) by the independent body which may or may not be a judicial instance.97 The 
decision of a non-judicial body should always contain written reasons and be subject to 
further review by a court or tribunal which has a right to refer preliminary questions for 
the interpretation of EC law to the ECJ under Article 234 EC. Member States are required 
to ensure that the body entrusted with review functions should have the appropriate 
expertise to perform an effective review.  
                                                 
94 Ibid. at pp. 114 ff. The ERG Common Position places “termination” on the same footing as the 
main heads of competition problems, i.e. “vertical leveraging”, “horizontal leveraging” and 
“single market dominance”. 
95 Access Directive, Article 16.  
96 Ibid., Rec. 25. 
97 Framework Directive, Article 4. 
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3.4 Concluding remarks 
 
The above overview describes the preconditions for sector-specific regulatory 
intervention in the electronic communications markets, the arsenal of ex ante remedies 
which can be employed by NRAs to address interconnection problems, in particular, high 
tariffs for fixed to mobile interconnection, and the procedure of their imposition. Chapter 
4 includes a survey of the experience and approaches of the Dutch, UK, and Australian 




4. The relevant market and the central policy issue 
 
In this chapter, we will fill in the framework that was described in chapter 3. This chapter 
summarizes and discusses the current policy debate on mobile call termination. In 
particular, it discusses the definition of the relevant market and addresses the question 
whether mobile operators have market power with respect to termination access – the 
question whether exercising market power can be seen as undesirable (from a welfare 
perspective) will be treated in subsequent chapters. 
 
This chapter is organized as follows. Chapter 4 summarizes and discusses the recent 
policy debate on mobile call termination. In particular, it addresses the question whether 
mobile operators have market power with respect to termination access – the question 
whether exercising market power is bad for welfare or consumers will be treated in 
subsequent chapters. It is organized as follows. Section 4.1 introduces the antitrust notion 
of defining the relevant market, which is the usual starting point for policy makers. Using 
the recent policy discussion in the United Kingdom (UK) as a general example, section 
4.2 applies the concept of market definition to mobile call termination and discusses 
whether mobile operators have market power. Section 4.3 describes similar debates that 
have taken place in the Netherlands and in Australia. Section 4.4 concludes the chapter 
by pointing out that the exercise of market definition should not automatically lead to the 





4.1 The concept of market definition 
 
As we have seen, a central issue in policy debates is whether mobile operators have 
‘excessive’ market power with respect to termination access. Since competition 
authorities (by definition) tend to focus on the presence of monopoly power, and typically 
do this by starting with a market-definition exercise, it is useful to provide some 
background on monopoly power and market definition.98 Let us note already here, 
however, that market power in itself is not undesirable from a welfare-perspective, as it 
provides firms with incentives to invest and enter markets in the first place. Policy 
makers and authorities, unfortunately, are not very precise about the point where things 
start to go wrong. In the conclusion of this chapter, we will propose a theoretical 
benchmark to draw the line between desirable and excessive levels of market power. 
 
From a logical viewpoint, market definition is the first step of antitrust analysis. Defining 
the relevant market is typically done by determining (i) the products that compete with 
each other; and (ii) the geographical scope of the market. Without defining the market, it 
is impossible to calculate rough indicators such as market shares and concentration 
indices.  
 
The Commission Notice on the definition of relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law provides guidance as to how the European Commission 
                                                 
98 It is sometimes said, in an informal way, that terminating access can be seen as a ‘bottleneck’. 
For example, Armstrong (2002) coined the term ‘competitive bottlenecks’ in this context. This 
terminology is related to the ‘essential facilities doctrine’ in antitrust, which says that a dominant 
firm must provide mandatory access to an essential input to its downstream competitors at a non-
discriminatory price (Bergman, 2001). Landgrebe (2002) argues that if there is a ‘terminating 
monopoly’ on mobile networks, this is (from a formal viewpoint) not due to bottleneck 
characteristics or large sunk costs, so that there is no basis to apply the essential-facilities 
doctrine. 
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applies market definition.99 According to the Commission Notice, the objective of market 
definition is to identify the competitors of a particular firm that have the power to 
constrain that firm’s behavior and prevent it from behaving independently of competitive 
pressure, or shorter, to identigy competitive constraints on a firm. The definition of the 
relevant market is performed in two dimensions: the product and the geographical 
dimension. In the Commission Notice, the relevant product market is formally defined as 
follows: 
 
“A relevant product market comprises all those products and/or services which are 
regarded as interchangeable or substitutable by the consumer, by reason of the 
product’s characteristics, their prices and their intended use”, 
 
and the relevant geographical market is defined as: 
 
“The relevant geographical market comprises the area in which the undertakings 
concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in 
which the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can 
be distinguished from neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition 
are appreciably different in those areas.” 
 
The Commission Notice explicitly distinguishes two types of supply substitutability, 
namely by firms already in the market and by potential entrants. Thus firms are subject to 
three sources of constraints: 
 
1. Demand substitution. Assessing this type of substitution entails the identification 
of the set of products that consumers view as substitutes. This can conceptually 
done by performing a ‘hypothetical monopolist test’, which tries to assess whether 
a hypothetical single supplier can increase its profits by a ‘small but significant 
and non-transitory increase in price’ (SSNIP) above the ‘competitive’ level, for 
                                                 
99 EC, 1997; 97/C 372/03. 
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instance a price increase in the range of 5-10% sustained during one year. If such 
a price increase is believed to be unprofitable, then close substitutes are added in a 
repeated manner until raising the price becomes profitable. The geographic extent 
of the market is determined in a similar manner, by gradually broadening the 
geographic boundaries of the market. 
2. Supply substitution. This type of substitution may occur if firms can switch 
production to the relevant products and sell them in the short run without 
incurring substantial costs of adjustment or time delay. The additional output may 
have a disciplinary effect on competition similar to the demand substitution effect. 
3. Potential competition. Assessing this source of competitive constraint should 
initially not be taken into account when defining the relevant market. However, if 
the position of a firm gives rise to competition concerns, then potential 
competition as a disciplining force should be assessed subsequently. 
 
Note that in itself, the exercise of market definition ion the basis of a SSNIP test alone 
does not say much about the presence of entry barriers and market power. Such issues are 
addressed by analyzing supply substitution and potential competition. Interestingly, 
according to Harbord and Von Graevenitz (2000) the SSNIP test is hardly carried out in 
practice by competition authorities. This is possibly due to the fact that market data are 
difficult to obtain. As an informal illustration of the SSNIP test mentioned in the 
description of the first constraint, consider an example from the Netherlands: 
 
“At the beginning of 2001, KPN Mobile lowered its mobile termination charges 
by almost 25%. But the other four mobile network operators did not respond by 
lowering their prices the same amount. The other operators held their mobile 
termination charges at their existing high levels. This might indicate that there 
was not significant switching from the four other mobile operators to KPN. [...] 
After three months KPN reversed their action, bringing their mobile termination 
charges back to their previous high level. This event may be interpreted as a 
reverse SSNIP – or ‘hypothetical monopolist test’. The other four mobile 
operators were not forced to react to the sharp decline of KPN and were able to 
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maintain their high mobile termination charges without any significant losses, 
suggesting that their termination charges were not in the same market.”  
(Dutch submission as quoted in OECD, 2004, p. 141) 
 
It is important to note that defining the market may be complex and may lead to 
confusion, as was already pointed out by Fisher (1979): 
 
“[...] answering it [the question of what is the relevant market] in a sensible way 
can be an aid to analysis. The fundamental question is that of the constraints on 
power. Focusing on the question of relevant market can often lead to losing sight 
of that fact.”  
(Fisher, 1979, p. 16) 
 
Fisher (1979, p. 13) defines monopoly power as “the ability to act in an unconstrained 
way”. As a consequence, the relevant market has to include “those products and services 
and firms whose presence and actions can serve as a constraint on the policies of the 
alleged monopolist” (p. 13). Hence the essence of market definition is an assessment the 
forces that impose discipline on the alleged monopolist. According to Fisher, the 
constraints on the alleged monopolist can be of two types – note that he includes 
‘potential competition’, the third constraint in the definition of the EC, under the heading 
of ‘supply substitutability: 
 
1. Demand substitutability: the ability or ease of customers of the alleged 
monopolist to switch to substitutes (given actually encountered prices). 
2. Supply substitutability: the ability or ease of other firms (either inside or outside 
the market) to produce a good similar to the one sold by the alleged monopolist. 
 
In practice some confusion can arise if the hypothetical monopolist test is not correctly 
applied (Harbord and Von Graevenitz, 2000). For instance, as Gual (2004) asks, when are 
two distinct goods considered to be sufficiently close substitutes? The cut-off level is, at 
least, subjective, and in many cases one has to depend on survey data rather than 
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quantitative data. Also, how should one deal with strong complementarities in demand? 
Although such complementarities should not automatically lead to a market definition at 
the level of bundles of goods, they should probably be taken into account. In general, a 
correct implementation of the SSNIP test must take into account any constraints on the 
alleged monopolist. One may expect, though, that competition authorities will do that and 
not fall into traps.100  
 
In the next section we will discuss a prominent case of market definition related to 
mobile call termination. One should keep in mind, however, that the particularities of 
market definition should not distract policy makers from what it is all about: assessing 
whether there is a market failure that significantly distorts welfare. That is the topic of 
later chapters. 
 
                                                 
100 However, this may be too optimistic. After all the SSNIP test was not meant to deal with 
markets with externalities – or maybe not even complementarities. 
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4.2 The assessment of monopoly power, with an illustration from the UK 
 
Market parties, regulators and competition authorities typically agree that in the situation 
at hand, the relevant geographical market is the country in which mobile operators 
compete.101 Operators need nationally issued licenses to build and operate mobile 
networks. These licenses, and hence also the networks, are limited to national boundaries, 
and operators that are internationally active target national markets separately. We note 
that in general, it may not be easy to define the geographical market, but that this case is 
rather clear-cut (see also the Notice on Relevant Market Definition102). Because of the 
uncontroversial nature of geographical market definition, this subsection focuses on the 
definition of the relevant product market. 
 
Contrary to the geographical dimension, the definition of the relevant product market has 
given rise to a lot of discussion. The apparent controversy may partly103 be caused by the 
fact that on the one hand, the reflex of competition authorities and regulators, when they 
observe prices that are substantially above marginal costs, is to raise the alarm and 
perhaps intervene just because of the observed mark-ups. On the other hand, given the 
characteristics of the market it may be the case that high mark-ups are a natural outcome 
of the process of competition, without harm to welfare. It may therefore happen that the 
authorities want to ‘restore’ prices close to cost levels, while others (market parties, 
economists) see such an intervention as a distortion of competition and possibly also 
welfare. One should therefore keep in mind that the outcome of the market definition and 
analysis exercise in itself may not provide sufficient conditions for regulatory 
intervention (that is, the presence of monopoly power in a certain, partial market need not 
be problematic). Hence, later we will complete the picture by adopting a welfare 
viewpoint. 
                                                 
101 See e.g. CC (2003, ch. 6, p. 97), NMa (2002), and Frontier Economics (2003). 
102 Notice on the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Community competition 
law [1997] OJ C 372/5. 
103 Of course, the main cause is that firms dislike any intervention that may lead to lower profits. 
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Recall from chapter 3 that in its Recommendation on relevant product and service 
markets, the European Commission designated the wholesale market for call termination 
on individual mobile networks as a relevant market in which ex ante regulation may be 
justified, given the market characteristics.104 This market definition has also been 
recommended by the Independent Regulators Group (IRG) in the process leading to the 
new regulatory framework of communications markets in the EU.105 According to the 
IRG, mobile call termination markets in member states have very similar characteristics 
and competitive conditions (although they depend on current circumstances). 
Nevertheless the national regulatory authorities in the member states have to assess 
themselves whether they see a need to intervene. 
 
Market parties that want to avoid regulatory intervention have an incentive to claim that 
the relevant market is broad, so that it includes many substitution possibilities for 
consumers. In the UK for instance, operators argued that there is an overall market for 
mobile services; according to O2, Vodafone, Orange, and T-Mobile, call termination is 
just one element of a bundle of services.106 In Australia, similar claims have been 
made.107 In a similar spirit, Gual (2004) argues call termination is purchased as a part of a 
bundle of other mobile services, such as call origination and SMS.108 However, this type 
                                                 
104 Commission Recommendation of 11/02/2003 On Relevant Product and Service Markets 
within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with 
Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communication networks and services; C(2003)497. 
105 See IRG (2004). 
106 CC (2003, par. 2.76, p. 29). 
107 “Complementarities in production and demand mean it is inappropriate to define the relevant 
market as the wholesale market for either mobile termination services, or mobile originating 
services alone”, Frontier Economics (2003, p. 10). 
108 As a consequence, it may be optimal for firms offering a system of services to charge high 
mark-ups for services with inelastic demand. Hence, the occurrence of such mark-ups for 
individual services does not automatically signal that there is substantial market power. 
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of reasoning may be problematic as it ignores that because of CPP, call termination is a 
wholesale service that is not part of any bundle of mobile services purchased by end-
users. It is a fixed operator who purchases fixed-to-mobile call termination wholesale, 
and mobile operators who buy mobile-to-mobile call termination wholesale – not a 
mobile customer in the retail market. A consumer that makes a call to a mobile user just 
buys an off-net telephone call (the call termination service is a wholesale ingredient to 
make this type of call possible).109 Therefore, even if one accepts that there is a single 
mobile market where operators compete fiercely by offering service bundles in the retail 
market, call termination is not an element of these bundles. Hence it may not be subject 
to the same intensity of competition as the bundles in the retail market. 
 
Operators also tend to claim that there is a single, national market for the provision of all 
mobile services, which is highly competitive. BT argues, for instance, that mobile and 
fixed telephony constitute the relevant market.110 In general, operators tend to claim that 
there is a single, national market for the provision of all mobile services. Overall, the 
claims that there is a large and competitive mobile market, so that there cannot be a 
problem with call termination, ignores the possibility that mobile operators may not face 
any constraints when they set wholesale prices for termination access. 
 
In a case deferred to the Competition Commission (CC) in the UK, an extensive analysis 
based on empirical market research, apparently with sufficient depth and quality, on 
                                                 
109 It should be mentioned that the services bundle purchased by end-users includes the possibility 
of receiving calls from fixed lines. A relevant issue, which will be discussed later, is how much 
mobile users care about this (i.e., how much mobile operators may be constrained in their pricing 
of termination by consideration of this call externality). Moreover, the externality argument is not 
necessarily one that laissez-faire supporters may wish to push too far, since it is a traditional 
argument for regulation. 
110 CC (2003, ch. 6, p. 98). [check if formulation is perhaps that fixed and mobile are in the same 
market?] 
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mobile termination access has taken place.111 To structure the discussion, we will go 
through the arguments of the CC. Nevertheless, the structure of the discussion below is 
quite general and applies to any country with a CPP regime, that is, to all countries in the 
EU. The analysis and conclusion corresponds to the recommendation on relevant markets 
made by the EC (see chapter 3). 
 
The box below contains a description of the policy process in the UK. It can be skipped 
by readers who are primarily interested in the economic argumentation by the CC. 
 
Box: Survey of the policy process in the UK. 
 
In the UK, the Office of Communications (Ofcom) recently replaced Oftel as the independent 
authority in charge of implementation of policy in telecommunications sector. The new European 
Framework was implemented in the UK by the Communications Act 2003,112 which essentially 
replaced the Telecommunications Act 1984.113 Under the new Framework and the 
Communications Act, certain conditions can be attached to (mobile) operators with regard to 
interconnection following the procedure of market analyses provided by the Access and the 
Framework Directives. Oftel was the first European NRA to address interconnection of mobile 
networks, under the old legislative framework. This proved a long and complex procedure. Its 
successor Ofcom revisited the issue under the new framework. The actions of Oftel and Ofcom 
will be reviewed in turn. 
 
Under the old framework of the Telecommunications Act 1984,114 Oftel was empowered to 
modify licencing conditions provided that the affected operators do not object. In case of 
                                                 
111 The origin of the case was Oftel’s Review on charge control on calls to mobiles, 26 September 
2001. 
112 2003, ch. 21. It is available at http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts2003/ 
20030021.htm 
113 1984, ch. 12. 
114 Sections 12 and 12A, Telecommunications Act 1984.  
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operators disagreeing with those modifications, Oftel had to refer the issues to the Competition 
Commission (CC) which issued a report.115 If the latter found that modifications are justified in 
the public interest, Oftel could proceed with the modifications notwithstanding the operators’ 
                                                                                                                                                 
115 Section 13, ibid. 
116 Oftel Review of the charge control on calls to mobiles, 26 September 2001. 
117 Ibid, Oftel Review ..., Chapter 2 and, in particular, para. 2.49, p. 12. 
118 ‘In defining a separate market for termination on each network, Oftel is not classifying 
termination as a “bottleneck”, where that term is interpreted as meaning that substitution 
possibilities do not, and never will, exist’, para 4.17, Oftel Review. 
119 Ibid, Chapter 6.  
120 See Oftel Press Release, 12 December 2001.    
121 I.e., the date of the entry into force of the new EC framework abolishing the licensing 
procedure.  
122 T-Mobile (UK) Ltd and others v. Competition Commission and Director-General 
Telecommunications, High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Queen’s Bench Division), 
[2003] EWHS 1555 (Admin), Case Nos. CO/1192/03, CO/1308/03, CO/1536/03, 27 June 2003.  
123Article 9 (3), para. 1 speaks about powers of the NRAs to intervene ex officio to lay down 
specific conditions to be observed by parties to an interconnection agreement. Para. 2 list in a 
non-exhaustively way such specific conditions, including those ‘designed to ensure effective 
competition, technical conditions, tariff...’.   
124 Case C-79/00 Telefónica de Espana SA [2001] ECR I-10075. 
125 Paras. 55-61, T-Mobile (UK) Ltd and others v. Competition Commission and Director-General 
Telecommunications, High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Queens Bench Division), 
[2003] EWHS 1555 (Admin), Case No: CO/1192/03, CO/1308/03, CO/1536/03, 27 June 2003. 
126 Ibid, paras.101 ff. 
127 http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home, file number UK/2003/0040. 
128 Document SG-Greffe (2004) D/200489, available at http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/ 
infso/ecctf/home, file number UK/2003/0040. 
129 Available at http://forum.europa.eu.int/Public/irc/infso/ecctf/home, under the file number 
UK/2003/0040, as well as at http://www.ofcom.org.uk. 
130 Ofcom argued that “the lack of evidence of excessive charging, combined with the modest 
effect any charges have on consumers as a whole, mean that it would be disproportionate to 
impose ex ante obligations on 3G voice call termination at this time.” (at para 5.31). 
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objections. Oftel was formally not bound by the CC Report. Telecom operators could bring an 
appeal against Oftel’s decision modifying their licences to the High Court.    
 
Oftel tackled the problem of high mobile termination charges by using its powers to modify 
conditions of individual licences granted to mobile operators. The exercise of these powers was 
based directly on old Licening Directive 97/13 and the provisions of the Telecommunications Act 
1984. It was not conditioned by prior designation of a telecom operator as an operator with SMP. 
 
Prior to the current regulation of mobile termination charges, Oftel had already maintained price 
control based on charge caps (Retail Price Index (RPI) - 9% ) on the wholesale mobile 
termination charges of two mobile operators, BTCellnet and Vodafone. In anticipation of the 
expiration of this price control regime, which was in place from 1999 to 2002, Oftel conducted a 
new review of the mobile termination charges which resulted in the conclusion that they were 
excessively above cost.116 The cost of calls was assessed using LRIC as a standard. Oftel 
established that the ‘calling party pays’ convention adopted in the telecoms industry seemed to 
present one of the major obstacles for increasing competitive restraints on call termination 
charges117 and that it was unlikely, mainly due to technological hurdles, that new competitive 
pressure would emerge. It is noteworthy that, even though Oftel defined mobile call termination 
on each mobile networks as a separate market, it did not see call termination in terms of a 
‘bottleneck’.118 Having considered various solutions, Oftel advocated a price cap mechanism as 
the most appropriate remedy to address the lack of competition in the mobile call termination 
market.119 Not surprisingly, it proposed modifications to the licences of all four largest mobile 
operators reflecting a price control mechanism over interconnection charges in the form of price 
caps RPI-12% annually until March 2006.120 Following operators’ opposition, Oftel made a 
reference to the Competition Commission that issued its report in December 2002. Oftel followed 
the recommendation of the CC, namely that call termination on an individual mobile operator’s 
network represents a separate market in which it holds a monopoly, and modified the licence 
conditions for the mobile operators on 4 April 2003. Moreover, by its Continuation Notice, Oftel 
proposed to extend the price cap regulation of mobile termination charges to the period beyond 
25 July 2003121 until its completion of the market review required under the new European 
Framework. T-mobile, Vodafone, and Orange subsequently appealed against both the 
Competition Commission’s recommendation and Oftel’s licence modifications to the High Court. 
In brief, the claimants challenged the decisions of the CC and Oftel on a number of grounds. The 
most important of these were, firstly, that the price control of mobile termination charges of 
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mobile operators which had not previously been designated as operators with SMP was unlawful 
and, secondly, that the continuation of price regulation after the new European framework entered 
into force was contrary to the relevant EC Directives.  
 
On 27 June 2003, the High Court handed down the judgement dismissing the appeal in its 
entirety.122 In particular, the judge held that Oftel did not lack a general power to regulate mobile 
termination tariffs of telecom operators without significant market power. He specifically relied 
on Article 9 (3) of Interconnection Directive 97/33123 and the ECJ’s judgement in Telefónica de 
Espana124 in support of his conclusion.125 With regard to the legitimacy of the Oftel’s 
Continuation Notice, the court considered that that Article 7(6) of the Access Directive would 
permitted Oftel to take urgent measures related to price regulation, bypassing the process of 
designating of an operator as a SMP operator.126   
  
Under the new framework, Ofcom was one of the first NRAs to conduct the market definition and 
analysis exercise under the revised SMP procedure provided for in the new EC regulatory 
framework. Ofcom (then still Oftel) sent a Consultation Document on Wholesale Mobile Voice 
Call Termination to the Commission on 12 December 2003,127 to which the Commission replied 
with comments on 5 February 2004.128 In the light thereof, Ofcom proceeded to adopt a definitive 
Statement on 1 June 2004.129 The Statement does not introduce many substantive changes, when 
compared to the previous situation as described under the previous heading. Ofcom identified six 
relevant markets, one for each mobile communications network. It then found that each operator 
enjoyed SMP on its respective relevant market, with negative economic consequences. Ofcom 
decided not to impose any remedies as regards termination on 3G networks.130 The established 
2G network operators (Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile) were made subject to obligations 
regarding the provision of termination upon request, non-discrimination, notification of price 
changes and, most importantly, price control by way of an obligation to lower termination 




Given that we are interested in call termination on mobile networks, and that mobile 
networks are interconnected with fixed networks, we will not only consider mobile 
subscribers, but fixed users as well in the discussion that follows. The distinction between 
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mobile and fixed users making calls to mobile users is important, as in practice, 
especially fixed users’ prices for calls to mobiles happen to be inflated. Without the 
existence of a fixed segment of users making calls to mobile users, the policy problem 
would be less prominent (the economic theory discussed in chapter 5 provides intuition 
about this observation). 
 
With regard to substitution possibilities on the demand-side, it should be noted that one 
has to consider both fixed and mobile users, since both types of users can make calls to 
mobile subscribers.131 Two cases can be distinguished. At the wholesale level, an 
operator wishing to pass on a call to a particular operator cannot circumvent call 
termination at that operator’s network, and therefore must purchase the termination 
service from that operator. Thus, an operator wishing to establish a connection with an 
off-net customer cannot rely on its own or a third operator’s network to reach a mobile 
customer. At the retail level on the demand side, there do exist possibilities for 
substitution. Fixed subscribers may have alternative ways of reaching a mobile user, such 
as using their own mobile phone (if they have one) to initiate the call, sending a text 
message (SMS), trying to reach the user over a fixed line, and asking the mobile user to 
call back. Even though there is evidence that this type of substitution takes place (see also 
Crandall and Sidak, 2004), these options, however, are not complete substitutes (see also 
Valletti, 2003). A seeming contender for demand-side substitution is the option to use a 
mobile phone instead of a fixed line, to make a call to a mobile number.132 This requires 
that the fixed subscriber subscribe to a mobile operator as well, however. While 
penetration levels of mobile telephony may have been inadequate in the past, one would 
                                                 
131 Note that in practice, mobile termination charges may not distinguish between the origin of an 
incoming call (i.e., mobile operators do not price discriminate at the wholesale level, based on the 
identity of callers). Nevertheless, at the retail level, fixed callers may pay very different prices for 
calls to mobiles than mobile callers. 
132 Retail prices for mobile-to-mobile calls are sometimes significantly lower than those for fixed-
to-mobile calls, depending on the type of mobile subscription. 
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expect that this option for substitution plays a significant role at present.133 Nevertheless, 
a customer survey commissioned by CC (2003) suggests that this is not the case, even if 
callers are aware of the incurred cost of making a call to a mobile user.134 Apparently 
there is a significant lack of price sensitivity among consumers paying for mobile and 
fixed telephone services. A possible explanation is that the ability to immediately reach 
someone is a prominent element in the demand for calling a mobile user (CC, 2003; par. 
2.145, p. 44). Alternatively, for many consumers there may be no (significant) price 
difference between calling from a mobile phone or from a fixed line. 
 
The alternative ways of reaching a mobile user apparently do not add much weight in 
constraining wholesale prices for termination access. Sending a text message will often 
be inferior to talking over the phone – instantly speaking and listening over a two-way 
connection. Also, mobile users often cannot be reached through fixed connections, since 
they may happen to be in an area where there are no fixed connections available (e.g. in a 
car or in a rural area). Therefore, fixed-to-fixed calls provide a substitute only if certain 
conditions are satisfied, for instance the condition that the calling party is willing to wait 
until the mobile user can be reached through a fixed line (Crandall and Sidak, 2004). 
Moreover, the calling party may be clueless about which fixed number to call.135 Finally, 
callback requires the cooperation of the called party, which is not evident as it involves a 
additional, time-consuming effort (and a financial burden). Overall, these partial 
substitutes do not generate sufficient countervailing buyer power, according to CC 
(2003). 
 
Related to substitution possibilities on the demand side is the fact that the CPP principle 
precludes mobile users from caring about the tariffs for termination access. Based on 
various surveys commissioned by CC, Oftel and mobile operators, CC (2003) reports that 
                                                 
133 Recall from the introduction that the average penetration rate in Europe increased from 18% in 
1998 to 81% in 2003. 
134 Appendix 6.2, Section 6.4 in CC (2003). 
135 Exceptions occur if the mobile user is, for instance, at home or at work, and in the proximity 
of a line of which the caller knows the number. 
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mobile users are hardly or not concerned about incoming call costs when they choose a 
network. They care most about the price they have to pay to make calls themselves and 
the quality of the network – they principally focus on the value for money that they get 
when purchasing a subscription. Furthermore, customers’ awareness of the particular 
mobile network they are calling is limited, and is likely to reduce because of number 
portability. Their knowledge of the different tariffs (both actual and relative prices) for 
various types of calls, such as off-net calls to mobile users originating from fixed and 
mobile networks, is also limited. For example, a large majority of customers do not know 
what they pay for a call from a fixed to a mobile phone, while a minority has only an 
approximate idea of the cost. Also, if mobile operators pass on the revenues from call 
termination to their own customers through lower prices (which is realistic if they 
compete fiercely to attract subscribers), then mobile users have an incentive to choose the 
operator charging the highest access price. Thus, intense competition in the mobile retail 
market may actually push access tariffs upwards. Some mobile users, however, may 
dislike high access charges, such as large companies and families, whose employees or 
members may have ‘repeat calling relationships’.136 Empirical evidence, however, 
suggests that residential users are hardly concerned with the cost of incoming calls 
incurred by relatives, nor do many people join the same network as their friends and 
family. Large corporate customers typically negotiate a joint contract for all their 
employees with a mobile operator, so that a large part of the calls they make remain on-
net. Overall, according to CC (2003), there is not enough price sensitivity to push access 
prices sufficiently downward. To a large extent this is due to the fact that competition on 
the mobile market does not constrain operators’ access prices (chapter 5 discusses this 
issue in detail). 
 
In response to high prices, fixed callers will typically shorten the length of their calls to 
mobile users, so that (depending on the price elasticity of demand) mobile operators may 
lose revenues from call termination on their networks. Crandall and Sidak (2004) suggest 
that the recognition of the potential fall in profits will moderate the pricing of access 
                                                 
136 Also called ‘closed user groups’. 
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prices, that is, a potential reduction in demand will prevent a firm from setting excessive 
prices. This is true only to the extent that a monopolist, in order to maximize profits, will 
set its price such that marginal costs equal marginal revenues, but not higher – a 
monopolist does not have incentives to set its price above the monopoly level. Thus, 
despite its underlying logic, this type of argument does not say anything about constraints 
on in the sense of preventing a firm from acting like a monopolist. 
 
With regard to supply-side substitution possibilities, one has to assess whether other 
firms step in to offer the call termination service. To make this possible, there must be 
alternative means, in particular a connection over an alternative mobile network, by 
which a call to a mobile user can be terminated. This, in turn, requires the possibility for 
mobile users to have more than one subscription and switch between phones or (in case 
of a single phone) between SIM cards, or alternatively, use a ‘multiple-SIM’ card. 
However, even if a mobile user owning a single phone would subscribe to several 
operators, usually only one SIM card at a time can be slotted into a phone.137 Hence, even 
assuming that there is no SIM locking (which would make switching between cards 
impossible), a mobile user can often only be reached through the operator whose SIM 
card happens to be in use. Even if mobile users happen to have a mobile phone which has 
space for two SIM cards (making switching between operators easier), they have little 
incentives to do so because of the CPP regime. Therefore, supply-side substitution 
requires the possibility of a mechanism that induces a mobile phone to switch networks 
automatically. Without incurring substantial costs or time delay, at present there exist no 
such technological solution that is both practical and commercially viable. Therefore, 
alternatives that make supply-side substitution possible are not likely to come into 
existence in the sufficiently near future. Note in addition that operators are probably not 
in a hurry to introduce services or technologies that would cannibalize the revenues from 
call termination. Overall, supply substitution seems unlikely at present, or at best very 
limited, while the development of technological solutions to achieve this type of 
                                                 
137 Oftel (2001) suggests that multiple SIM cards are possible in Italy, Finland and Portugal. 
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substitution is uncertain (see also Valletti, 2003, Crandall and Sidak, 2004, and Newbery, 
2004).138 
 
Summarizing the discussion on the assessment of monopoly power, the CC concluded 
that there are insufficient substitution possibilities at present, such as (at the supply side) 
technological means of terminating calls other than to the network that a mobile user 
subscribes to, or (at the demand side) substitute services for calling a mobile user. In 
addition, incoming call costs have little priority for most mobile users. Quite to the 
contrary, if competition in the overall mobile market is intense, then mobile operators are 
induced to pass on the revenues from call termination to their own customers. This 
mechanism actually drives up access prices, since mobile users will de facto prefer 
operators charging high access price for incoming traffic. It is also important to point out 
that that fixed operators are usually regulated so that they do not have countervailing 
bargaining power with respect to the determination of access prices.139 Accordingly, a 
sensible conclusion is that mobile operators do not face downward competitive pressure 
on termination access prices. 
 
Consequently, according to the CC, termination of voice calls on each of the networks of 
O2, Vodafone, Orange, and T-Mobile constitutes a separate market, and that on each of 
these wholesale markets, the respective operator has 100% market share. Note that this 
implies that each operator has a dominant position on its own network with respect to 
termination access. It should be noted that this conclusion does not seem to be specific 
for the UK, but is quite general (even though it may depend on country-specific 
characteristics). See the following section for other countries.  
                                                 
138 In section 6.2.3 we will discuss this issue in more detail; a technological solution may be 
closer than is suggested here. 
139 If fixed and mobile operators would have equal bargaining power, for instance because 
regulation were symmetric or fixed access price were not regulated, then mobile operators’ 
tendency to exercise market power might be reduced, since fixed operators would have the power 
to retaliate (Wright 2002; Crandall and Sidak, 2003). 
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Recall from chapter 3 that the EU regulatory framework is based on an ex ante 
perspective, so that evidence of abuse (i.e., use of monopoly power) is not necessary. It is 
sufficient to motivate the risk of abuse. Nevertheless, let us give a brief, informal 
assessment of the likelihood of ‘abuse’: do mobile operators actually exercise market 
power stemming from their monopoly positions in the markets for call termination? We 
have seen that there are no mechanisms (in particular demand and supply-side 
substitution possibilities, including potential entry), that prevent mobile operators from 
setting termination access prices above underlying cost levels. Simple and intuitive 
economic models (see chapter 5) readily confirm that, at least in theory, mobile operators 
will set access prices at monopoly levels or even higher than that (with regard to the 
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls). Chapter 1 provided some estimates of mark-ups in 
access prices, which were quite high compared to marginal cost levels. Overall, it seems 
safe to assume that prices above the level in a competitive wholesale market for 
termination access are being sustained.140 
 
The view that termination access and the application of CPP give rise to a monopoly 
seems to be widely accepted by economists (see e.g. Newbery, 2004), sometimes 
implicitly through modeling choices (see e.g. Armstrong, 2002, and Wright, 2002, which 
will be discussed later) and sometimes more explicitly (see e.g. Valletti, 2003). An 
exception is Hausman (2002), who argues that if a ‘problem’ (that requires a regulatory 
intervention) exists, it is due to ignorance on the part of fixed users about the prices 
charged for terminating calls to mobile networks (given that there is a CPP regime). Note, 
however, that the arguments above depend only to a small extent on customer ignorance, 
while they nevertheless point at the existence of monopoly power. It is therefore not clear 
why ignorance would be a necessary condition for the existence of a policy problem.141  
                                                 
140 In chapter 6, we will come back to what is (or can) be meant with the competitive level of 
prices. 
141 Unfortunately, Hausman does not dig into this issue any deeper. Furthermore, according to 
Hausman, customer ignorance may not to a serious problem because customers receive specified 
bills and many calls are repeat calls. Even if it was a problem, Hausman argues that a 
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The outcome of the market definition carried out by the Competition Commission in the 
UK seems to be based on thorough empirical investigations. Nevertheless, the outcome 
may be a snapshot, while the problem as it is currently perceived may vanish over time, 
especially in a market with rapid changes related to both technology (e.g. multiple SIM 
cards) as well as usage patterns (e.g. fixed-mobile substitution). One should keep in mind 
though, as will be discussed later, for a welfare analysis and a discussion of potential 
remedies, the actual definition of the market is not directly relevant. 
 
Even though the relevant market may be defined somewhat differently in different 
countries and at different moments, a fact remains that the application of CPP introduces 
a distortion because of perverse incentives. Mobile operators who increase their 
termination charges do not increase their own costs, but those of other operators, of 
which some do not compete with them (fixed operators). At a more abstract level, one 
could also argue that ultimately, all market power is ‘in the hands of’ mobile users, since 
they are able to capture a larger surplus.142 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
technological solution, in particular requiring the terminating mobile network to identify itself 
(and the associated price) to the calling party, is superior to access price regulation, since the 
latter would introduce distortions. 
142 This is the case if access mark-ups lead, for instance, to handset subsidies. Such a situation 
arises if, because of intense competition in the retail market, all rents from call termination are 
dissipated. 
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4.3 Illustrations from the Netherlands and Australia 
 
In addition to the example of the UK that was presented in the box in the previous 
section, here we provide two additional country examples. 
 
4.3.1 The Netherlands 
 
The Netherlands implemented the old Telecommunications Framework with the 
Telecommunications Act of 1998 (TA) which has recently been amended to implement 
the new EC regime for electronic communications networks.143 The Dutch NRA, the 
Onafhankelijke Post en Telecommunicatie Autoriteit (OPTA), is now carrying out the 
new SMP procedure for the first time; it is at the market definition stage for the moment. 
It is too early to tell how interconnection between fixed and mobile operators, including 
mobile termination tariffs, will be treated under the new framework in the Netherlands. 
Before the new electronic communications framework was implemented, however, 
OPTA tried to deal with mobile termination tariffs under the old framework, using its 
power to settle interconnection disputes; it will be recalled that this dispute settlement 
power arises not from the SMP regime (second public policy rationale outlined at the 
outset of this chapter), but rather from the general regime concerning interconnection 
(first policy rationale). At the same time, under the Telecommunications Act of 1998, this 
dispute settlement power was to be exercised in the light of the business interests of the 
parties involved, without necessarily taking the broader public interest into account. 
 
The following discussion concerns the actions of OPTA under the old framework. The 
Telecommunications Act formerly distinguished slightly different markets for the 
designation of SMP operators, as compared with the old European Framework: besides 
                                                 
143 See the Act implementing the European regulatory framework for the electronic 
communications sector 2002 (Wet implementatie Europees regelgevingskader voor de 
elektronische communicatiesector 2002), Stb. 2004, 189.   
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the first three markets (mobile, fixed, and leased line network and services),144 it named 
the combined market for both fixed and mobile public telephone services in which a 
mobile operator can be designated as having SMP.145 As the Act omitted any reference to 
interconnection as a separate market, no mobile operator could be designated as an SMP 
operator in this market. Therefore, under the old regulatory regime, OPTA (Dutch 
regulatory authority, Independent Post and Telecommunications Authority) had no power 
to impose specific obligations associated with an SMP designation on mobile operators 
with regard to interconnection, e.g., cost orientation. However, like regulatory authorities 
in the other Member States, OPTA was concerned about the high mobile termination 
tariffs (MTA) in the case of fixed to mobile interconnection. It has therefore conducted 
an inquiry, on the basis, of which it has formulated its policy concerning mobile 
termination rates.         
 
With regard to call termination, OPTA held that it considers call termination as a 
bottleneck facility. In its view, mobile termination access is a separate market146 and 
every mobile provider holds a monopoly position on it own network.147 As on the basis of 
the current legislation OPTA is unable to designate a mobile operator as a SMP operator, 
it has instead relied firstly, on the general duty to interconnect addressed, in accordance 
with the TA, to all telecom operators and, secondly, on its dispute resolution powers to 
impose price control regulation with regard to MTA. OPTA constructed the duty to 
interconnect as a duty to which a principle of reasonableness applies. In other words, in 
OPTA’s interpretation, an obligation to interconnect includes an obligation to offer 
reasonable mobile termination tariffs (i.e., cost-oriented tariffs including a reasonable 
return). MTA tariffs which are excessively high (above costs) compared to 
                                                 
144 Article 6.4 (1) TA. 
145 Article 6.4 (2) TA. 
146 NMa, the Dutch competition authority, has come to the same conclusion in its Rapportage 
over de Marktdefenitie van het afwikkelen van gespreken op mobiele netten, NMa 01.08.2002, 
para. 80. 
147 Paras 20-22, Policy rules regarding the regulation of mobile terminating tariffs, 28 March 
2002, OPTA/IBT/2002/2200802. 
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interconnection tariffs of fixed operators cannot be considered reasonable and therefore, 
an operator who maintains them is in breach of the obligation to interconnect. 
Furthermore, MTA tariffs are part of interconnection agreements with regard to which 
OPTA has dispute resolution powers. At the request of the parties, OPTA is authorised to 
resolve disputes between operators about the conformity of their interconnection 
agreements with the law. It resolves the dispute by a decision in which it can lay down 
the rules which will become part of the interconnection agreement.148 As far as 
interconnection with mobile communications networks is concerned, OPTA was seized 
with a number of disputes between the various operators present on the Dutch market. 
Basically, it means that while OPTA, under the current Dutch law, has no power to 
regulate MTA tariffs neither by means of a general normative measure nor using a SMP 
concept, it has tried to use its ad hoc dispute resolution powers to adjust termination 
charges of mobile operators.  
 
Based on the above premises, OPTA has published Policy rules regarding the regulation 
of mobile termination tariffs in which it pointed out that it would assess the 
reasonableness of the interconnection charges of mobile operators using the method of 
the so-called best-practice benchmark.149 For the purposes of price control, OPTA has 
divided Dutch mobile operators into two groups depending on their market position KPN 
Mobile and Vodafone being subject to a lower MTA tariffs compared to T-Mobile, 
Orange and O2. In the Policy rules, the maximum reasonable MTA tariff is defined on the 
basis of the MTA tariffs applied by the best-performing mobile operators in Europe who 
are not subject to cost orientation requirement. OPTA established that the MTA tariffs 
should be reduced gradually in two stages, after which (July 1, 2003) it intended to apply 
principle of cost orientation as a criterion for assessment of the reasonableness of the 
MTA tariffs.150 OPTA further indicated that it considered a bottom–up FLLRIC approach 
                                                 
148 Article 6.3 (1) and ( 2) TA. 
149 Para. 43, Policy rules 
150 Para. 50, ibid. 
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as the most appropriate basis for the cost allocation model for determination of a cost-
oriented MTA charge.151  
 
It is noteworthy that the Dutch competition authority (NMa) had also started an 
investigation concerning MTA tariffs, on the ground that they could represent an abuse 
by mobile operators of a dominant position in violation of Article 24 of the Dutch 
Competition Law (Mw). That investigation resulted in Report on the market definition 
for call termination on mobile networks.152 However, the NMa decided not to proceed 
with its enquiry further since in the meantime OPTA published its Policy rules and 
commenced its practice of rendering decisions by which it effectuated tariff reduction, in 
context of resolution of disputes between telecom operators. In accordance with the 
Cooperation Protocol153 concluded between OPTA and the NMa, in case of concurrence 
between regulatory powers of OPTA and the NMa the former has a priority as a sector-
specific regulator provided it takes measures pursuant to TA and the NMa agrees that the 
measures eliminate the competition law concern.  
 
In its Report, the NMa came to a conclusion similar to OPTA’s regarding the relevant 
market for call termination.154 However, in its non-binding Recommendation to OPTA,155 
the NMa indicated that while it would also apply cost orientation as a basis for the 
assessment of the MTA tariffs it would not use a FL-LRIC model. Instead, the mobile 
operators would be able to recover all their historic costs plus a reasonable rate of return. 
  
OPTA has applied the above mentioned Policy rules to resolve numerous disputes 
between operators. However, its authority to do that had been challenged by the mobile 
                                                 
151 Para 49, ibid. 
152 NMa (2002), Rapportage over de marktdefenitie van het afwikkelen van gesprekken op 
mobiele netten, 1 augustus 2002. 
153 Cooperation Protocol, 19 December 2000. 
154 Paras. 51 and 71ff, NMa (2002). 
155 NMa Reactie op de beleidregels inzake de regulering van de MTA-tarieven, zaaknummer 
2574, 27. 03.2003. 
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operators before courts. In November 2002, the appeals judge of the district court of 
Rotterdam suspended by its provisional ruling a number of OPTA’s decisions by which 
the latter resolved disputes regarding mobile termination tariffs.156 The judge based its 
ruling on the following considerations: firstly, he stated that OPTA seemed to have 
exceeded its dispute resolution authority when it imposed on categories of mobile 
operators general rules on MTA tariffs formulated in its policy document without taking 
into considerations and analysing specific circumstances surrounding each individual 
dispute.157 This kind of general authority is more pertinent to competition law enforcers, 
such as the NMa. Secondly, the judge emphasised that the assessment of whether the 
termination tariffs were excessively high and therefore, would be in violation of the 
general duty to interconnect should be made on a case by case basis paying due regard to 
the position of the parties and the terms of their contractual relationship which may 
compensate for high termination rates. Thirdly, the judge questioned the legal basis for 
the requirement of cost-orientation with regard to MTA, because the law envisaged such 
obligation only in case of operators with SMP.  
 
It is a pity that the final judgement rendered in this case by the Rotterdam court158 did not 
deal with the assessment of the legality of OPTA’s decisional practice on MTA or with 
other substantive issues which were raised in the provisional ruling discussed above. It 
granted the claim of mobile operators and annulled OPTA’s decisions on purely formal 
grounds: the decisions were rendered in disputes between mobile operators which 
formally did not have direct contractual relationships on the basis of an interconnection 
agreement and which, moreover, had been granted a special exemption from the duty to 
                                                 
156 Voorzieningen rechter, Rechtbank Rotterdam, 29 November 2002, Reg. nr. VTELEC 02/2675 
RIP, Dutchtone et al v. OPTA.  
157 As mentioned earlier, under the old Telecommunications Act of 1998, dispute settlement was 
to be conducted in the light of the business interests of the parties involved, and as such there was 
little room to adopt a general policy (in the light of the general interest) which would perhaps 
neglect the specific interests of the parties involved in each dispute. 
158 Rechtbank Rotterdam, 25 April 2003, Reg.nr. TELEC 02/2156 GERR and 02/2339 GERR, O2 
and KPN Mobile v. OPTA. 
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interconnect directly. The OPTA has lodged an appeal against the judgement which is 
now pending before the Regulatory Industrial Organisation Appeals Court. In practical 
terms, however, the immediate effect of the judgement is that now more than 30 OPTA 
decisions on tariff reduction adopted in conformity with its Policy rules appear to lack 
proper legal ground and are hence unenforceable.159 
 
In a last twist to this story, the Dutch Competition Authority, the NMa, which had been 
involved in this case all along, decided to pick up where OPTA had left. It re-opened the 
investigation mentioned previously into possible abuses of dominant position in the 
setting of the MTA tariffs. The NMa has already indicated that it would follow the same 
line of argument as OPTA, namely that termination on each mobile network is a separate 
relevant market, on which the network operator is by definition in a dominant position. 
For the NMa, excessive MTA tariffs can constitute an abuse of that dominant position 
and lead to a range of remedies, including the obligation to apply cost-oriented tariffs. In 
the light of these developments, the Dutch mobile operators “voluntarily” offered to 
lower their MTA tariffs,160 whereupon the NMa terminated its case.161 
 
Ironically, the new Dutch Telecommunications Act, in accordance with the new EC 
framework, does not make a distinction between direct and indirect interconnection.162 
Instead of the generally applicable obligation to interconnect, the new Act speaks about a 
broader obligation to achieve end-to-end connectivity (interoperability) by whatever 
technical means and arrangements the operators may choose.  
 
 
                                                 
159 Bitton (2003). 
160 Presumably, they estimated that the NMa would be in a position to take a decision against 
them (and see it survive judicial review). In that situation, it might be preferrable to make a 
voluntary commitment and avoid a formal negative decision. 
161 See “OPTA en NMa: bellen naar mobiel wordt fors goedkoper”, Press Release (5 December 
2003), available at www.nmanet.nl. 





The Australian experience in regulating the issues of fixed-to-mobile interconnection 
tariffs represents an interesting example of light-handed sector-specific regulation which 
differs in some respects from the approach adopted in the European Community and the 
majority of the EC Member States. The Australian legislative framework which is 
relevant in the context of access and interconnection is formed by the 
Telecommunications Act 1997, the Trade Practices Act 1974 hence: (the Act) and the 
Telecommunications Competition Act 2002. The Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (ACCC) is a body that exercises control over the telecommunications sector 
as far as the access obligations163 and competition in the telecommunications sector are 
concerned.  
 
Under the Act,164 the standard access obligations are applied with regard to the 
telecommunications services “declared” by the ACCC in accordance with Section 39 of 
the Telecommunications Act 1997.165 The objective of the ACCC declarations is three-
fold: promoting competition in telecommunications markets, achieving any-to-any 
connectivity and encouraging efficient use of and investment in the telecommunications 
infrastructure.166 The mobile (GSM) termination services have been declared by the 
ACCC.  
 
                                                 
163 Note that, as was outlined above, interconnection is a specific type of access. 
164 Section 152 AR, Trade Practices Act 1974. 
165 In the discussion of Australian law, the terms “declare”, “declaration”, etc., will refer to a 
declaration under s. 39 of the Telecommunications Act 1997, which can be seen as the functional 
equivalent of a finding that a relevant market must be analysed and that there is SMP, under the 
new EC regulatory framework. 
166 Section 152 AB (2), Trade Practices Act 1974. 
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Maintaining the standard access obligations is aimed at promoting the long-term interests 
of end-users. The standard access obligations require that the declared services should be 
made available by the provider of such services at the request of other operators seeking 
the access. Thus, the access obligations ensure the rights of third parties to gain access to 
the facilities/services which are necessary for them in order to supply their services to 
their own customers.  
 
Hence, fixed-to-mobile and mobile-to-mobile interconnection must be provided by the 
mobile operators who are in control of termination calls to their subscribers. At present, 
there is no direct regulation of fixed-to-mobile termination charges in Australia. 
However, the ACCC has used its dispute resolution powers to introduce a soft form of 
regulation, discussed further below, in the form of principles which it intends to apply in 
the course of settling disputes concerning mobile termination prices.   
 
The terms and conditions of interconnection, including interconnection tariffs, are subject 
to commercial negotiations. If parties are unable to reach an agreement on 
interconnection terms and conditions, either party may appeal to the ACCC with the 
request to resolve their interconnection dispute. The ACCC is required to issue a written 
determination of rights and obligations of the parties who wish to settle settling their 
disputes by means of arbitration.167 In arbitrating access disputes, the ACCC has to take 
into account such factors as the interests of end-users, the legitimate business interests of 
the service provider, the interests of the access seeker, cost and technical conditions 
associated with the provision of access, and the economic efficiency of the provision of 
access.168 
 
                                                 
167 ACCC (2003), “Resolution of Telecommunications Access Disputes - A Guide to Dispute 
Resolution Provisions under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the 
Telecommunications Act 1997”, last revised May 2003. 
168 ACCC (2001), “ACCC Pricing Methodology for the GSM Termination Service”, Final Report, 
July 2001. 
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At a certain point, seven access disputes had been submitted to the ACCC for arbitration. 
All of these disputes focused, inter alia, on the parties’ disagreement with regard to 
mobile termination.169 Under the Act, arbitration proceedings, in which the operators 
disputes are heard, are private and so are not open to public. Nevertheless, to ensure 
consistency of its decisional practice and to inform all interested parties on its policy in 
arbitrating interconnection disputes, the ACCC has formulated pricing principles in its 
Final Report on Pricing Methodology for the GSM Termination Services of July 2001 
and its Final Report on Pricing Methodology for the GSM and CDMA Termination 
Services of September 2002, which it intends to apply to determine fixed-to-mobile 
termination tariffs in interconnection disputes submitted to it. The ACCC has expressly 
excluded mobile to mobile termination charges from its Pricing Methodology as not 
warranting regulatory intervention.170  
 
The ACCC has established that basically two features of the mobile termination service 
create a situation in which mobile operators can charge termination tariffs which are 
significantly above costs of providing termination service: firstly, the ability of mobile 
operators to exercise control over termination calls to their subscribers, and secondly, 
consumer ignorance with regard to the costs of calling mobile subscribers. While the 
ACCC did not exclude that a number of factors could mitigate these two problems of the 
mobile termination service (transit arrangements, countervailing power of fixed-line 
operators, closed user groups and call back), it found that the competitive forces would, 
initially, too relatively weak to eliminate concerns about above-cost fixed-to-mobile 
termination prices.171 It is interesting to note that, in its analyses of relevant product 
markets, the ACCC did not define mobile termination as a separate market.172 On the one 
hand, it considered mobile termination as one of the components of the mobile services 
market which includes wholesale and retail functional elements.173 On the other hand, the 
                                                 
169 Ibid., Appendix A.  
170 Ibid., p. 5.  
171 Ibid, para. 4.2.4, p. 19. 
172 ACCC (2003b), p. 41. 
173 ACCC (2001), para. 5.1.1, p. 31. 
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fixed-to-mobile services market was regarded by the ACCC as a related retail 
downstream market of the mobile services market.174  
 
The pricing methodology currently used by the ACCC as the most appropriate for the 
mobile termination service is retail benchmarking. According to this approach, each 
mobile operator’s termination charges are correlated with the retail price of its overall 
mobile package (including access and outgoing calls).175 This method uses the lowest 
existing freely negotiated termination price as a starting point. This termination price is 
then subject to gradual reduction at a rate corresponding to the rate of the decrease of 
retail prices. Apparently, the choice in favour if this approach was influenced by the 
expectation that retail prices (which are believed to be subject to healthy competition 
pressure and to reflect efficiency improvements) would continue to fall and, therefore, 
termination prices would be driven down towards cost. As the ACCC noted, if this 
expectation did not materialise, the retail benchmarking approach would not work.176  
 
The ACCC pricing principles outlined above have never been applied in practice, though 
the ACCC claims that they have served a useful purpose in encouraging parties to settle 
their disputes over termination tariffs in view of the most probable arbitrated outcome 
which would otherwise follow from the ACCC.177 It is noteworthy that all seven 
termination access disputes submitted to the ACCC withdrawn: four at an early stage and 
the remaining three following the publication of the ACCC Final Report on Pricing 
Methodology. Nevertheless, the ACCC now also questions whether the retail 
benchmarking approach would have been effective (i.e., ensure a continuing decrease of 
mobile termination charges) had it been applied in practice, since one of the essential 
presumptions on which the ACCC pricing principles are based, namely, that retail prices 
                                                 
174 Ibid., para. 5.2.1(d), p. 45. 
175 Ibid., para 7.4, p. 75. 
176 Ibid., para.7.5, p. 78. 
177 ACCC (2003b), para. 5.1.2, p. 30; ACCC (2001), p. 78. 
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would continue to fall, did not eventuate,178 which makes the retail benchmarking 
approach inoperable.  
 
Currently, the ACCC is conducting a review of markets for mobile telecommunications 
services to assess the need for regulatory intervention in a number of mobile markets, that 
is, whether mobile termination service should continue to be declared under the 
Telecommunications Act 1997, and the appropriate form of regulation. As far as mobile 
termination is concerned, the Commission basically has to establish whether this service 
should remain declared. As already noted, the ACCC can only regulate mobile 
termination access including its price terms if the mobile termination service is declared 
under the Act. Moreover, in contrast to the current practice of developing pricing 
principles related to fixed-to-mobile interconnection tariffs on an ad hoc basis, under the 
Trade Practices Amendment (Telecommunications) Act 2001,179 the ACCC is 
now under an obligation to formulate pricing principles with regard to 
declared services as soon as possible after the declaration has been made or 
varied. One of the major criteria on the basis of which the service can be declared is 
promotion of competition. The ACCC therefore has to identify the market(s) in which 
this objective can be achieved. So far, the ACCC has been reluctant to see mobile 
termination as a separate market.180  
 
Provided that the mobile termination service remains declared, the ACCC has to 
determine the appropriate form of its regulation. In its Mobile Service Review 2003, the 
ACCC has put forward a number of possible approaches to mobile termination charges, 
such as retail benchmarking, cost-based methodology (TSLRIC-total service long-run 
incremental cost, LRIC in combination with price caps, short-run marginal cost), or 
                                                 
178 On the contrary, they appeared to increase over the period during which the ACCC monitored 
mobile operators retail prices for the purposes of implementation of the retail benchmarking 
pricing principles. See ACCC (2003b), para. 5.1.6, p. 49.   
179 Section 152AQA. 
180 ACCC (2003b), para. 5.1.5, p. 41. 
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‘retail-minus avoidable costs’ (RMAS) pricing. In particular, the ACCC has pointed out 
that, in the past, despite the fact that it considered TSLRIC to be the most appropriate 
pricing principle, it ultimately preferred to use the retail benchmarking method instead 
because the cost of implementation of a cost-based methodology appeared to outweigh its 
benefits.181  
 
In June 2004, the ACCC published its new Decision on mobile termination access 
services, in the wake of the Mobile Services Review.182 In its Decision, the ACCC 
concludes that it would be in the long-term interests of end-users to maintain the 
declaration of mobile termination services. In essence, the ACCC finds that all mobile 
operators have market power on termination over their respective network. Its 
observation of the market leads it to conclude that termination prices are excessive, which 
has a negative impact on competition on the markets for mobile-to-mobile and fixed-to-
mobile calls. Furthermore, the ACCC believes that regulation of mobile termination 
promotes an efficient use of, and investment in, infrastructure, since excessive 
termination prices tend to reduce the consumption of fixed-to-mobile calls and induce 
excessive investment in mobile infrastructure (in particular handsets). Like Ofcom, the 
ACCC chooses to leave 3G services unregulated, however. With respect to remedies, the 
ACCC proposes to abandon its retail-minus approach to pricing, in favour of a target 
price based on estimates of the cost of providing mobile termination. This target price is 





                                                 
181 Ibid., para. 5.1.6, pp. 50-51. 
182 ACCC (2004), “Mobile Services Review: Mobile Terminating Access Service: Final Decision 
on whether or not the Commission should extend, vary or revoke its existing declaration of the 
mobile terminating access service”, June, Melbourne. 
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4.4 Concluding remarks 
 
We have seen that regulators and competition authorities have concluded that call 
termination on individual mobile networks are relevant markets. Given the EU regulatory 
framework, the presence of the risk of abuse is sufficient to intervene – there is no need 
to demonstrate an actual occurrence of abuse.  
 
The typical way to deal with call termination monopolies within the European regulatory 
framework seems to be to ‘revert’ to cost-based prices by means of price controls. 
Although this looks like a logical approach at first sight, it is questionable. Gual (2004) 
argues that  
 
“[...] market definition in mobile call termination should not be mixed up with the 
issue of whether a regulation of termination charges is required.”  
(Gual, 2004, p. 62.) 
 
In particular, note that exercising market power may not be an undesirable if one adopts a 
welfare perspective. It is therefore unfortunate that regulatory frameworks or competition 
law procedures seem to be biased towards price controls to deal with ‘excessive’ mark-
ups.183 Such a regulatory reflex risks to be dealing with symptoms at a local level, 
without having performed a diagnosis from a broader, welfare perspective. In chapters 5 
and 6 we will see that a priori, it is uncertain that there is a disease that needs a cure. This 
is because the excessive use of market power is typically assessed within narrowly 
defined markets, but without sufficient consideration to the interactions between 
wholesale and retail markets, and between the fixed and the mobile sector. 
 
                                                 
183 See Larouche (2004). 
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5 Analysis based on economic models 
 
As discussed in chapter 4, call termination on individual mobile networks are generally 
considered to be relevant markets, on which operators have 100% market share. Within 
the EU regulatory framework, the risk of potential abuse is sufficient to intervene, as 
there is no need to demonstrate an actual occurrence of abuse. To assess whether 
remedies are needed, and if so, which ones, however, one has to make a welfare 
assessment that goes beyond the relevant market, as this market is closely linked with the 
overall markets for fixed and mobile telephony. 
 
This chapter contains an economic analysis of fixed-to-mobile network interconnection 
based on economic models. It is organized as follows. Section 5.1 summarizes some 
central results from the literature on access in telecommunications markets and surveys 
the literature on call termination on mobile networks. Section 5.2 provides additional 
results from numerical simulations. The model is presented in subsection 5.2.1, while 
results are presented and discussed in subsection 5.2.3. In the models discussed in 
sections 5.1 and 5.2, the issue of cost recovery was ignored. To address this issue, section 
5.3 extensively deals with Ramsey pricing and the recovery of fixed and common costs. 
Section 5.4 concludes the chapter. 
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5.1 Welfare analysis based on models from the literature 
 
In the early days of liberalization in telecommunications markets, one-way access 
probably posed the main regulatory problem. The central question was the level of the 
access price faced by entrants. Should this price be regulated? Given the bottleneck 
nature of local access, the incumbent may have an incentive to set the access price at a 
level so high that it makes entry unattractive. This problem is also known as foreclosure 
in an unregulated market. To prevent foreclosure, regulation of the access price may be 
needed. Other considerations with regard to the access price included the incumbent’s 
possibilities to recover investments and entrants’ incentives to invest in their own 
networks.  
 
The theory of optimal access pricing was initially developed within a static context, 
focusing on allocative efficiency and ignoring the relationship between regulation and 
investment decisions of entrants.184 Whereas in the short run, entry by firms without or 
with partial networks may be desirable, policy makers typically aim at promoting 
investments in infrastructure. A low access price, however, stimulates entry and 
competition in services, but mutes entrants’ incentives to roll out their own networks. To 
stimulate entry competition in networks, it may therefore be necessary to adopt a 
dynamic access pricing rule, one that encourages entrants to invest. This can for instance 
be done by increasing the maximum access price over time according to a prespecified 
schedule (see Cave et al., 2001, for an extensive, policy-oriented discussion). 
 
The first papers on two-way access focused on a symmetric setup corresponding to a 
mature market with competing operators, in which foreclosure is not an issue because 
operators are in a reciprocal situation. Nevertheless, the literature showed that there may 
                                                 
184 A complete survey of the economics of access is beyond the scope of this report – the reader 
may wish to consult Armstrong (2002) and Laffont and Tirole (2000) for excellent surveys, based 
on formal, theoretical approaches, as well as more detailed references to the literature. Vogelsang 
(2003) contains a less formal overview. 
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be a role for regulation, because an access price for network interconnection above 
marginal costs leads to an inefficient situation of double marginalization. Also, in certain 
cases the access price may be used as an instrument of collusion, leading to inflated retail 
tariffs (see Armstrong, 1998, Carter and Wright, 2000, and Laffont, Rey and Tirole, 
1998). The latter effect occurs if operators compete in linear prices (i.e., they charge per-
minute prices but no subscription fees). If they compete in two-part tariffs, then access 
mark-ups do not affect profits at all. This result is known as ‘profit neutrality’.185 186 
 
Most of the results obtained in the seminal papers cannot be directly applied to the 
transition phase in telecommunications markets, in which competition is still developing. 
In an infant market, in which entrants are still small, the asymmetry between an 
incumbent and an entrant gives rise to a problem related to the foreclosure problem in 
one-way access situations. As long as the entrant’s customer base is still small relative to 
the market share of the incumbent, the entrant’s customers will relatively often make 
calls to subscribers of the incumbent. Hence, the entrant needs to purchase access from 
the incumbent much more often than the other way around. If the incumbent charges a 
high access price for terminating calls on its network, it increases the entrant’s perceived 
marginal cost, and substantially weakens the entrant’s competitive position. The 
incumbent, on the other hand, is much less affected by an increase in the access price 
charged by the entrant. The reason is that a small entrant generates only little incoming 
traffic for the incumbent.187 To stimulate entry, policy makers may therefore temporarily 
want to regulate the termination access price charged by the incumbent, while allowing 
entrants to charge an access mark-up, according to a pre-specified schedule.188 
                                                 
185 In section 5.2, we encounter the same result in a more general setting of interconnected fixed 
and mobile networks. 
186 It is beyond the scope of this report to summarize the literature on one-way and two-way 
access. The interested reader can consult Vogelsang (2003) for a concise overview of the 
regulatory problems and solutions suggested in recent literature in economics. Armstrong (2002) 
contains a more formal (i.e. model-based) overview. 
187 This depends on the nature of calling patterns. 
188 See De Bijl and Peitz (2002, 2004). 
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Recently, several papers and reports on mobile call termination have been published. 
Armstrong (2002) contains an extensive overview of economic theory on the topic.189 A 
nice feature of that paper is the use of a simple model that incorporates several extensions 
in a stepwise fashion, relating them to (and incorporating insights from) other papers in 
the literature. While Armstrong’s paper provides a reference point with regard to 
economic theory, other papers (which will also be discussed in chapter 6) are much more 
geared towards policy debates. Marcus (2004) considers the economic frameworks under 
which call termination fees are implemented in the US compared to the EU, the salient 
point being the absence of CPP in the US. Crandall and Sidak (2004) assess whether 
regulators should regulate access prices for mobile call termination. Newbery (2004) 
demonstrates the importance of taking into account the fixed and common costs of 
networks when considering socially optimal access charges. Littlechild (2004) discusses 
the effects of CPP versus RPP on mobile access prices. 
 
To start with, a basic model and various adaptions analyzed in Armstrong (2002) are 
presented and discussed. Similar results and welfare implications were derived by Wright 
(2002). We will adopt Armstrong’s notation and go through his model in detail. We start 
with a benchmark model. Subsequently, in various adaptations, some assumptions of this 
model will be relaxed. 
 
Benchmark model (Armstrong, 2002) 
There is a fixed and a mobile market. The size of each market is normalized to 1 (remark: 
the markets do not overlap). There are n  LGHQWLFDOPRELOHRSHUDWRUV DQGRQH IL[HG
operator. The mobile and fixed networks are all interconnected. There are no fixed costs 
of network rollout, so recovery of fixed cost does not come into play (see the next 
subsection for a discussion on that topic). 
                                                 
189 Armstrong discusses mobile call termination (‘competitive bottlenecks’) as a bridge between 




Each mobile operator charges a subscription fee fi and a per-minute price pi (subscripts 
will be suppressed when prices are identical for all operators). Operator i’s market share, 
which depends on all mobile operators’ prices in the retail market, is denoted by Si(p1,..., 
pn; f1 ,..., fn). Because of competition, the market share function Si is decreasing in pi and 
fi, and increasing in the prices pj and fj set by all other operators j i.
 190 The demand for 
mobile subscriptions is inelastic, that is, these tariffs do not affect the total number of 
mobile subscribers. Mobile users’ individual demand for calls is denoted by q(p). All 
their calls terminate on the fixed network.191 Demand q(p) is decreasing in p. The net 
utility of a mobile customer equals v(p) – f, where v’(p) = – q(p). Mobile operators incur 
fixed cost k per subscriber (say, the cost of supplying the customer with a handset), 
marginal cost c0 for off-net calls, and marginal cost cT for terminating calls. The access 
price for call termination on mobile network i is denoted by ai. Operator i’s profit 
IXQFWLRQZKLFKZLOOEHGHILQHGODWHULVGHQRWHGE\ i (pi, fi ; ai). 
 
The fixed sector is regulated (e.g. because competition in fixed telephony is still 
ineffective), such that customers pay a per-minute price P for calls to mobile users. Fixed 
subscribers’ aggregate demand for calls to mobile users is denoted by Q(P); since the 
total number of mobile subscribers is normalized to be equal to one, Q also denotes the 
number of calls received per mobile user.192 Demand Q(P) is decreasing in P. The net 
surplus of fixed consumers is equal to V(P), where V’(P) = – Q(P). Regulation of the 
fixed sector also includes a termination access price (for calls incoming from the mobile 
networks) equal to zero. Since P may depend on the access price for mobile call 
termination ai, on network i, sometimes the notation P(ai) will be used. We will 
sometimes assume that P is regulated at the level of total marginal costs, that is, P(ai) = C 
                                                 
190 For the purposes of this analysis, it is not necessary to specify in detail how competition 
between the operators affects market shares. 
191 This assumption simplifies the exposition. It will be relaxed in section 5.2, where we will look 
at both fixed-to-mobile as well as mobile-to-mobile off-net calls. 
192 Without loss of generality, calls that remain on the fixed network are left out of the picture. 
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+ ai, where C denotes the marginal cost of a fixed-to-mobile call up to the point of 
interconnection with a mobile network. Note that fixed callers may not know to which 
network a mobile user subscribes, but they do know the per-minute price of calling that 
user. The fixeGRSHUDWRU¶VSURILWVDUHGHQRWHGE\ P). 
 
 
- There is a fixed market (with 1 operator) and a mobile market (with 2 competing mobile 
operators). The fixed and mobile networks are all interconnected. 
- The demand for mobile subscriptions is inelastic. 
- All calls made by mobile users terminate on the fixed network. 
- The mobile operators compete by choosing two-part tariffs. The fixed operator’s prices are 
regulated. 
- Mobile users are not charged for receiving calls, and derive not utility from receiving calls. 
Box 5.1: Summary of the benchmark model. 
 
 
Given P, a mobile user receives Q(P) calls from the fixed sector. Mobile subscribers do 
not pay for being called, that is, the calling party pays (CPP). Accordingly, mobile 
operator i’s profits per customer are equal to: 
 
i (pi, fi ; ai) = Si(p1,..., pn; f1 ,..., fn) [ (pi – c0) q(pi) + fi – k + (ai – cT) Q(P(ai)) ].  
 
Assuming that the mobile sector is perfectly competitive, the net utility of mobile users is 
maximized subject to the constraint i = 0 for all operators.
193 Therefore, in a symmetric 
equilibrium, in which each operator charges the same access price a,  
 
p* = c0 and f* = k – (a – cT) Q(P(a)). 
 
                                                 
193 This assumption is not restrictive. Wright (2002) obtains similar results as Armstrong (2002) 
by assuming imperfect competition. 
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Note that the termination access price only affects mobile users’ subscription fee, not the 
per-minute price, which is set at the marginal-cost level.194 One can readily observe that 
if the access price is above marginal cost (i.e. a > cT), then mobile handsets are offered at 
prices below the fixed cost per subscriber (i.e. f* < k). In other words, operators subsidize 
mobile phones. 
 
In a symmetric equilibrium, and under the assumption that there are no call externalities 
(i.e., mobile users attach no value to being called) and mobile users do not care about the 
utility of the persons that call them, each mobile operator will set access prices at the 
monopoly level:195  
 
 a* = argmaxa (p, f; a) = argmaxa (a – cT) Q(P(a)). 
 
Since a* satisfies the first-order condition Q(P(a)) + (a – cT) Q’(P(a)) = 0, where Q(Â!
0 and Q’(ÂRQHFDQVHH WKDWa* > cT, that is, the profit-maximizing access price is 
higher than the marginal cost of termination access. Note that because of perfect 
competition, the access price has no effect on an operator’s overall profits. 
 
Summarizing, without regulation, each mobile operator makes zero overall profits 
because of perfect competition, but nevertheless maximizes revenues from termination on 
its network. The effect is that the rents from termination access – which are financed by 
fixed callers – are not eliminated by competition in the retail market, but transferred from 
mobile operators to their customers.  
 
                                                 
194 A similar result would also be obtained if calles made by mobile users would not all go to the 
fixed sector. In particular, per-minute prices would then be set equal to ‘perceived’ marginal 
costs, which takes into account the access charges for mobile-to-mobile calls. 
195 For instance, operators simultaneously choose access prices. The same result is obtained if 
operators can coordinate on, or ajointly determine, the access price. 
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To determine the welfare-maximizing access price, assume that other fixed services are 
not affected by changes in the fixed-mobile retail price.196 Welfare is then measured by 
the sum of the net utility that fixed subscribers obtain from calling mobile users, and the 
total net utility of mobile subscribers (mobile operators make zero profits, since there is 
perfect competition in the mobile market):197 
 
 W(a)  = V(P(a)) + v(c0) – f  
= V(C + a) + v(c0) + (a – cT) Q(C + a) – k. 
 
One can easily show that welfare is maximized if access is priced at the marginal cost 
level, that is, 
 
 â = argmaxa W(a) = cT. 
 
The central observation in this model is that a* > â, that is, operators will set an access 
price that is above the socially efficient access price, even if there is perfect competition 
in the retail market. The consequence is that without regulation, the retail price P(a*) is 
inflated compared to the social optimum, leading to reduced demand and hence 
underconsumption of fixed-to-mobile voice calls. Hence, regulation of the access price 
(assuming that regulation can be fully effective) is desirable from a social point of 
view.198 To understand this benchmark result, notice that mobile users benefit from a 
mark-up in the access price, since it translates into lower subscription fees. Nevertheless, 
their benefits, subsidized by the fixed market, do not outweigh the reduction in the net 
utility of fixed subscribers. A cost-based access price eliminates any distortion in their 
calling behavior. Furthermore, note that a consequence of the assumption of perfect 
                                                 
196 A consequence of this assumption is e.g. that fixed subscribers do not switch to a mobile 
subscription if they are dissatisfied with the high retail price of calling mobile customers. 
197 Without loss of generality, we can abstract from the fixed operator’s profits, which are 
regulated at a fixed level. 
198 This result does not depend on the intensity of competition in the mobile sector. 
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competition in the mobile market is that a* maximizes the surplus of mobile subscribers 
– a result that does not survive under imperfect competition. 
 
The model demonstrates that even if mobile operators make monopoly profits from call 
termination, it may be the case that intense competition at the retail level fully dissipates 
these profits. That is, any excess profits from termination access are offset by retail prices 
below costs. Even if excess access revenues are competed away, welfare is reduced due 
to distorting effects on consumers’ behavior.  
 
It is interesting to verify how the benchmark result might change if certain assumptions 
are adapted. Armstrong (2002) explores various adaptations of the basic model, which are 
presented below.  
 
Adaptation 1: RPP 
Suppose that the price for receiving calls is not a priori fixed at zero because of some 
convention, while the calling party still pays a price for call originiation. Thus, whereas 
the receiving party now pays a reception charge, the calling party still pays a price for 
making calls. Also, mobile users have to accept all incoming calls. Let fixed consumers 
pay a per-minute price P. Think of P as the price for call transmission up to the point of 
interconnect. If P is equal to marginal cost, then P = C. Mobile subscribers to network i 
pay a per-minute price ai for incoming calls (also called reception charge). Assuming that 
mobile users cannot refuse incoming calls, having them pay for receiving calls does not 
distort welfare; it just leads to a transfer from the mobile user to its network operator. 
Note that market shares now also depend on termination access prices. The profit 
function of mobile operator i becomes: 
 
i (pi, fi ; ai) = Si (p1,..., pn; f1 ,..., fn; a1 ,..., an)  
[ (pi – c0) q(pi) + fi – k + (ai – cT) Q (P) ].  
 
In equilibrium, p* = c0, and because any profits are competed away, f* = k – (a – cT) 
Q(P). The profit-maximizing price for incoming calls a* maximizes (a – cT) Q(P) subject 
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to f = k – (a – cT) Q(P). Welfare can be written as W(a) = V(P) + v(c0) + (a – cT) Q (P) – 
k. It follows directly that the socially optimal access price is equal to the price charged by 
the operators, that is, â = a*. Furthermore, given that mobile consumers do not value 
incoming calls, the socially optimal per-minute price for fixed calls equals P = C + cT. 
The crucial observation from this adaptation of the benchmark model is that introducing 
RPP may eliminate the need of cost-based access regulation.199 Nevertheless, as will be 
discussed in chapter 6, it may be necessary to enforce an access price of zero, in order to 
induce mobile operators to introduce reception charges (see also Wright, 2002). 
 
The result above suggests that combining CPP with RPP will eliminate the need for 
regulation of access prices. RPP introduces a concern on the part of mobile users about 
the level of access prices and therefore stimulates mobile operators to reduce them. This 
is confirmed in a paper by Doyle and Smith (1998), who show that under RPP, mobile 
operators compete on reception charges to gain market share. Nevertheless, RPP 
introduces some new concerns, such as the possibility that mobile users will switch off 
their handsets. As will be discussed in chapter 6, such concerns do not seem to be of great 
importance. 
 
The theoretical insights on competition under RPP are still in development. The welfare 
effects of RPP in terms of call efficiency are analyzed in Kim and Lim (2001) and Jeon et 
al. (2004), who both show that positive reception charges can improve welfare. More 
specifically, Jeon et al. analyze a situation of two competing operators and address 
whether reception charges (the prices paid by called parties) can lead to the social 
optimum, which is obtained by the maximization of the total surplus from calls (net of 
                                                 
199 The results are somewhat different in a ‘pure’ RPP regime, where callers do not have to pay at 
all. As competition drives profits down to zero, mobile operators choose subscription fees and the 
access price so that they recover their fixed costs. This introduces an upperbound on the 
unregulated access price that effectively solves the call termination problem. A negative side-
effect is that the per-minute price of fixed consumers is too low, as it no longer covers the cost of 
access. The presence of call externalities may balance this distortion to a certain extent 
(Armstrong, 2002). Thus both CPP and RPP distort welfare, but in different ways. 
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costs) when callers as well as called parties derive utility from calls.200 If reception 
charges are regulated, it can be shown that there exists an equilibrium that implements 
the social optimum. The reception charge may not be too large, however, to make sure 
that called parties do not hang up. The authors also analyze the case in which reception 
charges are set noncoooperatively by the operators. One can show that the termination 
access price can be chosen such that there exists an equilibrium that approximates the 
social optimum. Intuitively, reception charges introduce an additional instrument 
contributing to the internalization of the call externality.201 202 
 
Adaptation 2: elastic demand for mobile subscriptions + network externalities 
Suppose that the demand for mobile subscriptions is elastic, which implies that the total 
number of mobile subscribers may vary with tariff (p, f). In particular, suppose that the 
number of mobile subscribers increases with the net surplus offered by mobile operators. 
Since an access mark-up leads to a subscription fee below cost, that is, f < k, it also leads 
to a larger number of mobile subscribers. Assume that the utility of fixed consumers is 
increasing in the number of mobile subscribers, for there are more persons that can be 
called (there is a ‘network externality’). Accordingly, an access mark-up increases the 
                                                 
200 In their model there is no separate segment that is interconnected to the competitive segment, 
so that the results may not immediately apply to the case of interconnected networks. 
201 Jeon et al. also show that if operators can apply network-based price discrimination, operators 
have strong incentives for ‘connectivity breakdown’, i.e., to choke off-net traffic by setting high 
reception charges or per-minute prices for off-net calls. 
202 Hermalin and Katz (2004) look at socially optimal origination and reception charges in the 
case of a single network while it is assumed to be given that the caller and called party subscribe 
to this network. Given these assumptions, their results are more difficult to translate to our 
setting. They derive results on the socially optimal level of the sum of the origination and the 
reception charge. Under specific assumptions, they show that prices that equally divide the cost 
between sender and receiver are socially optimal. They also consider a waiting game in which 
each party can decide to either send a message or wait for the other party to send one (‘two-way 
calling’). Again it is shown that an equal split of the cost may lead to larger welfare than does 
CPP. 
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utility of fixed customers, since it indirectly inflates the number of mobile users that can 
be called by them. Nevertheless, Armstrong (2002) shows that the welfare-maximizing 
access price â is below the unregulated monopoly price, but it may be above marginal 
cost. Summarizing, cT â < a*. The socially optimal level of the access price may be 
higher than in the model without the network externality, but optimal regulation of the 
access price still improves welfare. 
 
Wright (2002) builds on the standard model in which the size of the mobile market is 
given, by allowing for the possibility that more aggressive pricing in the mobile retail 
market leads to a higher penetration rate of mobile telephony. In Wright’s model, there is 
no network externality. Let wi denote the net surplus enjoyed by a consumer subscribing 
to mobile operator i, that is, wi = v(pi) – fi. By using a random discrete utility model in the 
spirit of Anderson et al. (1992) and normalizing the outside option to zero, it can be 
shown that operator i’s market share is equal to: 
 
Si(p1,..., pn; f1 ,..., fn) = ( e wi  ) / ( 1 + e w1  + ... + e wn  ), 
 
where pDUDPHWHU UHSUHVHQWVWKHLQWHQVLW\RIFRPSHWLWLRQEHWZHHQWKHPRELOHRSHUDWRUV
WKHRSHUDWRUVRIIHUSHUIHFWVXEVWLWXWHVDV DSSURDFKHV]HUR7KHUHVXOW WKDW WKHDFFHVV
price does not affect an operator’s profit level (obtained in the benchmark model) no 
longer holds. An increase in the access price has two effects. First, it results in higher 
access revenues, which boosts profits. Second, it results in a higher penetration of mobile 
telephony because of the resulting downward pressure on subscription fees. This effect 
also increases profits. Wright shows that mobile operators will choose the same access 
price a* as in the benchmark model, that is, the monopoly price. Moreover, the welfare-
maximizing access price â is larger than the marginal cost of access cT but lower than the 
unregulated access price. Summarizing, cT < â < a*. 
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Adaptation 3: call externalities 
Suppose that mobile subscribers benefit from receiving calls (there is a ‘call externality’). 
Each call minute generates utility b > 0, and the net utility of a mobile subscriber equals 
v(p) + b Q (P(a)) – f. Profit-maximizing operators will choose the access price such that it 
maximizes (a – (cT – b)) Q(C + a).203 This implies that the unregulated access price a* is 
typically lower than in the benchmark case.204 Furthermore, given that P(a) = C + a, 
welfare can be written as  
 
W(a) = V(C + a) + v(c0) + b Q (C + a) + (a – cT) Q (C + a) – k.  
 
It is straightforward to show that â = cT – b and a* > â. Thus, the presence of call 
externalities reduces the socially optimal access price as well as the unregulated access 
price, compared to the benchmark case. Intuitively, the utility obtained from receiving a 
call increases a mobile user’s total benefits from having a subscription. Decreasing the 
access price indirectly results in fixed subscribers making more calls to mobile users, and 
hence raise the surplus offered to mobile users. Just as before, access regulation (again 
under the assumption that it is effective and has no negative side effects) improves 
welfare. 
 
                                                 
203 This expression is derived from maximizing mobile users’ net utility subject to the zero-profits 
constraint. 
204 Because of the implicit-function rule, in the benchmark model we have that da*/dcT = 
[Q’(C+a) / (2Q’(C+a) + (a– cT)Q’’(C+a))]. A sufficient condition for da*/dcT to be increasing is 
that a– cT is not too large while Q’’(·) > 0. In the adapted model, if Q(P) = m – r P then a* = Q(C 
– (cT – b)) / 2r, compared to a* = Q(C – cT) / 2r in the benchmark. Note that in this example, â is 
reduced with b while a* is reduced with b/2, so that the need for regulation of the access price 
becomes stronger compared to the benchmark. 
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Adaptation 4: internalization of fixed users’ utility by mobile users 
Suppose that mobile callers care about the people who call them to the extent that they 
fully take into account the welfare of their callers when they choose a mobile network.205 
Because the mobile sector is perfectly competitive, the total net utility of mobile and 
fixed users is maximized subject to the constraint i = 0 for all mobile operators. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, retail prices are equal to p* = c0, f* = k – (a – cT) Q (P(a)). 
Moreover, profit-maximizing operators will set a* = cT = â. In this situation, there is no 
market failure, and hence regulation of the access price is not needed. In intermediate 
cases, in which mobile subscribers attach more weight to their own utility then to the 
benefits of those calling them, the access price set by operators is still inflated, although 
less than in the benchmark situation (see Wright, 2002). 
 
Adaptation 5: substitution between fixed and mobile connections 
So far, it was implicitly assumed that there is no substitution between fixed lines and 
mobile subscriptions. Now suppose that some consumers have both a fixed and a mobile 
subscription, so that they can choose when making a call.206 Then an increase in the 
fixed-to-mobile price P affects the profits generated in the fixed market. Note that this 
could happen anyway if P is not equal to C + a. Also, note that mobile operators will take 
into account that a lower access price leads to a larger mobile market, an effect that 
introduces downward pressure on a*. Implicitly it is assumed that access is charged for 
off-net mobile-to-mobile calls as well (the issues discussed here did not arise earlier since 
it was assumed that there were no mobile-to-mobile calls). Welfare can be written as 
 
 W(a  C + a) + V(C + a) + v(c0) + (a – cT) Q(C + a) – k. 
 
                                                 
205 Wright (2002) incorporates this assumption by assuming that mobile users, in addition to the 
earlier specified utility level, derive utility that is proportional to the utility of fixed users. 
206 In reality, it may of course happen that some users abandon their fixed connections and only 
subscribe to a mobile operator. 
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The socially optimal access price satisfies â = cT – ¶C + â) / Q’ (C + â). In particular, 
LI ¶C + â) > 0 then â > cT. This situation may occur if the profit reduction from a 
higher fixed-to-mobile price is overcompensated by an increase in the demand for other 
services on the fixed network, such as fixed-to-fixed calls. If this is the case, the 
discrepancy between the socially optimal access price and the monopoly access price 
becomes smaller. ReYHUVHO\ ¶C + a) < 0 implies that â < cT. This situation may occur 
if fixed consumers who face a higher price for calls to mobile users, use their mobile 
telephone instead of their fixed connection, so that fixed profits are reduced. Overall, it is 
unclear whether the discrepancy between â and a* is reduced.207 
 
Adaptation 6: customer ignorance or oversimplified tariffs 
The benchmark model and the five adaptations above show that it is the application of 
CPP that introduces a basic distortion in the allocation of costs between fixed and mobile 
users. It is interesting to briefly discuss another potential source of distortion, namely 
consumer ignorance (Gans and King, 2000), which can equivalently be seen as a situation 
in which the fixed operator sets a price based on average access prices, that is, P = C i 
(si ai), where si is the share of calls terminating on i’s network.. The ACCC (2002) argues 
that end-users who want to call a mobile user, may know the various access prices 
charged by mobile operators, but often do now know the access price charged by the 
operator to whom the called party subscribes.208 Suppose that fixed consumers are not 
aware of the mobile network they are calling nor of the price for a given call to a mobile 
network. As a consequence, they may base their calling behavior on an average per-
minute price for fixed-to-mobile calls. This introduces a free-rider effect, as an individual 
mobile operator who raises its own access price does not experience the full reduction in 
demand which is caused by such a price increase. A lack of consumer awareness 
therefore contributes to an operator’s market power with respect to termination access. 
                                                 
207 An interesting, more elaborate extension would be the case in which fixed and mobile 
subscriptions are perfect substitutes. If, at some point, all fixed users switch to mobile phones, the 
problem of call termination could vanish. 
208 Calls to relatives and calls within closed user groups may be exceptions to this observation. 
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Ignoring the possibility that regulation may be costly or ineffective, this provides an 
additional argument in favor of access regulation (within the assumptions that were 
made). 
 
The following table summarizes the results of the basic model and its adaptations. Note 




Model and adaptations Results and comparison with benchmark* 
0. Benchmark model with CPP a* > marginal cost of access 
â = marginal cost of access 
There is a discrepancy (a* – â) 
1. RPP (called party pays for 
termination; calling party still pays a 
price for origination) 
a* undetermined 
â = a* 
No discrepancy (a* – â) 
2. Elastic demand for mobile 
subscriptions + network externalities 
(utility of fixed users is increasing in 
size of mobile market) 
â PDUJLQDOFRVWRIDFFHVV 
a* > â 
Discrepancy (a* – â) weakly decreases 
3. Call externality (mobile users 
benefit from receiving calls) 
a* decreases 
â decreases (possibly to larger extent than the 
reduction in a*) 
There is a discrepancy (a* – â) 
4. Internalization of fixed users’ utility 
by mobile users (mobile users care 
about people who call them) 
a* = marginal cost of access 
â = marginal cost of access 
No discrepancy (a* – â) 
5. Substitution between fixed and 
mobile subscriptions 
a* decreases (compared to benchmark) 
â may increase or decrease 
Discrepancy (a* – â) may increase or decrease 
6. Customer ignorance (fixed users are 
ignorant about prices for calls to 
mobile users) or oversimplified tariffs 
a* > marginal cost of access 
â = marginal cost of access 
Discrepancy (a* – â) increases 
* a* denotes the unregulated access price; â denotes the welfare-maximizing access 
price. 
Table 5.1: Summary of theoretical results. 
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Concluding, a central insight from the analysis above is that without CPP, regulation is 
not needed. Moreover, the adaptations of the benchmark model discussed above suggest 
that in some cases, an access price above marginal cost may be optimal for welfare. For 
instance, a case for an access mark-up was made in the model with network externalities: 
if the market for mobile telephony is not yet mature (in the sense that some people do not 
yet have mobile phones), it may be welfare-improving to have fixed callers subsidize 
mobile subscribers.209 In general, however, arguments that support an access mark-up do 
not imply that the access price should not be regulated at all. The reason is that mobile 
operators will choose the access price such that profits per subscriber are maximized. At 
the margin, a lower access price does not affect mobile operators’ profits, but it does lead 
to higher welfare because the fixed-to-mobile price is reduced (Wright, 2002). The latter 
effect is ignored by mobile operators when they choose the access price. Therefore, in a 
situation with CPP, ignoring fixed cost recovery and assuming that regulation is effective 
and not very costly to implement, it is typically desirable to regulate the access price for 
call termination on the mobile networks. Without such regulation, there is a distortion in 
the sense that fixed users pay too much when they call mobile subscribers, while mobile 
users are heavily subsidized. In section 5.3, we will discuss the welfare implications in a 
setting in which fixed and common costs need to be recovered.  
 
 
                                                 
209 It should be noted that as mobile telephony tends towards market saturation, the need for a 
subsidy from the fixed to the mobile market is reduced. The high and increasing penetration rate 
in the EU (81% in 2003) does not seem to support an argument in favor of subsidies between the 
markets. 
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5.2 Additional welfare analysis based on numerical simulations 
 
In this section, we will assess some of the results discussed in the previous section in a 
set-up that allows for more fine-tuned and detailed outcomes, and for additional insights. 
To do so, we construct a somewhat richer and more complex model, which we solve by 
numerical simulations. The model depicts interconnection between the fixed market, in 
which there is a single network operator, and the mobile sector, in which two mobile 
operators compete with each other.210 The fixed operator is a monopolist and its 
wholesale and retail prices are regulated at cost levels. The mobile operators are 
horizontally differentiated. They compete by choosing retail prices (we consider both 
linear prices and two-part tariffs). At the outset, mobile termination charges are given, for 
instance because of access regulation or because operators jointly agree on them before 
they compete in the retail market. CPP applies. 
 
The model is different to the benchmark model of Armstrong (2002), discussed in the 
previous section, in several ways. Whereas Armstrong only analyzes competition in two-
part tariffs in the mobile sector, we also consider competition in linear prices. 
Furthermore, Armstrong assumes that all calls made by mobile subscribers terminate on 
the fixed network. Here we allow for calls between all types of subscribers and networks, 
according to a structure of ‘uniform calling patterns’. This means that each call is 
directed to any other consumer, whether on-net or off-net (and in the latter case, whether 
directed to a fixed or mobile subscriber) with equal probabilities. These probabilities are 
proportional to operators’ customer bases. Also, in Armstrong’s model, there is perfect 
competition in the mobile sector. Here we assume that there is imperfect competition 
because of horizontal differentiation between mobile operators. 
 
                                                 
210 The model explored here is an extension of the model of facilities-based competition in De 
Bijl and Peitz (1994). To depict a situation of mobile call termination, a fixed operator that 
interconnects with the mobile operators (taking into account the implied traffic volumes between 
the fixed and mobile sector) has been incorporated. 
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5.2.1 The model 
 
In the fixed sector, there is a single operator, denoted as operator 0. The prices (both 
wholesale and retail) of this operator are regulated. In the mobile sector, two operators, 
denoted as operator 1 and 2, compete in the retail market by simultaneously setting retail 
prices (see below for the way wholesale prices are determined). In reality, it may be the 
case that one of the mobile operators is integrated with the fixed operator. Since we will 
assume that the fixed operator is completely regulated such that it breaks even, adapting 
the model so that the fixed operator is integrated with, say, mobile operator 1, does not 
change the insights that are obtained. 
 
The mobile users are uniformly distributed on the interval [0,1]. Operator 1 is located at 
l1 = 0, and operator 2 at l2 = 1. A mobile user located at z who subscribes to operator i 
incurs a disutiOLW\  _ li – z |, where i 3DUDPHWHU !LV LQYHUVHO\UHODWHGWRWKH
intensity of competition. The parameters of the model will be chosen such that all mobile 
consumers participate. 
 
The size of the fixed sector is equal to nfixed, while the size (or more precisely: mass) of 
the demand side in the mobile sector equals nmobile consumers in the mobile sector. The 
size of the overall market equals n = nfixed + nmobile. 
 
Two cases of price competition will be considered. In the case of ‘two-part tariffs’, 
operator i charges a per-minute price pi and a subscription fee mi, i = 1, 2. In the case of 
‘linear pricing’, operator i only sets a per-minute price pi. In the latter case, the 
description of the model below still applies by assuming that mi = 0, i = 1, 2. 
 
Operator 0 charges a subscription fee m0 and per-minute prices p0i, i = 0, 1, 2, where p00 




Let cij denote operator i’s traffic-dependent (i.e., marginal) cost for on-net calls (denoted 
by j = 1), off-net calls (j = 2), and incoming calls (j = 3), ignoring the access charges that 
may be incurred. Operator i’s traffic-independent cost per customer is denoted by f0. The 
termination access prices charged by operator i for a call originating on operator j’s 
network is denoted by ji (note that the sequence of j and i depicts the direction of the call 
set-up from network j to network i). We abstract from all costs that are traffic-
independent and customer-dependent, in particular the fixed and common costs of 
networks.211 
 
Fixed subscribers’ individual demand for call minutes priced at p is denoted by x0(p), 
while fixed users’ utility of calling x minutes is u0(x). Assuming that u0(x) = a0 x – ½ b0 
x2, we obtain a linear demand x0(p) = (a0 – p) / b0. Similarly, mobile consumers have a 
quadratic utility function u(x) and an individual demand function x(p) = (a – p) / b. 
 
A fixed user’s indirect utility from making a call priced at p0i will be written as v0(p0i, 
m0) = k0 + u0(x0(p0i)) – x0(p0i) p0i – m0. Similarly, mobile users’ indirect utility from 
subscribing to operator i = 1, 2, will be written as v(pi, mi) = k + u (x(pi)) – x(pi) pi – mi. 
Parameters k0 and k denote traffic-independent utility levels (the utility obtained from 
having a connection, for instance because one can be reached by others). Fixed users 
maximize their utility by choosing the appropriate number of calls to make.212 Mobile 
users maximize their utility by subscribing to one of the mobile operators and then 
choosing the appropriate number of calls. While doing so, consumers take operators’ 
retail prices as given. 
 
                                                 
211 Including such costs in the model will not affect the insights, since they do not affect 
equilibrium outcomes. 
212 The fixed operator’s subscription fee will be regulated such that all fixed users subscribe. 
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Since the fixed operator’s prices are regulated, we will write market shares and profit 
functions as functions of the mobile operator’s retail prices only. It is straightforward to 
show that mobile operator i’s market share is equal to  
 
 i(p1, p2, m1, m2) = 1/2 + [v(pi, mi) – v(pj, mj@ ZKHUHj i and j = 1, 2. 
 
Calling patterns are assumed to be uniform, that is, although consumers do care about 
making calls, they are indifferent about whom they call, in the sense that they determine 
randomly whom to call. That is, when a consumer makes a call, the called consumers 
may be any other consumer (subscribing to the fixed operator or to either mobile 
operator) with equal probability. An implication of this assumption is that the volumes of 
on-net and off-net traffic are proportional to market shares and segment sizes. 
 
Adding up the revenues from on-net calls, off-net calls, incoming calls, and subscriptions, 
and taking into account the calling patterns between the different groups of customers, 
one can write the fixed operator’s profits as213 214 
 
 0(p1, p2, m1, m2) =  (nfixed / n)  [ x0(p00)  nfixed  (p00 – c01) 
    +  x0(p01 1  nmobile  (p01 – c02 – 01) 
    +  x0(p02 2  nmobile  (p02 – c02 – 02) 
    +  1  x(p1)  nfixed  ( 10 – c03) 
    +  2  x(p2)  nfixed  ( 20 – c03) ]  + 
    nfixed  (m0 – f0). 
 
Similarly, the mobile operator’s profits are equal to 
 
                                                 
213 To keep the expressions readable, retail prices are suppressed in the market share functions. 
214 For more background on the construction of the profit functions, see, e.g., Armstrong (1998) 
and Laffont et al. (1998). 
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 1(p1, p2, m1, m2) =  (nmobile / n) [ x(p1 12  nmobile  (p1 – c11) 
    +  x(p1 1 2  nmobile  (p1 – c12 – 12) 
    + x(p1 1  nfixed  (p1 – c12 – 10) 
     2  x(p2 1  nmobile 21 – c13) 
    + nfixed  x0(p01 1  nmobile 01 – c13) ]  + 




 2(p1, p2, m1, m2) =  (nmobile / n) [ x(p2 22  nmobile  (p2 – c21) 
    +  x(p2 2 1  nmobile  (p2 – c22 – 21) 
    + x(p2 2  nfixed  (p2 – c22 – 20) 
     1  x(p1 2  nmobile 12 – c23) 
    + nfixed  x0(p01 2  nmobile 02 – c23) ]  + 
    nmobile 2  (m2 – f2). 
 
Consumers surplus in the fixed sector is equal to 
 
(nfixed / n) [nfixed v0(p00, m0 1nmobile v0(p01, m0 2nmobile v0(p02, m0)],  
 
and in the mobile sector it can be written as  
 
(nfixed / n> 1 v(p1, m1 2 v(p2, m2) –  12 22)].  
 
Welfare is defined as the sum of consumers and producers surplus (we will distinguish 
between welfare in the two sectors). In the tables that report the outcomes of the analysis, 
consumers surplus will be denoted by CS, producers surplus by PS, and welfare by W. 
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Operator 0’s subscription fee m0 is regulated at the level of traffic-independent costs f0. 
Its per-minute prices p0i, i = 0, 1, 2, are regulated at the level of traffic-dependent costs. 
Hence the price for an on-net call is p00 = c01, while the price for an off-net call to mobile 
network i = 1, 2 equals p0i = c02 + 0i. 
 
To solve the model, we look for a Nash equilibrium in the mobile operators’ retail prices 
p1, p2, m1 and m2 (in the case of two-part tariffs) or in retail prices p1 and p2 (under 
linear pricing). To do so, the fixed operator’s prices, and all mobile termination access 
prices will be taken as given, the latter prices either because of regulation or because the 
mobile operators can agree on them before they compete in the retail market. Since we 
are mainly interested in the effect of different levels of access prices on consumers 
surplus and welfare, the process according to which access prices are determined will not 
be considered further. 
 
The model has been programmed in Mathematica.215 The core of the program is a 
numerical procedure based on Newton’s method, a procedure which is applied to solve 
the system of first-order conditions that define a Nash equilibrium in the mobile retail 
market.216 
 
To solve the model numerically, all parameters must get numerical values. The problem 
is, however, that data is unavailable. Mobile operators typically do not calculate the 
marginal (or long-run incremental) costs associated with specific parts of their networks 
or with different wholesale services, and if they would do so, they view this information 
as highly sensitive because of competition concerns.217 The same is the case for data 
about demand functions and elasticities. Therefore the model has to be calibrated by 
using educated guesses for plausible values of the parameters. Fortunately, the type of 
                                                 
215 The simulation programs are available on request. 
216 For further details see De Bijl and Peitz (2002), Appendix 3.2. 
217 Private communication with KPN Mobile and Vodafone Netherlands. 
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model that we use delivers qualitatively robust results.218 The parameter values that were 
used to obtain numerical outcomes can be found in table 5.2 below. 
 
With regard to the model parameters, note the following. 
 
1. All parameters with a monetary connotation (all cost parameters; regulated 
price levels; demand parameters a, a0, k0, and k) are in Euro-cents. 
2. In order to keep the results ‘clean’ from asymmetries between the two sectors 
(about which no data is available in any case), it is assumed that the fixed and 
mobile sector exhibit symmetric cost and demand characteristics. 
3. Demand parameters are chosen such that for a per-minute price equal to 0, a 
consumer would call 1,000 minutes, and for a per-minute price equal to 19 cents, 
a consumer would call 50 minutes. 
 
 
                                                 
218 It is straightforward to check that by running the model under different parameter 
constellations, the qualitative implications of the model do not change within wide ranges of 
plausible parameter values. Of course, the parameters need to be within reasonable ranges to 
deliver outcomes with meaningful interpretations. Different parameter constellations do change 
the outcomes in a quantitative sense, but since the model is not meant to provide an accurate 
picture of the market, this is not a major problem. See also De Bijl and Peitz (2002, p. 56). 
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Parameter Interpretation Value 
nfixed size of fixed sector 10,000,000 
nmobile size of mobile sector 10,000,000 
 measure of horizontal differentiation in mobile 
sector 
2,000 
k traffic-independent utility level from subscribing to 
a mobile operator 
2,000 
a demand parameter of mobile users 20 
b demand parameter of mobile users 0.02 
k0 traffic-independent utility level from subscribing to 
fixed operator 
2,000 
a0 demand parameter of fixed users 20 
b0 demand parameter of fixed users 0.02 
ci1, i = 1, 2 operator i’s marginal cost of an on-net call 10 
ci2, i = 1, 2 operator i’s marginal cost of an off-net call 5 
ci3, i = 1, 2 operator i’s marginal cost of an incoming call 5 
fi, i = 1, 2 operator i’s fixed cost of a single connection 1,000 
c01 operator 0’s marginal cost of an on-net call 10 
c02 operator 0’s marginal cost of an off-net call 5 
c03 operator 0’s marginal cost of an incoming call 5 
f0 operator 0’s fixed cost of a single connection 1,000 
m0 operator 0’s subscription fee f0 
p00 operator 0’s per-minute price for on-net calls c01 
p0i, i = 1, 2 operator 0’s per-minute price for off-net calls to 
operator i’s customers 
 c02  0i 
ij, i = 0, 1, 2 and  
j = 1, 2 
access price for calls from operator i to mobile 
operator j 
varied (see tables with 
output) 
i0, i = 1, 2 access price for off-net calls from operator i to 
operator 0 
c03 




5.2.2 Simulation results 
 
Simulation results are obtained in two different situations of competition in the mobile 
market. In the first one, operators compete in two-part tariffs (consisting of subscription 
fees and per-minute prices which are linearly related to usage). In the second one, they 
compete in linear prices (i.e. per-minute prices only). In reality, however, mobile 
operators offer menus of a variety of contracts, for instance to distinguish themselves 
from other operators, and to apply implicit price discrimination. In these menus, many 
contracts have a more complex pricing structure than a two-part tariff or a linear price. 
Unfortunately, with the type of model explored here, incorporating that operators 
compete by offering menus of contracts would render the model virtually intractable. 
Hence we explore two relatively simple pricing modes and, by comparing the possible 
differences in model outcomes, will try to draw more general conclusions. 
 
The results that are derived highlight the different consequences of mark-ups in access 
prices for fixed-to-mobile (F2M) and mobile-to-mobile (M2M) calls. In current practice, 
mobile operators typically do not make a distinction between F2M and M2M access 
prices, which effectively results in uniform F2M and M2M charges. However, as Rey and 
Jullien (2004) argue, F2M and M2M call termination exhibit fundamentally different 
characteristics. For instance, M2M access prices can be used as an instrument of tacit 
collusion. In addition, if mobile operators are asymmetric in the sizes of their customer 
bases, then increases in the M2M access prices of large operators slow down the growth 
of smaller rivals. These effects do not occur with regard to F2M access prices. The key 
issue there is that F2M termination gives rise to wholesale monopolies on individual 
networks. It is therefore worthwhile to consider F2M as well as M2M access mark-ups, 
and to compare them to the current practice of uniform F2M and M2M mark-ups. 
 









uniform F2M and M2M 
access mark-ups 
F2M access mark-ups 
only 
M2M access mark-ups 
only 
ij, i,j=1,2 5 7.5 10 5 5 7.5 10 
0i, i=1,2 5 7.5 10 7.5 10 5 5 
pi, i=1,2 10.00 10.62 11.25 10.00 10.00 10.62 11.25 
mi, i=1,2 3000 2238 1828 2531 2375 2707 2453 
p00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
p0i, i=1,2 10.00 12.50 15.00 12.50 15.00 10.00 10.00 
m0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
i, i=1,2 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
CS (mobile) 100.0 145.9 158.6 146.9 162.5 99.0 96.1 
W (mobile) 300.0 345.9 358.6 346.9 362.5 299.0 296.1 
CS (fixed) 350.0 295.3 256.3 295.3 256.3 350.0 350.0 
W (fixed) 350.0 295.3 256.3 295.3 256.3 350.0 350.0 
CS (total) 450.0 441.2 414.8 442.2 418.8 449.0 446.1 
PS (total) 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 200.0 
W (total) 650.0 641.2 614.5 642.2 618.8 649.0 646.1 
Prices are in cents; profit and surplus levels in millions (Euros). 
Table 5.3: Competition in two-part tariffs: basic results on access mark-ups. 
 
 
Table 5.3 illustrates the following effects of different types of access mark-ups: 
 
1. Uniform (F2M and M2M) and M2M access mark-ups lead to increases in mobile 
per-minute prices and decreases in mobile subscription fees. 
2. Mobile operators’ profits are not affected by mobile access mark-ups (‘profit 
neutrality’).  
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3. Uniform (F2M and M2M) access mark-ups and F2M access mark-ups increase 
consumers surplus and welfare in the mobile sector. M2M access mark-ups have a 
reverse effect. 
4. Uniform (F2M and M2M) and F2M access mark-ups reduce consumers surplus 
and welfare in the fixed sector. M2M access mark-ups do not affect the fixed 
sector. 
5. All types of access mark-ups reduce total consumers surplus and total welfare. 
 
Interestingly, mobile operators are indifferent about the level of termination access 
prices. 219 The background is that under competition in two-part tariffs, operators, for any 
level of access prices, set per-minute prices equal to perceived marginal costs and 
exercise any market power through subscription fees. Any revenues from access prices 
above marginal costs are competed away in the retail market through lower subscription 
fees. Thus the model illustrates the so-called ‘waterbed’ effect, as it is called in policy 
discussions in the UK.  
 
With regard to surplus levels, one can make two central observations. First, F2M access 
mark-ups increase consumers surplus in the mobile sector at the expense of fixed 
consumers who ‘pay the price’. Since mobile consumers’ gain does not offset the surplus 
reduction in the fixed sector, such mark-ups reduce total welfare. Second, M2M access 
mark-ups do not affect fixed consumers, but do reduce consumers surplus in the mobile 
sector (for inflated per-minute prices distort calling behavior). Again total welfare is 
reduced. The effects of F2M access mark-ups on total surplus can also be observed if the 
                                                 
219 This result is well known from the literature on facilities-based competition in 
telecommunications. See Laffont, Rey and Tirole (1998), and also Dessein (2003). Here we 
observe that profit-neutrality not only holds for M2M access prices (which corresponds to the 
results in the literature on facilities-based competition in situations of two-way access), but also 
to F2M charges. The profit-neutrality would not hold without reciprocity (M2M) or symmetry 
(F2M) of access prices, or if operators choose access prices unilaterally. In the latter case 
operators have strong incentives to increase any access price, as it increases profits and market 
share. 
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number of fixed subscribers is very small compared to the number of mobile subscribers. 
On the one hand, the reduction of surplus in the fixed sector would become much less 
significant, but on the other hand, the same holds for the increase of consumers surplus in 
the mobile sector. 
 









uniform F2M and M2M 
access mark-ups 
F2M access mark-ups 
only 
M2M access mark-ups 
only 
ij, i,j=1,2 5 7.5 10 5 5 7.5 10 
0i, i=1,2 5 7.5 10 7.5 10 5 5 
pi, i=1,2 14.67 14.33 14.43 14.00 13.75 15.00 15.34 
mi, i=1,2 - - - - - - - 
p00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 10.00 
p0i, i=1,2 10.00 12.50 15.00 12.50 15.00 10.00 10.00 
m0 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 
i, i=1,2 12.2 34.8 42.9 33.4 39.9 12.5 12.2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CS (mobile) 220.9 230.5 227.6 240.1 247.5 212.5 204.3 
W (mobile) 245.4 300.1 313.5 306.9 327.3 237.5 228.7 
CS (fixed) 350.0 295.3 256.3 295.3 256.3 350.0 350.0 
W (fixed) 350.0 295.3 256.3 295.3 256.3 350.0 350.0 
CS (total) 570.9 525.8 483.8 535.4 503.8 562.5 554.3 
PS (total) 24.5 69.6 85.9 66.8 79.7 25.0 24.4 
W (total) 595.4 595.4 569.7 602.3 583.5 587.5 578.7 
Prices are in cents; profit and surplus levels in millions (Euros). 




Table 5.4 illustrates the following effects of different types of access mark-ups: 
 
1. F2M access mark-ups lead to lower mobile per-minute prices, and M2M access 
mark-ups to higher mobile per-minute prices. The effects of uniform (F2M and 
M2M) access mark-ups are mixed. 
2. Uniform (F2M and M2M) and F2M access mark-ups increase mobile operators’ 
profits. M2M access mark-ups have the same effect but to a much smaller extent 
and within a narrower range (due to choking off mobile customers’ demand).  
3. Uniform (F2M and M2M) access mark-ups and F2M access mark-ups increase 
consumers surplus and welfare in the mobile sector. M2M access mark-ups have a 
reverse effect. 
4. Uniform (F2M and M2M) and F2M access mark-ups reduce consumers surplus 
and welfare in the fixed sector. M2M access mark-ups do not affect the fixed 
sector. 
5. All types of access mark-ups reduce total consumers surplus. Uniform (F2M and 
M2M) and M2M access mark-ups reduce total welfare. F2M access mark-ups 
may increase or decrease total welfare. 
 
Contrary to the situation with two-part tariffs, where mobile operators were indifferent, 
now their profit levels depend sharply on termination access prices. Accordingly, the 
‘waterbed’ effect (the additional revenues from access mark-up are competed away in the 
retail market), observed if operators compete in two-part tariffs, does not occur. 
 
To discuss the effects on surplus levels, we distinguish F2M and M2M access mark-ups. 
First, note that F2M access mark-ups increase consumers surplus and profits in the 
mobile sector at the expense of fixed consumers. The surplus gain in the mobile sector 
may or may not offset the surplus reduction in the fixed sector, so that the effect on total 
welfare can go either way. In particular, if the F2M access mark-up is not too high, total 
welfare may go up, as the aggregate effect on profits and consumers surplus in the mobile 
sector outweighs fixed consumers’ loss in surplus. Second, again M2M access mark-ups 
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are neutral for fixed consumers, but do make mobile consumers worse off and reduce 
total welfare. 
 
The results depicted in the two pricing situations (two-part tariffs and linear pricing) can 
be seen as extreme cases. In a situation of two-part tariffs, all access revenues are 
competed away in the retail market so that mobile operators’ profits remain constant. 
Under linear pricing, access prices can be used as instruments of tacit collusion, since 
they increase mobile operators’ profits.220 While neither of the explored modes of price 
competition is fully realistic (mobile operators typically use menus of contracts in a 
world where customers are not identical), the fact that mobile operators seem to care a lot 
about termination revenues suggests that the linear-pricing model provides useful 
pointers to understand the nature of competition. In particular, economic theory suggests 
that the outcomes of competition when operators use menus of contracts to implement 
price discrimination, tend to resemble the results obtained under linear pricing.221 With 
price discrimination, for instance, per-minute prices are typically set above (perceived) 
marginal cost levels, while operators leave some surplus to consumers. Accordingly, the 
profit-neutrality result in the model with two-part tariffs is unlikely to be realistic. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that operators (partly) use termination access revenues to reduce 
subscription fees and capture market share. That is, the ‘waterbed’ effect probably plays a 
role in reality, to a certain extent. 
 
                                                 
220 This is a well-known result from the literature (Armstrong, 1998; Laffont et al., 1998). 
221 See Dessein (2003) for references and discussion. 
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5.3 Ramsey pricing and the recovery of fixed and common costs 
 
In this section we discuss the recovery of fixed and common network costs. From a 
welfare viewpoint, the most natural way to guarantee cost recoupment is to set Ramsey 
prices, which are welfare-maximizing prices subject to the constraint that firms break 
even. To implement Ramsey pricing, data is needed, for instance about demand 
elasticities of various services. The report of the Competition Commission (2002, ch. 8) 
contains an extensive discussion of the limitations and inconsistensies of currently 
available demand data. This section is complementary to that discussion, as we focus on 
more conceptual issues related to Ramsey pricing, which, as far as we know, have not 
been discussed in detail in policy discussions or in the literature. 
 
We will first explain what is meant by the concept of Ramsey pricing. The general 
problem in a world with fixed costs is that a ‘second-best’ solution, that is a solution in 
which prices deviate from marginal costs, needs to be found in order to recoup the fixed 
costs. The logical way to proceed is to determine the prices that maximize welfare subject 
to the cost recovery constraint. By definition, such prices are socially optimal (in a 
second-best way). This problem, known as Ramsey (or as Ramsey-Boiteux) pricing, can 
be formulated as follows.222 Consider a regulated multi-product firm selling n goods 
(possibly wholesale as well as retail) at prices p1,..., pn ,WVSURILW IXQFWLRQ p1,..., pn) 
depends on an underlying cost function C(q1,..., qn), where qi = D(pi) denotes the demand 
function of good i7KHSURILWIXQFWLRQFDQDFFRUGLQJO\EHZULWWHQDV p1,..., pn) = i  pi 
D(pi) – C(D(p1),...,D(pn). Let Si(qi) denote the gross consumers surplus of consuming a 
quantity qi of good i. Hence welfare, which is equal to the sum of producers surplus and 
net consumers surplus, can be written as W = i [Si(D(pi)) – C(D(p1),...,D(pn))]. The 
social planner’s problem is: 
 
                                                 
222 See Laffont and Tirole (2000, section 2.2). 
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Determine prices p1,..., pn that maximize welfare WVXFKWKDW p1,..., pn)  
 
It can be shown that optimal prices, also called Ramsey prices, include mark-ups in all 
prices in such a way that the relative sizes of the mark-ups reflect underlying costs and 
demand characteristics: 
 
 mark-up for good i = ( pi  – (&qi)) / pi = (  / (1 + )) / i , 
 
where i is the price elasticity of demand for good i and 1/  is the shadow price of the 
zero-profit constraint. Accordingly, mark-ups should be proportional to inverse 
elasticities, or put somewhat differently, each individual price should be equal to the 
underlying marginal cost plus a ‘Ramsey term’. If the price elasticity of demand i for 
product i is relatively low, then this mark-up will be relatively high, and vice versa. This 
pricing structure is known as the inverse elasticity rule, meaning that higher mark-ups are 
charged for goods with a lower price elasticity. Accordingly, mark-ups minimize the 
distortions in consumers’ consumption decisions. 
 
In the situation of mobile termination access, Ramsey pricing might lead to mark-ups in 
mobile access prices, for two reasons. The first reason is that the price elasticity of the 
demand for fixed-to-mobile calls is, according to some empirical studies, relatively low, 
so that a Ramsey mark-up is desirable.223 The second reason is that since access mark-ups 
lead to reduced mobile subscription fees, they contribute to a fast expansion of the mobile 
market. As this enables fixed callers to reach more mobile users, social surplus is 
increased. Mobile users do not take this network externality into account when they 
decide to subscribe. However, given that the current-generation mobile market is mature, 
                                                 
223 Different studies do not show consistent results, however. See Competition Commission 
(2002, ch. 8) for a critical discussion of empirical studies in the UK. Moreover, the elasticities 
faced by operators (firm-specific elasticities), which affect prices set by them, may be different 
from market elasticities, which are relevant for Ramsey pricing (par. 8.61 in Competition 
Commission, 2003). 
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the rationale for a ‘network externality surcharge’ has vanished. We will therefore focus 
on the first reason, related to the need for cost recovery. 
 
A natural – and crucial – observation is that Ramsey pricing should be applied at an 
overall level to the mobile sector and the fixed sector.224 The reason is that the 
interconnected fixed and mobile networks form a closely integrated system, leading to 
important interactions between the sectors (in particular because of call traffic and 
wholesale tradings between the two sectors). Since these interactions form the heart of 
the call termination problem, a priori they cannot be ignored. Note in particular that, 
given the prominent presence of fixed and common costs in the fixed sector, Ramsey 
mark-ups in the fixed market may be desirable from a welfare viewpoint.225 Thus, just as 
Ramsey pricing in the mobile sector might imply that the fixed sector partly finances the 
costs of mobile networks, a reverse subsidy also makes sense; perhaps even more.226  
 
In theory, the proper way to implement Ramsey pricing (in the sense that it truly leads to 
the second-best welfare outcome), is to regulate all prices, wholesale and retail, to ensure 
that they are set at the correct levels. There exist, however, more realistic ways of 
formulating the social planner’s problem that, although unable to reach a true second-best 
outcome, still included elements of Ramsey pricing. In policy debates these different 
‘shades’ of Ramsey pricing are typically not explicitly defined and discussed – all of 
                                                 
224 See also Marcus (2004) and Valletti (2003). Jeon (2002) analyzes Ramsey pricing in a simple 
model of interconnected fixed and mobile networks. 
225 In a model of Ramsey pricing, Jeon (2002) assumes that only the fixed network incurs a fixed 
cost, and ignores fixed costs of mobile networks. 
226 What would happen the fixed operator also charges an access price above cost? Without 
presenting numerical results (which are straightforward to derive with the model of section 5.2), 
we note that introducing an M2F access mark-up decreases total welfare (it introduces a 
distortion) and it increases the fixed operator’s profits. One could transfer this surplus partly to 
fixed customers, e.g. by decreasing the regulated subscription fee. Hence, an M2F access mark-up 
can compensate fixed customers for the loss in surplus caused by F2M access mark-ups. 
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them are put under the header of Ramsey pricing.227 As a consequence, confusing 
statements and claims that may lack foundation are easily being made. 
 
To clarify the discussion it is therefore useful to precisely write down the most obvious 
ways of defining the social planner’s problem. We will do this by using the same notation 
as in section 5.2. Suppose that there are one fixed operator (operator 0) and two mobile 
operators (1 and 2). Operators choose non-linear, two-part tariffs. The fixed operator is 
allowed to use termination-based price discrimination, just as is typically the case in 
reality.228 The subscription fee charged by operator i = 0, 1, 2 is denoted by mi (if 
operators compete in linear prices, subscription fees are fixed to be zero). Each mobile 
operator i = 1, 2 sets a per-minute price pi. The fixed operator sets a per-minute price p0i 
for a call terminating on network i = 0, 1, 2. Market shares in the mobile market are i = 
i(p1, p2, m1, m2), i = 1, 2. The individual demand for call minutes, given price p, is x0(p) 
for fixed users and x(p) for mobile customers. The size of the fixed sector is normalized 
to 1, just as the size of the mobile sector. Let ij denote the termination access price for a 
call originating on network i and terminating on network j. Parameter Fi denotes the fixed 
and common cost incurred by operator i. Parameters cij and fi denote various levels of 
marginal costs and traffic-independent costs per customer, respectively. Consumers 
surplus in the fixed sector is denoted by CSfixed, and consumers surplus in the mobile 
sector by CSmobile. In a generic example that illustrates the intricate links between the 
fixed and mobile sector, which is obtained under assumptions that are typically used in 
telecommunications models, profit functions can be written as follows:229 230 
                                                 
227 For instance, Competition Commission (2003, ch. 8) contains an extensive discussion on 
Ramsey pricing, but it does specify the social planner’s optimization problem. 
228 Note that this is not the same as price discrimination in general. 
229 See section 5.2. The underlying model and the exact nature of the profit functions does not 
affect our discussion. This example allows for the presence call externalities. 
230 The deduction of fixed and common costs in the mobile operators’ profit functions, as in the 
expressions above, is somewhat problematic due to the static nature of the depicted problem. The 
profit functions above depict revenues and costs in a single period of competition. If the time 
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0 =  (1/2) [ x0(p00) (p00 – c01) + x0(p01) 1 (p01 – c02 – 01)  
  +  x0(p02) 2 (p02 – c02 – 02) + 1 x(p1)  ( 10 – c03) 
  +  2 x(p2)  ( 20 – c03) ]  + (m0 – f0) – F0, 
 
 1 =  (1/2) [ x(p1) 12  (p1 – c11) + x(p1)  1 2 (p1 – c11 – 12) 
  + x(p1) 1 (p1 – c11 – 10) + 2 x(p2) 1 ( 21 – c13) 
  + x0(p01) 1 ( 01 – c13) ] + 1 (m1 – f1) – F1, 
 
 2 =  (1/2) [ x(p2) 22  (p2 – c21) + x(p2)  2 1 (p2 – c21 – 21) 
  + x(p2) 2 (p2 – c21 – 20) + 1 x(p1) 2 ( 12 – c23) 
  + x0(p02) 2 ( 02 – c23) ] + 2 (m2 – f2) – F2. 
 
The social planner’s problem of Ramsey pricing can now be written as follows: 
 
Problem I: Ramsey pricing (second-best outcome) 
'HWHUPLQH IL[HG DFFHVV SULFHV 10 DQG 20PRELOH DFFHVV SULFHV 01 02 12 DQG 21; 
fixed retail prices p00, p01, p02, and m0; and mobile retail prices p1, m1, p2, and m2, that 
maximize total welfare W  0 1 2 + CSfixed + CSmobileVXFKWKDW 0  1 
DQG 2  
 
Even though regulation of all prices may be too much to ask for in reality, the problem of 
Ramsey pricing (problem I) is the benchmark, or point of reference, that we will use to 
discuss less ambitious social goals. In practice it may be more realistic to assume that 
regulators can only control access prices in the mobile market, and have to leave the 
                                                                                                                                                 
horizon is longer, say five years, and a single period amounts to, say, two months, then per-period 
profits need only partially contribute to the recoupment of investments. It may therefore be more 
accurate to include a ‘per-period portion’ of fixed and common costs in the per-customer fixed 
costs f1 and f2, and fix F1 and F2 at zero. 
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determination of retail prices to the operators.231 However, by doing so, a second-best 
welfare outcome may no longer be attainable. The social planner’s problem of reaching a 
‘third-best’ outcome can be written as follows: 
 
Problem II: Partial price controls with Ramsey elements (third-best outcome) 
'HWHUPLQHIL[HGDFFHVVSULFHV 10DQG 20PRELOHDFFHVVSULFHV 01 02 12DQG 21; and 
fixed retail prices p00, p01, p02, and m0, that maximize total welfare W  0 1 2 + 
CSfixed + CSmobileVXFKWKDW 0  1 DQG 2  
 
In problem II, retail prices in the mobile sector, p1, m1, p2, and m2, are implicitly 
determined as the outcome of price competition between operators 1 and 2. The retail 
prices of the fixed operator, p00, p01, p02, and m0, are all regulated (as is typically the 
case in practice, one way or another), jointly with all access prices.232 
 
By definition, the regulator has less grip in problem II than in problem I. Hence, denoting 
the welfare level that is obtained by solving problem k by W k, we have that 
 
W I W II. 
 
Policy discussions tend to focus on yet another way of characterizing the problem of 
Ramsey pricing (or rather incorporating Ramsey-style elements in price controls), namely 
by taking regulation of the fixed sector as given – determined in the past through a 
separate regulatory process – and restrict attention to the mobile sector. Accordingly, 
regulation of the fixed operator is left out of the problem. One can now define two 
                                                 
231 The Commission Recommendation of the EC identifies three potentially troublesome (for 
competition purposes) markets in mobile telephony, all of which are wholesale markets (call 
termination is the most prominent one). 
232 Problem II is somewhat similar to the model in Jeon (2002, section 3), who derives Ramsey 
formulas if only the fixed network (and not the mobile networks) incurs a fixed cost. 
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additional problems, denoted as III and IV.233 In problem III, mobile retail prices are 
explicitly included to be set at Ramsey levels. Since it differs in one dimension from 
problem I, problem III can, just as problem II, be said to lead to a third-best welfare 
outcome, although the resulting welfare levels may turn out to be different. 
 
Problem III: Partial price controls with Ramsey elements (third-best outcome) 
6XSSRVHIL[HGDFFHVVSULFHV 10DQG 20, and fixed retail prices p00, p01, p02, and m0, are 
JLYHQ'HWHUPLQHPRELOHDFFHVVSULFHV 01 02 12DQG 21 and mobile retail prices p1, 
m1, p2, and m2, that maximize total welfare W  0 1 2 + CSfixed + CSmobile, such 
WKDW 1 DQG 2  
 
In problem IV, mobile retail prices are left to be determined by competition. Problem IV 
departs from the second-best outcome in two dimensions instead of the single dimension 
of problem II, and will therefore be said to lead to a fourth-best outcome. 
 
Problem IV: Partial price controls with Ramsey elements (fourth-best outcome) 
6XSSRVHIL[HGDFFHVVSULFHV 10DQG 20, and fixed retail prices p00, p01, p02, and m0, are 
JLYHQ'HWHUPLQHPRELOHDFFHVVSULFHV 01 02 12DQG 21 that maximize total welfare 
W  0 1 2 + CSfixed + CSmobileVXFKWKDW 1 DQG 2  
 
Table 5.5 recapitulates the four welfare problems that were defined above. 
 
                                                 
233 The regulatory regime in the fixed sector is assumed to be identical in problems III and IV. 
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The social planner... ...sets all prices in the mobile 
sector 
...only sets termination 
charges in the mobile sector 
...includes the fixed operator’s 
prices in the optimization 
Problem I 
welfare W I 
Problem II 
welfare W II 
..does not adjust the fixed 
operator’s prices 
Problem III 
welfare W III 
Problem IV 
welfare W IV 
 
Table 5.5: Overview of welfare problems. 
 
 
Because the regulator has less grip (i.e., less variables to regulate at its disposal) in 
problem IV than in problem III, it must be that 
 
W III W IV. 
 
The main, conceptual division between the four problems defined above is between, on 
the one hand, problems I and II, and on the other hand, problems III and IV. The dividing 
line consists of the decision whether or not to include the fixed sector in the welfare 
analysis. At each side of the dividing line, a choice can be made whether or not to 
regulate mobile retail prices. Taking the latter choice as given, what can be said about 
welfare levels in the two broad classes of problems? Suppose that one can ignore the 
fixed operator’s zero-SURILW UHVWULFWLRQ 0  IRU LQVWDQFHEHFDXVH LW LVQRWELQGLQJ LQ
problems I and II, and would not be binding in problems III and IV if taken into 
consideration.234 Then, because the social planner has less instruments at its disposal in 
problems III and IV (compared to problems I and II, resp.), we have that 
 
                                                 
234 This assumption facilitates further welfare comparisons of the problems and is unlikely to 
affect the generality of the discussion that follows. In reality, the fixed operator is typically 
regulated such that it makes a reasonable (and hence positive) return, so that its zero-profit 
constraint is not binding. 
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W I W III and W II W IV. 
 
If Ramsey considerations did not play a role in regulating the fixed sector, it is likely that 
W I > W III and W II > W IV. In reality, the fixed sector is typically regulated because of 
the dominant position of the former incumbent, and prices are usually fixed at cost-based 
levels (including a reasonable return). These are completely different considerations. 
Hence it is quite unlikely that the fixed operator’s prices, that are taken as given in 
problems III and IV, happen to coincide with the optimal prices that contribute to welfare 
maximization in problems I and II. 
 
Does competition in the mobile market induce operators to set retail prices at Ramsey 
levels? More precisely, is it sufficient to only regulate the mobile operators’ access prices 
at Ramsey levels, in order to obtain W I = W II or W III = W IV? It is sometimes claimed 
that the answer is yes, because if competition is effective, operators will maximize the 
surplus of their customers.235 How accurate is this claim? Note that competition in the 
mobile market is imperfect, as is typically the case in an oligopoly situation. Casual 
observation suggests that operators derive market power from various sources, such as 
consumer switching costs (e.g. frictions in number portability), horizontal differentiation 
(e.g. because of branding strategies), strategies targeting different niches (e.g. corporate 
versus individual customers), and price discrimination through menus of contracts (e.g. 
non-linear price schemes, prepaid phones and bucket plans). Thus, even if the claim that 
competing operators maximize their customers’ surplus is true, it is uncertain that 
competition is sufficiently effective achieve this outcome. Assume, however, that 
competition in the mobile market is perfect. In the model with no externalities, fixing the 
                                                 
235 See Competition Commission (2001, 8.66-8.67), summarizing a claim by Frontier Economics 
on behalf of Vodafone, which is motivated by referring to a result in Armstrong and Vickers 
(2001). However, the model in that paper does not directly apply to fixed-mobile interconnection. 
Newbery (2004) mentions, in a footnote, the view that overall competition would force operators 
to set Ramsey mark-ups for unregulated, competitive services (if the uncompetitive ones are 
regulated at Ramsey levels). 
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F2M termination tariff at the ‘right’ level (obtained from either problem I or III) would 
presumably take care of the connections between the fixed and mobile networks and of 
the fixed consumers’ welfare. Regulation of the fixed sector should eliminate excessive 
profits in that sector, while (allegedly perfect) competition would do it in the mobile 
sector – and such a way that it maxizes CSmobile. If there are call or network externalities, 
then the above logic fails, even if the F2M rate is set at the ‘right’ level that takes 
externalities into account.236 A reasonable conjecture is therefore that W II < W I and W IV 
< W III, that is, regulating mobile access prices at Ramsey levels without controlling retail 
prices can be expected to lead to an inferior welfare outcome. To summarize, the claim 
that competition for mobile subscribers will lead to Ramsey prices is hard to justify.237 
 
The lesson from the discussion above is that allowing a small set of wholesale prices to 
include Ramsey-like mark-ups is unlikely to lead to a proper Ramsey pricing structure, 
and will probably not lead to the envisioned second-best welfare outcome. Without 
further analysis, the size of the gap between a proper Ramsey outcome and third- or even 
fourth-best outcomes is uncertain, so that it is hard to assess the social benefits of 
implementing some diluted form of Ramsey pricing. Nevertheless, an implementation as 
for instance described in problem IV may be the only realistic option for Ramsey-like 
price controls, given the regulatory limitations that are in place. The reason is that among 
the markets identified as having higher potential for competition problems in the 
Commission Recommendation on relevant product and service markets, only three 
markets related to mobile telephony are identified: access and call origination, voice call 
                                                 
236 Note that call and network externalities can be common in telecommunications markets and 
could be a rationale for regulation, even if we had several facility-based providers of all sorts of 
services. The new regulatory framework in the EU seems to consider those issues not worthy of 
regulation (e.g., nothing can be done without a finding of dominance) and that could be a 
reasonable judgement call – one can never really prove that the costs of regulation would be 
lower (or higher) than the market failure it would try correct. 
237 See also ACCC (2004) and the discussion of Gans and King (2004) therein: “There is no 
reason to suspect mobile network competition for subscribers will lead to socially-optimal 
Ramsey prices.” (p. 170). 
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termination on individual networks, and the national market for international roaming 
services, all of them wholesale markets. Hence the regulatory framework does not lend 
itself well to socially optimal regulation of retail prices, for the Framework Directive 
states that remedies can only be applied if dominance is established. It seems, however, 






5.4 Concluding remarks 
 
Ignoring, in sections 5.1 and 5.2, welfare issues related to the recovery of investment 
costs, we have seen that mobile access mark-ups, in general, tend to distort welfare. Fixed 
consumers make less calls because they face higher prices for F2M calls, and a large part 
of their potential surplus is captured by the mobile sectors. If competition between mobile 
operators is more intense, a larger part of this surplus is transfered to mobile subscribers 
through lower subscription fees and handset subsidies. The theoretical results and 
simulations discussed in those sections left at least two important issues untouched. First, 
they did not address the recovery of fixed and common costs of networks (see below). 
Second, they were oblivious to the large asymmetry between termination access prices 
charged by fixed operators (which are typically regulated) and mobile operators. The 
consequence of this asymmetry is a substantial transfer of wealth from the fixed to the 
mobile sector, which could be prevented by repairing the asymmetry. The latter issue will 
be addressed in the next chapter. With regard to cost recovery, we have seen in section 
5.3 that it is unclear whether (and perhaps even unlikely that) mobile termination charges 
will include substantial mark-ups in a situation of Ramsey pricing. If a competition 
authority or regulator wants to implement price controls as a remedy for call termination 
monopolies, it is crucial that the optimal level of access prices of both fixed and mobile 
operators are carefully analyzed within an overall framework of welfare maximization. 
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6 Welfare and remedies 
 
Given what we learned in the previous chapter, what are the policy implications with 
regard to potential remedies to deal with call termination monopolies? Is a remedy 
needed in the first place, in the sense that it would lead to an increase in welfare? What 
type of remedy could be most effective, if any? 
 
Using the insights of the previous chapters, in this chapter we focus on the welfare effects 
of call termination monopolies and discuss potential remedies. Ths chapter is organized 
as follows. Section 6.1 gives a general overview of potential welfare effects. Section 6.2 
discusses structural remedies that are more or less straightforward: eliminating the 
asymmetry between the fixed and the mobile sector (subsection 6.2.1), changing from 
‘calling party pays’ (CPP) to ‘receiving party pays’ (RPP; subsection 6.2.2), and 
implemeting the technical remedy of ‘call termination bypass’ (subsection 6.2.3). Section 
6.3 revisits access prices regulation and cost recovery, which was the topic of section 5.3. 
Section 6.4 concludes the chapter. 
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6.1 Welfare effects in general 
 
In the member states of the EU, it is up to competition authorities and national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs) to assess if mobile termination leads to a competition problem (access 
prices above the ‘competitive level’) with adverse effects on retail markets (e.g. high end-
user prices for F2M and possibly also off-net M2M calls). The Independent Regulators 
Group (IRG) defines the competitive level of access prices as the level that would be set 
if the wholesale market for call termination was effectively competitive. In particular,  
 
“In an effectively competitive market, excessive margins are competed away and 
prices driven down to the efficient level of cost plus a sustainable margin.” 
(IRG, 2004, p. 17.) 
 
As a side remark, note that it is unclear what exactly is meant by the ‘efficient level of 
cost plus a sustainable margin’, and there is no background information on the underlying 
notion of welfare, which may be absent or, at best, imprecise.238 Policy makers, 
competition authorities and regulators actually quite often refer to the ‘competitive level’ 
of prices, without making precise what they mean. Is there a meaningful way to define 
the competitive level of access prices? In this chapter we will discuss the notion of ‘call 
termination bypass’, a technical way of making competition feasible. This technological 
solution, which is, in principal, feasible, may provide a useful reference point for 
competitive prices. Another reference point may be provided by considering a situation 
of RPP (receiving party pays), in which mobile subscribers pay a price for the incoming 
part of calls that they receive.239 Although it is impossible to know the extent to which 
                                                 
238 See also subsection 3.1.2, in which we discussed the policy objectives of the EU regulatory 
framework. For economic analysis, the main handicap of such general notions is that they do not 
specify exactly which consumers are taken into account, and according to which weights (if there 
are different groups of consumers). See also Pijnacker Hordijk and De Vries (2002). 
239 More generally, by RPP we mean that the price for receiving calls is not a priori fixed at zero 
because of some convention, while the calling party still pays a price for call originiation. 
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call termination bypass or RPP would reduce access prices, in principle it is possible to 
use these situations as starting points for the determination of competitive access prices. 
Presumably they would lead to prices that are significantly below currently observed 
levels, and perhaps (but this is more speculative) even close to ‘cost-based’ levels. It is 
outside the scope of this report to fill in these details, but regulatory interventions that 
aim at ‘restoring’ competitive levels, an example of which is provided by access price 
regulation, should be based on quantified information about prices and cost levels. 
 
Recall that even if any excess profits from termination access are competed away in the 
retail market, one should worry about access mark-ups. This is because even under 
intense competition, welfare distortions of access mark-ups may be present, and it is 
important to take them into account.240 Clearly, call termination monopolies transfer 
wealth from fixed users to mobile operators (and indirectly to mobile customers if these 
revenues are competed away), while distorting the number of calls that are made 
(especially by fixed users).241 Accordingly, call termination monopolies lead to 
distortions, and the question is whether, in a second-best world, there are other welfare 
effects that compensate for these distortions. It is therefore useful to look at the welfare 
effects in more detail. 
 
On the one hand, one can distinguish several, potentially distortionary effects from 
excessive access prices. First, note that the producer of a final product (say the fixed 
operator) would in principle like to substitute other inputs for an input (the termination 
access service) that is priced too high. This producer, however, cannot circumvent buying 
call termination and will have to translate the incurred cost to prices paid by end-users. 
The indirect effect is therefore that there is too little consumption of the end-services that 
use call termination as a wholesale input, in particular fixed-to-mobile and (to a lesser 
                                                 
240 As we have seen in various models discussed in chapter 5, the extent to which access revenues 
are competed away depends not only on the intensity of competition, but also on the nature of 
price competition (linear prices versus two-part tariffs).  
241 The numerical results in chapter 5 gave an indication of the relative order of magnitude of 
these distortions in a stylized model. 
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extent) off-net mobile-to-mobile voice telephony. In addition, possibly there is too much 
consumption of the mobile products and services that are subsidized by the access 
revenues, in particular mobile subscriptions or handsets. Offering free handsets may lead 
to ‘excess momentum’, consisting of an inefficiently high turnover of phones by 
consumers and excessive investments in the development of handset technology. Another 
distortionary effect (that may occur if the market does not function well) is that mobile 
operators may partly use the access revenues to finance superfluous sales and marketing 
activities. Also, consumers’ calling behavior may be distorted away from fixed telephony 
towards mobile telephony, in order to benefit from the fact that calls originating at a 
mobile network are relatively cheap (e.g. because fixed termination access is regulated, 
so that per-minute prices of mobile-to-fixed calls are not inflated).242 
 
On the other hand, access prices above marginal costs may also have positive welfare 
effects. In the economic models discussed in the previous subsections, the fixed and 
common costs of networks, and more generally network investments, were ignored. 
Therefore, a typical outcome of welfare analysis is that socially optimal access prices are 
typically equal to marginal costs (depending on the assumptions; see ch. 5). A relevant 
question is, however, to what extent access revenues should be used to recover fixed and 
common costs of the existing network.243 In the presence of such costs, it may be optimal 
to set access prices above marginal cost levels. Hence, a first possible contribution to 
welfare is that access mark-ups may contribute to the recovery of fixed and common 
costs. Note that this argument not only applies to mobile operators, but also to fixed 
operators, whose networks (i) have required investments of a high order of magnitude 
(presumably higher than those needed for the rollout of mobile networks), and (ii) 
                                                 
242 See also Wholesale Mobile Voice Call Termination, Statement by Ofcom, 1 June 2004. Not all 
of these effects are equally concinving, though. 
243 It is sometimes argued that access revenues are needed to finance next-generation network 
investments. In the UK, for instance, some 2G operators claimed that these revenues are 
necessary for the roll-out of 3G. The latter claim can be readily dismissed. Even though from a 
strategy viewpoint, operators cannot separate 2G and 3G, the business case for 3G should not 
depend on excessive profits from another, existing technology, but on its own merits. 
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depreciate slowly.244 245It should be noted, though, that a large part of the investments by 
fixed operators (laying the cables) was done long ago, so they may have been largely 
amortized by now. 
 
Second, since access mark-ups lead to reduced mobile subscription fees and prices of 
handsets, they contribute to the expansion of the mobile market. Fixed callers, who can 
then reach more mobile subscribers, benefit from a larger mobile market. Accordingly, it 
may be desirable that the expansion of the mobile market is indirectly subsidized by fixed 
customers. However, it should be noted that this argument is losing its relevance as the 
mobile market has matured and penetration growth rates have gone down.246 Note, 
however, that saturation per se may not be the critical variable: lower access charges 
leading to higher fixed fees may, in theory, push subscribers to leave mobile networks. In 
practice, one may wonder whether that will occur (e.g., people who received free 
handsets financed by access revenues will not drop out). 
 
A potentially positive effect of mobile access mark-ups on welfare is, furthermore, that 
equipment manufacturers indirectly benefit from access mark-ups, since their products 
are subsidized by mobile operators. In theory, one can imagine that this can help them to 
                                                 
244 Fixed networks depreciate presumably slower than mobile networks, as progress typically 
does not occur through new generations, such as GSM and UMTS in mobile telephony, but 
through network improvements, maintenance and datacompression over existing connections. In 
particular, the introduction of technologies such as ADSL can be seen as a paradigm shift that 
boosts the value of the fixed network. 
245 On the other hand, if fixed network assets depreciate more slowly, mark-ups can be lower as 
there is a longer horizon for cost recovery. 
246 The EU average penetration rate in 2003 was 80.9%, and the EU average penetration growth 
rate (2002-2003) was 6%. The growth rate has been levelling off. Hence it will probably take just 
a couple of years for the average market to achieve its saturation point. Some penetration and 
growth rates for specific countries include: Germany penetration 75% and growth 7%, 
Netherlands penetration 75% and growth 2%, United Kingdom penetration 85% and growth 6% 
(EC, 2003b). 
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overcome barriers to attract capital needed for R&D, but this type of reasoning requires 
the presence of imperfections on the capital market. It also requires that one cares about 
subsidizing R&D related to handsets relatively more than R&D on other dimensions of 
telecommunications services.247 
 
Access mark-ups also have redistributive consequences, which should not be neglected. 
The most significant one is probably the cross-subsidy from the fixed to the mobile 
sector. This effect on fixed customers may be offset by the fact that most fixed customers 
also own a mobile phone, so that overall they may hardly be affected. But there may 
always be a group of consumers owning a fixed telephone but no mobile, who are worse 
off because of inflated fixed-to-mobile per-minute prices while they miss the benefit of 
reduced subscription fees for mobiles. In the UK, for instance, the group for whom this is 
the case is substantial (12% of households) and consists mainly of lower-income 
consumers.248 Is regulation needed to protect this segment, which is probably decreasing 
in size, or should these consumers be induced (perhaps through a subsidy) to buy a 
mobile phone so that they can bypass the fixed-to-mobile connection? Redistributive 
policy goals are perhaps better implemented through tax and expenditure policies (at the 
central government level), rather than being carried out through sector-specific 
intervention. In any case one can question the desirability of heavy-handed intervention 
to deal with this aspect of the problem, which is limited and shrinking.  
 
Without a full-fledged empirical analysis of welfare effects, it is hard to assess whether 
the distortions caused by call termination monopolies are substantial. At present, we 
know very little about the size of welfare distortions. Crandall and Sidak (2004) cite a 
witness statement by Professor James Mirrlees (University of Cambridge): 
 
                                                 
247 Moreover, it requires that handset manufacturers are either operating in a perfectly competitive 
market (so that innovation would benefit consumers) or that they are not located abroad. 
248 Wholesale Mobile Voice Call Termination, Statement by Ofcom, 1 June 2004, p. 31-32. 
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“[...] the welfare gains that could be realized by a move toward regulation of 
mobile call termination rates are modest at best. Mirrlees estimates that the annual 
welfare increase would be roughly one-tenth the size of the benefits upon which 
the U.K.’s Competition Commission relied in justifying its price cap on mobile 
termination rates (£4.7 million versus £54.5 million)”  
(Crandall and Sidak, 2004, p. 4). 
 
The difference between the welfare estimations pointed out by Mirrlees is explained by 
the fact that lower access prices will lead to increases in other prices charged by mobile 
operators, tempering the demand for mobile subscriptions. In any case, it is clear that our 
current knowledge about the size of welfare effects is rather limited, while existing 
estimations may not be reliable.249 Littlechild (2004) argues that since in the current 
situation (which is characterized by access mark-ups and transfers of benefits to mobile 
consumers) there are beneficial as well as detrimental effects, policy makers should not 
only be concerned with decreasing the detriments. They should also make a comparison 
with the reduced benefits (or the costs) caused by regulatory intervention. A crucial point 
is that it makes sense to first consider options that are less intrusive than price controls. 
The following section (6.2) discusses three such possibilities. We will come back to 
access price regulation later (section 6.3). 
                                                 
249 The simulation model of section 5.2 can deliver reasonable estimates of welfare effects, if 
calibrated with realistic cost and demand data. 
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6.2 Structural remedies 
 
In this section, we assume that F2M access prices are indeed too high and we focus on 
ways (other than direct price controls) in which regulators can bring them closer to 
welfare-optimal levels. The remedies we consider here are not ruled out by the regulatory 
framework in the EU (see chapter 3), but nevertheless have hardly received explicit, 
prominent attention in policy discussions.250 For instance, in ERG (2004), only the 
standard remedies (transparency, non-discrimination, accounting separation, access, price 
control and cost accounting) are discussed, while it is mentioned that NRAs are allowed 
by the Access Directive to impose other remedies as well (in ‘exceptional 
circumstances’), and that those are not covered by the document. Here, we discuss 
remedies without trying to (artificially) fit them into the set of standard remedies.251  
 
We discuss one-shot interventions that may create a fundamental change in the market 
which, if successful, may make heavy-handed regulation of access prices unnecessary. 
One way of intervening is to change from CPP to RPP, and another way is to directly 
introduce competition for call termination by making it technically feasible that 
alternative mobile operators can deliver calls to other operators’ customers (‘call 
termination bypass’). These options will be discussed in turn, but first, we consider the 
simple remedy of repairing a bargaining asymmetry between fixed and mobile operators. 
 
 
                                                 
250 More generally, the analytical underpinnings of different types of remedies is an 
underdeveloped area in policy discussions (Larouche, 2004). 
251 A discussion of the feasibility of implementing the remedies that we discuss is outside of the 
scope of this report. In principle, the EU regulatory framework allows for them. 
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6.2.1 Eliminating the asymmetry between the fixed and the mobile sector 
 
The possibility that we describe here is rather preliminary, more meant to be an eye-
opener than a serious contender. At present, there are large asymmetries between 
termination access prices charged by fixed operators, who are typically regulated at cost-
based levels, and mobile operators, who do not face such constraints. A straightforward 
idea to tackle the problem of call termination monopolies is to eliminate this asymmetry. 
This idea can be implemented in several ways. An obvious one is, for instance by 
deregulating fixed operators’ access prices or by enforcing reciprocity of access charges, 
to give them the capability (i.e., the power to commit) to retaliate to access mark-ups 
charged by mobile operators. Such a capability could prevent mobile operators from 
charging high access prices in the first place, being afraid of retaliation by the fixed 
operator. Nevertheless, as operators typically have unilateral incentives to increase their 
own access price, it could happen that all access prices (i.e., not only those charged by 
mobile operators) would end up at inflated levels. Facing little competitive pressure, the 
fixed operator would have no incentives to pass the access revenues on to its customers, 
unless forced to do so by retail price regulation. 
 
It is worthwhile to explore this type of option in more detail, in order to gain a better 
understanding of its potential consequences, both in theory and in practice.252 In practice, 
this solution does not have good chances of being adopted. This is because the same 
regulatory frameworks that are biased to use price controls to deal with call termination 
monopolies, are unlikely to loosen the grip on fixed operators as long as their competitive 
positions are still strong (in particular, as long as they still have dominant positions). 
 
An additional consideration when implementing this type of option is that the regulator 
should verify that access mark-ups, if they still occur, affect consumers to the smallest 
                                                 
252 A difficulty with this option is that bilateral negotiations in combination with reciprocal access 
charges may be problematic in practice, because the marginal costs of access of fixed and mobile 
operators are asymmetric. 
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extent possible. A way to do that is to enforce that the fixed operator’s revenues from call 
termination are passed on to its customers, for instance by imposing a global price cap on 
fixed operators’ fixed and wholesale prices. More direct is to adapt the levels of the fixed 
operators’ regulated retail prices in accordance with the level of access revenues (higher 
access revenues should translate into reduced retail prices).  
 
It should be stressed that given our current knowledge, it is uncertain that this remedy 
will work. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to implement, certainly in comparison with 
imposing price controls on mobile operators. The next subsection discusses a remedy that 
is almost equally straightforward, but with the added benefit that there is much less doubt 
about its effectivity. 
 
 
6.2.2 Changing from CPP to RPP 
 
Because the application of CPP (‘calling party pays’) is a central cause of monopoly 
power in call termination markets, a comparison with RPP (‘receiving party pays’) 
should get prominent attention in discussions on remedies.253 Unfortunately, this is not 
the case, as policy makers give much more attention to price controls. 
 
RPP does not mean that the calling party does not pay at all. Neither does it automatically 
mean that receiving calls is costly – it only means that the price for receiving calls (the 
‘reception charge’ or ‘receive price’) is not a priori fixed at zero because of some 
convention in the market. Also, the calling party still pays a price for call originiation.254 
Accordingly, RPP actually means that the caller and called party share the cost of a call, 
                                                 
253 RPP is known as MPP (‘mobile party pays’) in the US. 
254 Note that in principle, operators may decide to offer these services for free. For instance, if 
reception charges are set at zero, while call origination prices are positive, a situation of RPP 
effectively coincides with CPP. 
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where the balance of cost sharing is endogenously determined in accordance with the 
prices set by operators. 
 
Note that CPP and RPP are nothing more than commercial arrangements with customers. 
A major advantage of RPP is that it remedies the distortions of call termination 
monopolies, and consequently, it makes price controls unnecessary (Doyle and Smith, 
1998, Littlechild, 2004, and see also section 5.1 on the model adaptation of Armstrong, 
2002). RPP encourages mobile operators to compete for call termination, a service which 
is part of the bundle purchased by mobile end-users (the salient difference with a CPP 
regime). Thus mobile termation charges would be subject to competitive (downward) 
pressure. In the US, for example, the average mobile access price in 2002 was equal to $ 
0.005, roughly the size of the average fixed access price, compared to an average mobile 
access charge of $ 0.16 in Europe.255 Marcus (2004) argues that RPP is an important 
element that contributes to lower mobile prices per minute of use, but it must be 
understood in the broader context in the US. Nevertheless, RPP does not give rise to call 
termination monopolies, while CPP does. 
 
A welfare effect of RPP that has recently received some attention is related to the 
efficiency of calls (see Littlechild, 2004, for an informal discussion, and see section 5.1 
for papers based on formal models). Define the net value of a call as the utility derived 
from the call minus its price. Note that for any payment regime, a call that is made will 
always create net value for the calling and the called party.256 If not, the call would not 
take place, as it could be ‘vetoed’ by either party. However, if the caller derives a lot of 
value from a certain call but the called party doesn’t, then RPP may prevent a call that 
would create positive aggregate value from happening. Similarly, CPP can lead to an 
                                                 
255 According to the Eight Annual Report by the FCC, cited in Crandall and Sidak (2004, p. 16). It 
must be noted that in the US, mobile operators are allowed to charge a reciprocal access price to 
compensate for the incremental cost of call termination. 
256 Ignore the nuisance from receiving an unwanted call that is terminated immediately. Such 
disutilities can be avoided if handsets display the number of the calling party, or simply charging 
callers only for the first few seconds of every call. 
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efficiency loss when the called party highly values a certain call while the caller doesn’t. 
It will be hard to empirically estimate these types of efficiency effects of RPP and CPP. 
Nevertheless, some conclusions can be drawn without empirical data. Recall that CPP 
puts the financial burden – which is inflated because of call termination monopolies – 
completely on the calling party, while RPP leads to a split of the charges incurred by 
consumers. Even though this split need not be exactly in proportion to the underlying 
costs of call origination and termination, it is likely to lead to a smaller number of 
‘unoccurring’ calls that would create aggregate value if they were made. Also, the split of 
the financial burden is unlikely to be distorted by underlying market failures, as in the 
case of CPP. Hence, from a welfare viewpoint, RPP may lead to superior results. The 
main reason is that RPP supports the internalization of call externalities that occur when 
subscribers positively value receiving calls. 
 
Section 5.1 contained a discussion of some recent theoretical papers on the welfare 
effects of RPP. Let us recall here that various recent papers show that positive reception 
charges can improve welfare (in terms of the efficiency of calls). Since this result is 
obtained under specific assumptions, for instance related to the decision to make a call or 
to wait until one is being called, there is no guarantee that this would occur in reality. 
Nevertheless, it seems safe to say that RPP is unlikely to harm welfare, to formulate it 
carefully. 
 
Implementing RPP has some disadvantages, however. Of course, there is an 
implementation cost. Since a change to RPP is a discrete, one-time only event, requiring 
adaptations in the system that handle information about customers, calls and billing, the 
implementation cost should not be a major concern, compared to the costs of more 
heavy-handed interventions. Another objection to RPP, also of transitory nature, is the 
fact that consumers will have to get used to a new way of charging for calls, and that 
some of them (e.g. those without fixed telephones) may dislike a system of RPP. Overall, 
the disruption from changing to RPP does not seem to pose a heavy burden. 
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A potential disadvantage of RPP, which is worrysome at least at first sight, is that mobile 
users may switch off their handsets, and also keep their phone numbers secret, in order to 
avoid being charged for incoming calls. These are legitimate concerns, but unfortunately 
it is hard to empirically assess the size of such effects.257 Experience in the US, however, 
suggests that mobile subscribers in an RPP regime use their phones much more often than 
users in CPP regimes.258 It should be noted that it is not just RPP, but also the 
introduction of ‘bucket plans’ (i.e. charging a flat fee for a certain number of call 
minutes, which are purchased in advance by customers) by mobile operators to encourage 
their subscribers to use their phones more often, that led to higher minutes of use per 
subscriber. Before the diffusion of bucket-plans, apparently it was common to avoid 
giving out mobile phone numbers. Nevertheless, the introduction of innovative price 
structures endogenously depends on the RPP regime. Therefore it seems that the risk that 
mobile users switch off their phones is mostly theoretical. 
 
As argued by Doyle and Smith (1998) and Littlechild (2004), compared to implementing 
price controls (which will be discussed in the next section), a change to RPP seems to be 
superior.259 It is like curing a disease rather than eliminating the symptoms. Not only does 
it lead to the desired effects (elimination of distortive prices, elimination of cross-
subsidies from the fixed to the mobile sector), it reaches these effects without prolonged 
and intrusive interfering in the market.260 
                                                 
257 See Littlechild (2004) for brief discussions of several case studies in developing countries. 
258 See a discussion of empirical data in Crandall and Sidak (2004) and Marcus (2004). 
259 To the best of our knowledge, there are no legal impediments for EU member states to switch 
from CPP to RPP. 
260 It is hard to understand why it has not been selected among other candidate remedies by Oftel 
and the Competition Commission in the UK. Littlechild (2004) cites an interesting statement 
made by Oftel in 2002: “In Oftel’s view, existing mobile users would react strongly against 
having to pay to receive calls. Oftel would have a hard job explaining that overall it was in their 
interests to pay for such calls when previously they received them for free. Oftel believes that 
MNOs would also be likely to criticise the changes, lobby against them, and blame the CC and 
Oftel for their introduction. The political outfall would be considerable” (p. 18). 
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Mobile operators would probably have to be forced to switch to RPP-based commercial 
arrangements with their customers. Given the (apparently) high revenues from call 
termination on their networks, they are unlikely to be in a hurry. According to Wright 
(2002), mobile operators will probably never choose to implement RPP if mobile 
termination charges are unregulated. Hence it may be necessary to mandate a switch to 
RPP for all operators. Can this be done in a simple way? An indirect way of doing this 
(which requires further consideration for policy purposes) is to regulate mobile 
termination charges at zero.261 This type of price control requires neither cost monitoring 
by the regulator nor adjustments over time (as in the case of RPI–x price caps); hence it is 
very simple to implement, something which cannot be said about price controls in 
general. By doing so, mobile operators at once lose all their access revenues. Having lost 
their funds to cross-subsidize mobile retail prices, they will then have strong incentives to 
rebalance their retail prices, which may lead to a positive reception charge.262  
 
 
6.2.3 Call termination bypass 
 
An interesting remedy is to change the technological architecture of mobile 
telecommunications networks, in order to create the possibility of competition in call 
termination.263 Imagine that the caller (or alternatively, the caller’s network operator who 
bargains on behalf of its customers) can decide to bypass the called party’s network, and 
instead select an alternative operator to deliver the call. If such an additional choice were 
feasible, alternative operators would have the ability to compete in the call termination 
market.  
                                                 
261 See also Wright (2002). See adaptation 1 of the benchmark model in section 5.1. 
262 In principle, nothing prevents them from charging nothing for receiving calls. But if the 
termination access charge is fixed at zero, then in any case retail prices for call origination will 
not be inflated due to high access charges. 
263 Valletti (2003) also discusses this type of solution. 
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Some background is useful in order to consider this remedy in more detail. What exactly 
is it that a consumer buys when subscribing to a mobile operator? In return for a 
subscription fee, the mobile user typically purchases a bundle consisting of: 
 
1. a SIM card corresponding to a unique telephone number, possibly in combination 
with a mobile handset; 
2. the ability to make calls which are charged at certain per-minute prices, 
depending on the type of call (possibly including a given number of free call 
minutes); 
3. the ability to receive calls, which are charged in a regime of RPP but not under 
CPP; and 
4. the ability to use various other services, which are usually charged, such as 
voicemail, international roaming, the ability to send and receive short message 
services (SMS) or more advanced multimedia services. 
 
An element of the subscription contract is that only the operator to which a consumer 
subscribes (i.e., the operator that provides the SIM card) is able to terminate calls to that 
consumer. Suppose, for instance, that a customer subscribes to mobile operator A. The 
switches of the networks are programmed such that when a call originating from a 
subscriber to some other network needs to be delivered to the customer on network A, 
this is automatically done by operator A’s network and antennas. By default, bypass of 
call termination is impossible. Suppose, however, that there is another operator, B, with 
the same network coverage as operator A. In principle, the antennas of network B are also 
able to communicate with the handset of the subscriber to network A; in fact they pick up 
signals from all phones that are switched on within its coverage area. Except for the way 
the networks have been programmed and mobile services are being bundled, in principle 
there is nothing to prevent operator B from bypassing operator A, that is, from 
terminating the call to network A’s subscriber. This type of ‘call termination bypass’ 
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could, for example, take place on the request of the calling party (e.g. by dialling a 
‘Carrier Select’ prefix on a per-call basis).264 
 
Note that call termination bypass is not equivalent to the option of introducing multiple 
SIM cards, a remedy discussed in Valletti (2003). A multiple SIM card allows the mobile 
subscriber to switch between different networks. Hence, the main difference is that 
multiple SIM cards put the choice in the hands of the receiver, whereas call termination 
bypass puts the choice in the hands of the caller. Clearly, the effectiveness of multiple 
SIM cards remedy will be greater under RPP than under CPP, since the ability to switch 
may not be exercised in practice if it has no financial consequences. Call termination 
bypass, however, empowers the caller, who bears the financial burden of calling under 
CPP, to decide which network terminates his or her call. Therefore it is likely to be much 
more effective than the introduction of multiple SIM cards. 
 
Is call termination bypass feasible from a technical viewpoint? To allow alternative 
operators to deliver calls to other operators’ customers, two adaptations in mobile 
network architecture are needed:265 
 
1. Operators’ HLRs (the databases containing information about their subscribers; 
see ch. 2) need to be adapted. 
2. The ‘attach procedure’, which is the procedure according to which mobile users’ 
handsets virtually ‘attach’ themselves to a network, needs to be changed. 
 
Apparently, these adaptations can be implemented with the current generation of 
handsets, so that mobile users do not need to purchase new handsets.266 However, this 
                                                 
264 It would be interesting to incorporate call termination bypass in the models analyzed in chapter 
5. Due to time restrictions, we have not been able to perform this analysis. Nevertheless, if callers 
are well informed about access prices and face little hassle when they choose to use the bypass 
option, clearly mobile operators will face strong downward pressure on the access price. 
265 We are grateful to Jan van Loon (TNO Telecom, Delft) for providing the necessary 
background information. 
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type of solution is not very practical because a mobile phone can only be attached to a 
single network at a time.267 In particular, if an alternative operator wants to deliver a call 
to a mobile user, the handset first needs (to be forced) to switch to that operator’s 
network (this would be carried out by the revised attach procedure). The main practical 
barrier is that the switching process would take time, in the order of magnitude of 10 
seconds, comparable to the time lag between turning on a handset and the connection 
with a network. Assuming that consumers would dislike such a delay, the implementation 
of call termination bypass does not seem to be an attractive option, at least at present. 
Nevertheless, current R&D in mobile telecommunications includes ‘access network 
selection’, which focuses for instance the possibility of automatically switching to a 
wireless local area network (‘WLAN’) when an employee enters the premises of the 
company where he or she works. The remedy of call termination bypass could easily fit 
into this type of research program. Within a couple of years, such solutions can become 
reality. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the attach procedure will become faster in the 
near future. Hence the practical barrier mentioned above may then cease to exist. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
266 Most mobile users have so-called ‘phase 2’ handsets, which can handle the network 
adaptations described above. 
267 This is not the case for ‘dual mode’ handsets, which are not commonly used. 
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6.3 Socially optimal regulation of access prices 
 
In practice, the behavioral remedy of price controls, in particular regulation of mobile 
termination charges, tends to push these prices towards cost-based levels. The reason is 
that the narrowly defined markets (call termination on single networks – see chapter 4) 
give rise to dominant positions (100% market shares) and hence a substantial risk of 
abuse (i.e., high mark-ups). This policy approach is questionable because it is uncertain 
that cost-based access prices are in consumers’ interest or maximize welfare. 
 
An important issue in the debate is the need to recover fixed and common costs. Falch 
(1997) provides estimates of investment-related costs in (presumably fixed) telecoms that 
vary between 60 and 90 percent of the costs of production, consisting of investments in 
terminal equipment, access networks, switching, transmission/long line, and other 
facilities (buildings etc.). The numbers are probably lower for mobile 
telecommunications, for instance, the component ‘access’ exhibits fundamentally 
different characteristics in mobile telecoms, as there is no need to roll out physical local 
connections. Nevertheless the investments in mobile telecoms are likely to be quite 
substantial.  
 
According to the Access Directive of the EC, national regulatory authorities have to take 
into account the investments by operators, if they conclude that access price regulation is 
the most appropriate intervention. The question is how this should be done. Although 
prices that are fixed at cost-based levels may include a sufficiently high ‘reasonable 
return’, they tend to ignore efficiency considerations with regard to the allocation of the 
burden of cost recovery. The reason is that they are not based on the maximization of 
total welfare, contrary to Ramsey prices. By definition, Ramsey pricing (i.e., a proper 
implementation and not just adopting Ramsey-style elements in price controls) maximize 
welfare under the restriction that operators break even (see section 5.3). The resulting 
outcome was denoted as a second-best welfare outcome. 
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Within the context of mobile call termination, Ramsey pricing is more complex than is 
commonly thought. An important observation in section 5.3 was that Ramsey pricing 
should jointly be applied to the mobile sector and the fixed sector, since these sectors 
form a closely integrated (read: interconnected) system characterized by call traffic flows 
and wholesale payments between them. These interactions form the heart of the call 
termination problem. Given the prominent presence of fixed and common costs in the 
fixed sector, just as Ramsey pricing in the mobile sector might imply that the fixed sector 
partly finances the costs of mobile networks, a reverse subsidy may also be socially 
desirable. 
 
To assess the claim that Ramsey pricing will lead to mobile access mark-ups, consider 
the following observation by Valletti (2003): 
 
“No Ramsey mark-up is required when demand for mobile subscriptions is totally 
inelastic in which case all fixed and common costs should be recovered via 
monthly rental fees, without inducing any additional distortion.” 
(Valletti, 2003, p. 25). 
 
In reality, telephony has become virtually indispensable in order to participate in society 
(most users probably cannot miss them if prices stay within a reasonable range), so that 
the assumption of inelastic demand for connections (whether fixed or mobile) does not 
seem to be wide off the mark.268 Hence, suppose that the price elasticity for subscriptions 
is relatively low compared to the elasticities of metered services such as calling. Ignoring 
for a moment the possibility that handsets are subsidized through access revenues, if 
                                                 
268 Some existing empirical studies, which are based on relatively old data (approx. the second 
half of the 1990s to 2001), show that the demand for subscriptions is elastic, but relatively low 
(Competition Commission, 2002, ch. 8). Different studies do not lead to the same rankings of 
elasticities, however, which makes one wonder about the reliability of these studies (CC, 2002, 
contains a critical discussion). Note that given the rapid development of the mobile market, it is 
unlikely that data which are mainly from the late 1990s can accurately describe the demand 
characteristics of the current situation of a mature mobile market. 
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competition in the retail market is not too intense, mark-ups in subscription fees may then 
constitute a feasible and efficient way to recover fixed and common costs without 
distorting consumers’ choices and calling behavior.269 However, if mobile operators set 
access prices above marginal cost levels, intense retail competition will force them to use 
the resulting access revenues to lower subscription fees. Accordingly, access mark-ups 
may undermine the potential for cost-recoupment of other, possibly more effective 
instruments, in particular subscription fees. This tension is usually not taken into account 
in policy discussions, although it puts access mark-ups in a different light – the claim that 
Ramsey pricing automatically leads to mobile access mark-ups is not as convincing as it 
may seem at first sight. 
 
The central lesson from section 5.3 was that optimizing over a small set of prices (mobile 
termination charges), while ignoring prices in the fixed sector and mobile retail prices, is 
unlikely to lead to the second-best welfare outcome. Nevertheless, a partial 
implementation of Ramsey elements (e.g., only regulating mobile termination charges) 
may be the only realistic option, given that among the markets identified as having higher 
potential for competition problems in the Commission Recommendation on relevant 
product and service markets, only three markets related to mobile telephony are identified 
(access and call origination, voice call termination on individual networks, and the 
national market for international roaming services, all of them wholesale markets). We 
repeat the observation from chapter 5 that since the Framework Directive states that 
remedies can only be applied if dominance is established, the regulatory framework in the 
EU does not lend itself well to socially optimal regulation of retail prices. 
 
                                                 
269 Within the context of the models analyzed in the previous chapter, mark-ups in subscription 
fees (and setting all other prices, including termination charges, at marginal, or perceived 
marginal, costs) would be optimal, since the demand for subscriptions was assumed to be 
inelastic. Nevertheless, one would want to analyze a more general model with elastic demand for 
subscriptions as well as substitution between fixed and mobile subscriptions. A possible outcome 
of such an analysis is that all prices will include some mark-ups, although subscription fees will, 
presumably, bear the heaviest weight. 
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In addition to the regulatory constraints that limit the effectiveness of price controls to 
obtain a second-best welfare outcome, there are some practical considerations to take into 
account. Implementing some elements of Ramsey pricing may not be immediately 
feasible, as it requires very detailed demand data about all types of elasticities. Although 
there have been attempts to estimate elasticities and derive implications for Ramsey 
prices in mobile telecommunications, at present the resulting estimates do not provide 
sufficient grounds for implementing price controls based on Ramsey considerations 
(Newbery, 2004). There is little data available and the existing data does not seem to be 
sufficiently accurate or robust.270 Obtaining useful data is rather complex and requires 
sophisticated techniques – operators themselves are not likely to have such detailed data 
available for their own pricing strategies.271 As Elliot (2004) and Newbery (2004) argue, 
such difficulties should not prevent regulators from learning to gather sound data and 
improve the methodology and techniques that are needed. In addition, we have seen 
above that Ramsey pricing requires a careful, joint consideration of the fixed and mobile 
sector, as well as a reorientation of regulation of the fixed operator towards an overall 
Ramsey pricing structure. As a side remark, note that the demands on the fixed operator 
need not become heavier by doing so, for one will only have to adapt prices that are 
already regulated to Ramsey levels. 
 
The conclusion is that regulation in the form of price controls, aiming at an efficient 
recovery of operators’ fixed and common costs, requires careful reflection, to put it 
mildly. Partial, Ramsey-style price controls cannot be assumed to lead to an overall 
Ramsey pricing structure. Whether the resulting pricing structure requires substantial 
mark-ups in mobile access prices is an open question, since they undermine the 
effectiveness of cost recovery through alternative, potentially superior instruments, such 
as subscription fees. 
 
                                                 
270 Elliot (2004) claims that current empirical data is sufficiently reliable to make judgments for 
regulatory investigations. However, he also writes that currently available data may not be robust. 
271 Private communication with mobile operators. 
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6.4 Concluding remarks on remedies 
 
An important observation of the previous section is that the telecommunications sector is 
plagued by more than problems of market power alone (e.g. natural monopoly, essential 
facilities, call termination monopolies). In particular, externalities (call externalities, 
network externalities) are common and may provide a rationale for regulation, even if 
there are several facility-based providers of all sorts of services that compete 
effectively.272 As nothing, or hardly anything, can be done without a finding of 
dominance, the new regulatory framework in the EU seems to consider those issues not 
worthy of regulation. That might be a reasonable judgement call, since one can never 
really prove that the costs of regulation would be lower (or higher) than the market 
failure it would try correct. Nevertheless, it is important to point out that the problem of 
call termination monopolies should not merely be seen, from the narrow context of the 
relevant market, as a problem of market power, but rather from a broader context as a 
market failure caused by externalities. Based on this observation, it is natural to look 
beyond remedies that deal with symptoms of monopoly power (price controls in 
particular), and take more structural remedies into consideration as well. Moreover, the 
standard list of remedies of the regulatory framework (see chapter 3) does not seem to be 
set up in order to deal with the type of market failure that we are facing here. None of 
those remedies, except for price controls, seems to have the power to do something about 
call termination monopolies. As this list is non-exhaustive, regulators are able to look 
beyond it. 
 
An economic analysis of mobile call termination must take into account the connections 
between the fixed and the mobile sector, and also between the wholesale and retail level. 
At present, there are large asymmetries between termination access prices charged by 
fixed operators (who are typically regulated) and mobile operators. Thus a 
straightforward way of tackling the problem of call termination monopolies may be to 
                                                 
272 See e.g. the arguments made in Larouche (2000, ch. 4). 
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eliminate the regulatory asymmetry between the two sectors, and verify that fixed end-
users benefit from access mark-ups through reduced retail prices. This type of remedy, 
which was discussed in subsection 6.2.1, merits further exploration, at least to shed more 
light on the backgrounds of call termination monopolies. 
 
Also, given the prominent presence of fixed and common costs in the fixed sector, 
Ramsey pricing, if pursued, should be applied at an overall level to the fixed and mobile 
market. A possible outcome of such an exercise is that fixed operators should increase 
their termination access charges, so that mobile users contribute to cost recovery in the 
fixed sector. However, besides the large scale of such an exercise, controlling access 
prices may turn out to be a semi-permanent phenomenon, rather than a one-shot 
intervention that creates a fundamental change in the market.  
 
Major drawbacks of access regulation (through price controls) are that it is heavy-handed, 
and that it is transitory only to the extent that regulators will have to continuously 
monitor whether the ‘single network’ market definition has ceased to be valid, and if yes, 
withdraw the price controls. Without a full-fledged analysis of welfare effects, it is hard 
to assess whether the problems and distortions caused by call termination monopolies are 
sufficiently substantial to warrant regulatory intervention. In any case, rather than 
jumping to heavy-handed measures (such as imposing price controls) in the mobile 
market, it makes sense to consider less intrusive options – that may happen to be more 
structural. 
 
Fortunately such alternatives exist, with the added benefit that they eliminate the root 
cause of the welfare distortion and hence make access regulation unnecessary. One way 
to do this is to make operators charge called parties for the termination part of a call, 
while calling parties pay for other ‘parts’ of the call (RPP). This remedy can probably be 
implemented straightaway, but must probably be enforced through regulatory pressure. 
Another option is introduce call termination bypass, that is, competition for call 
termination by making it feasible that alternative mobile operators can deliver calls to 
other operators’ customers (on the explicit request of calling parties, for instance by 
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dialling a ‘Carrier Select’ prefix). The option may require further technological progress 
to make it fully effective and acceptable, as an implementing based on current technology 
is somewhat disruptive, introduces a nuisance for customers making calls to mobile users, 
and may require regulatory oversight to guarantee effective access to call termination. 
 
The legal implications of the structural remedies that we proposed deserve more attention 
(e.g., given the regulatory framework, are there undesirable biases towards certain 
remedies, and are there different ways to implement a certain remedies?). As an example, 
let us mention the current discussion on ‘interoperability’, which can loosely be defined 
as the establishment of end-to-end connections between end-users.273 In the Netherlands 
and in the UK, telecommunications authorities are currently investigating to what extent 
interoperability, a vague notion which features prominently in telecoms legislations, can 
be used as a guiding principle to deal with a whole range of market and competition 
issues.274 For instance, in conflicts on wholesale tariffs (such as mobile access prices), the 
notion of interoperability might help to establish pricing principles, in addition to, or 
perhaps as a substitute for, price controls that deal with abuses of market power. A more 
general issue is whether interoperability can also have implications on CPP versus RPP, 
or more technical implications, in particular on the implementation of call termination 
bypass. 
 
                                                 
273 See Verbon (2004). 
274 The results of the consultations are meant to serve as input for the European Commission, in 
order to obtain principles of implementation and best practices for all member states of the EU. 




Market research by competition authorities in countries with CPP (‘calling party pays’) 
regimes indicates that wholesale call termination on a single mobile network can be 
defined as a relevant product market, and on such a market, an operator has 100% market 
share. Mobile operators face no (or very little) competitive pressure in the wholesale 
market for call termination. 
 
The root cause of these ‘call termination monopolies’ is the CPP regime, which gives rise 
to an externality: mobile operators can charge operators in the fixed market – instead of 
charging customers in the market in which they compete – for the termination of 
incoming calls from fixed subscribers. Fixed operators’ access charges are usually 
regulated (at ‘cost-oriented’ levels) so that they do not have countervailing bargaining 
power in the wholesale market for termination access. 
 
Intense (or even perfect) competition in the mobile retail market does not provide a 
reason to conclude that the call termination monopolies can be ignored by regulators and 
competition authorities. Even if termination profits are passed on to mobile customers (in 
the case of perfect competition: up to the point where each operator makes zero overall 
profits), welfare may be distorted. 
 
Mark-ups in mobile access prices stemming from call termination monopolies tend to 
inflate per-minute prices for off-net calls, especially for fixed-to-mobile (F2M) calls. This 
distortionary effect on retail prices is more severe when fixed and mobile markets are 
more ‘distinct’, that is, when there is a larger number of fixed users who are not 
customers in the mobile market but do make calls to mobile users. Therefore mobile 
access mark-ups effectively create a net money stream from the fixed to the mobile 
sector, subsidized by fixed subscribers who call mobile users. The problem in the mobile-
to-mobile (M2M) case tends to be less severe, since the effects of access mark-ups cancel 
out to some extent (in a more symmetric market, charging each other for call termination 
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makes much less sense, since access mark-ups would only lead to pumping around access 
revenues). 
 
The presence of call termination monopolies does not automatically imply that there is an 
overall welfare problem. On the one hand, (i) per-minute prices for F2M and off-net 
M2M calls are inflated, distorting the demand for these calls; and (ii) consumers who pay 
inflated prices subsidize consumers who benefit from handset subsidies or reduced 
mobile subscription fees, so that there may be overconsumption of mobile services (e.g. 
an inefficiently high turnover of phones by consumers). On the other hand, (i) access 
mark-ups may efficiently contribute to the recovery of fixed and common costs; and (ii) 
assuming that competition in the mobile retail market is sufficiently effective, mobile 
consumers benefit since overall mobile telephony becomes cheaper, an effect that 
contributes to fast market expansion. The net welfare effect is unknown (and hard to 
assess). 
 
If operators have to recover fixed and common costs of their networks, then Ramsey 
pricing (by definition) leads to a second-best welfare outcome (compared to the first-best 
outcome in which investments are covered by a lump-sum transfer from the government). 
A proper welfare analysis to derive Ramsey prices should include both the fixed and 
mobile market, each of them both at the retail and wholesale level. Whether the resulting 
pricing structure requires substantial mark-ups in mobile access prices is uncertain, in 
particular since they undermine the effectiveness of cost recovery through alternative, 
potentially superior instruments, such as subscription fees. Moreover, partial price 
controls with Ramsey elements (e.g. setting only mobile access prices but not fixed 
access prices at Ramsey levels, or leaving retail prices to be determined by competition) 
may not lead to a second-best welfare outcome. 
 
The current policy tendency is to restrict attention to the defined market, establish 
substantial market power (a dominant position), and regulate the prices in question. A 
shortcoming of this approach is that it is not based on an overall welfare analysis. Also, it 
is transitory only to the extent that regulators will have to continuously monitor whether 
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the ‘single network’ market definition has ceased to be valid, and if yes, withdraw the 
price controls. Thus a possible consequence is that regulatory intervention becomes a 
semi-permanent phenomenon, rather than a one-shot intervention that creates a 
fundamental change in the market. Overall, the strong focus on price controls that is 
observed in practice is hard to justify from a welfare perspective.  
 
Compared to price controls, there exist alternative, less heavy-handed, ways to intervene, 
which are directly aiming at the root cause of the problem and can make access 
regulation unnecessary. 
 
First, as an eye-opener, consider the elimination of the regulatory asymmetry between the 
fixed and mobile sector, for instance by creating countervailing bargaining power for the 
fixed operator in the wholesale access market (while verifying that fixed end-users 
benefit from lower access mark-ups through reduced retail prices). Although this type of 
remedy may ultimately not be be feasible as regulators may be unwilling to deregulate 
fixed termination access, it points at the connections between the fixed and mobile 
sectors in relation to call termination monopolies.  
 
Second, a remedy is to introduce RPP (‘receiving party pays’), that is, change the 
commercial agreements such that the price for receiving calls is not a priori fixed at zero 
because of some convention, while the calling party still pays a price for call originiation. 
This remedy can be implemented straightaway but requires regulatory intervention (to 
make it happen).  
 
Third, an option is to introduce ‘call termination bypass’ by making it technically feasible 
that alternative mobile operators can deliver calls to other operators’ customers (e.g. on 
the explicit request of calling parties, for instance by dialling a ‘Carrier Select’ prefix). 
The latter solution may not be immediately feasible or desirable though, given the current 
state of network technology. 
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Remedies should always be compared to the possibility of refraining from intervention. 
Arguments in favor of laissez-faire are: (i) the cross-subsidy from the fixed to the mobile 
sector, which might be the most significant effect of call termination monopolies, are 
offset by the fact that most fixed customers also own a mobile phone, so that overall they 
may hardly be affected; (ii) changes will not lead to Pareto-improvements, as users and/or 
operators in the mobile sector will lose, regardless of the way in which F2M termination 
tariffs are reduced; (iii) mobile operators paid money for their licenses, arguably on the 
expectation that they could recover (part of) it with F2M termination charges – changing 
the rules of the game could be considered a regulatory taking; (iv) we do not yet have a 
good understanding of how CPP versus RPP may affect social interactions and how the 
two regimes are valued by consumers; and (v) call  termination termination may become 
viable in a few years, so there is no need to introduce structural reforms now. Perhaps 
except for the first one, these arguments are not very strong: (ii) one cannot realistically 
expect Pareto-improvements to be a requirement for regulatory intervention; (iii) even 
though regulatory takings may pose a serious risk for firms, licence-holders can 
realistically expect that competition authorities and regulators are ‘obliged’ to deal with 
major market failures; (iv) the potential negative effects of a switch to RPP seem to be of 
minor importance; and (v) without external pressure, operators will not have incentives to 
develop the technology for call termination bypass. 
 
The net welfare effect of access mark-ups due to call termination monopolies is 
unknown, but clearly call behavior is distorted as a result of inflated per-minute prices for 
off-net calls. If any, forcing mobile operators to apply RPP instead of CPP is a 
straightforward and simple remedy, as it instantaneously eliminates the root cause of call 
termination monopolies.275 The current focus on price controls to deal with call 
                                                 
275 Recall that we framed the central question within the context of second-generation mobile 
networks (2G). Nevertheless, the insights that were obtained are also relevant for the next 
generation based on UMTS. In a CPP regime, and with similar regulatory asymmetries between 
the fixed and mobile sectors as in the current situation, 3G mobile telephony will also suffer from 
call termination monopolies. Our observation that implementing a regime of RPP is superior 
(because of practical reasons) to the remedy of call termination bypass, may no longer be valid if 
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termination monopolies is understandable within the context of the regulatory framework 
in the EU, but it ignores important elements of the broader picture and therefore risks to 
be misguided from a welfare viewpoint. Such an approach may eliminate the symptoms 
at a local level (namely within the narrowly defined market where an abuse of market 
power is established), but it lacks a welfare diagnosis that looks at the root cause of the 
problem, which happens to be an externality that goes beyond the ‘relevant’ market of 
wholesale call termination on a single mobile network. 
 
By adopting a welfare perspective, and keeping some distance from the regulatory 
framework’s possibilities and limitations, we have been able to address call termination 
monopolies more fundamentally than it is usually done in policy and legal arenas. An 
implication of our approach is that the legal implications of the structural remedies that 
we proposed deserve more attention. We observed that regulatory frameworks may be 
biased towards remedies that do not (necessarily) maximize welfare, as they may be 
dealing with incorrectly speficied problems. A more general lesson of our analysis is, 
therefore, that regulatory authorities should try to avoid myopic regulatory policies, even 
if this implies that they have to reason outside of the scope of the most accessible legal 
instruments at their disposal. If existing regulatory instruments are not suited to deal with 
a certain problem, it is important to point this out so that the legal framework can be 
adapted accordingly. 
                                                                                                                                                 
technological progress happens to result in a different architecture of 3G networks, allowing for a 




ACCC (2001), “Pricing Methodology for the GSM Termination Service”, Final Report, 
July. 
 
ACCC (2002), “Pricing Methodology for the GSM and CDMA Termination Services”, 
Final Report, September. 
 
ACCC (2003a), “Mobile Service Review 2003”, Discussion Paper, April. 
 
ACCC (2003b), “Resolution of Telecommunications Access Disputes - A Guide to 
Dispute Resolution Provisions under Part XIC of the Trade Practices Act 1974 and the 
Telecommunications Act 1997”, last revised May 2003. 
 
ACCC (2004), “Mobile Services Review: Mobile Terminating Access Service: Final 
Decision on whether or not the Commission should extend, vary or revoke its existing 
declaration of the mobile terminating access service”, June. 
 
Anderson, , S.P., A. de Palma, and J.-F. Thisse (1992), Discrete Choice Theory of 
Product Differentiation, MIT Press. 
 
Armstrong, M. (1998), “Network interconnection in telecommunications”, Economic 
Journal Vol. 108, 545-564.  
 
Armstrong, M. (2002), “The theory of access pricing and interconnection”, in: M. Cave, 
S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang (eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, 
North-Holland, 295-384. 
 
Armstrong, M. and J. Vickers (2001), “Competitive price discrimination”, RAND Journal 
of Economics 32, 579-605. 
 156 
 
Bezzina, J. and T. Pénard, “Dynamic competition in the mobile market, subsidies and 
collusion”, mimeo, ENST Bretagne, IDATE and CREREG, November 16. 
 
Bergman, M. (2001) “The Role of the Essential Facilities Doctrine”, Antitrust Bulletin 
46, 403-434. 
 
Bitton (2003), “Nieuwe ontwikkelingen in het MTA-dossier: Telecommunicatiewet niet 
van toepassing op indirecte interconnectie”, Actualiteiten Mededingingsrecht 5, 107-109. 
 
Buigues, P.A. (2004), “The competition policy approach”, in: P.A. Buigues and P. Rey 
(eds.), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives 
for the New European Regulatory Framework, Edward Elgar, 9-26. 
 
Canoy, M., P.W.J. de Bijl, and R. Kemp (2004), “Access to telecommunications 
networks”, in: P.A. Buigues and P. Rey (eds.), The Economics of Antitrust and 
Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European Regulatory 
Framework, Edward Elgar, 135-168. 
 
Carter, M. and J. Wright (1999), “Interconnection in network industries”, Review of 
Industrial Organization Vol. 14, 1-25. 
 
Cave, M. (2004), “Economic aspects of the new regulatory regime for electronic 
communications services”, in: P.A. Buigues and P. Rey (eds.), The Economics of 
Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives for the New European 
Regulatory Framework, Edward Elgar, 27-41. 
 
Cave, M., S. Majumdar, H. Rood, T. Valletti, and I. Vogelsang (2001), “The Relationship 
between Access Pricing Regulation and Infrastructure Competition”, Report to OPTA 
and DG Telecommunications and Post, Brunel University. 
 
 157 
Competition Commission (2003), “Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile: Reports on 
references under section 13 of the Telecommunications Act 1984 on the charges made by 
Vodafone, O2, Orange and T-Mobile for terminating calls from fixed and mobile 
networks”, London. 
 
Crandall, R.W. and J.G. Sidak (forthcoming), “Should Regulators Set Rates to Terminate 
Calls on Mobile Networks?”, Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 21. 
 
De Bijl, P.W.J. and M. Peitz (2002), Regulation and Entry into Telecommunications 
Markets, Cambridge University Press. 
 
De Bijl, P.W.J. and M. Peitz (2004), “Dynamic regulation and entry in 
telecommunications markets: a policy framework”, Information Economics and Policy 
16, 411-437 
 
Dessein, W. (2003), “Network competition in nonlinear pricing”, RAND Journal of 
Economics 34, 593-611. 
 
Doyle, C. (2002), “Mobile telecommunications and competition policy: Comparing 
Australia and the United Kingdom”, University of Warwick, presentation prepared for 
ITS Europe Conference 2002, Madrid. 
 
Doyle, C. and J.C. Smith (1998), “Market structure in mobile telecoms: qualified indirect 
access and the receiver pays principle”, Information Economics and Policy Vol. 10, 471-
488. 
 
Elliot, D. (2004), “The importance of price elasticities in the regulation of mobile call 
termination”, The Vodafone Public Policy Series 1, 6-10. 
 
European Commission (2002a), “Commission guidelines on market analysis and the 
assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for 
 158 
electronic communications networks and services”, Official Journal of the European 
Communities 2002/C 165/03, 6-31. 
 
European Commission (2002b), Eight report on the implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(2002) 695 final. 
 
European Commission (2003a), “Commission Recommendation On Relevant Product 
and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante 
regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks 
and services”, Official Journal of the European Communities 2003/311/EC, 45-49. 
 
European Commission (2003b), Ninth report on the implementation of the 
Telecommunications Regulatory Package, COM(2003) 715 final. 
 
ERG (2004), “ERG Common Position on the approach to Appropriate remedies in the 
new regulatory framework”, ERG (03) 30rev1, 1 April. 
http://www.erg.eu.int/doc/whatsnew/erg_0330rev1_remedies_common_position.pdf 
 
Fabrizi, S. (2003), “Competition and regulation with fixed and mobile networks”, mimeo, 
Université Toulouse I (GREMAQ), March. 
 
Falch, M. (1997), “Cost and Demand Characteristics of Telecom Networks”, in: W.H. 
Melody (ed.), Telecom Reform: Principles, Policies and Regulatory Practices, Technical 
University of Denmark, 101-116. 
 
Fisher, F.M. (1979), “Diagnosing Monopoly”, Quarterly Review of Economics and 
Business, p. 7-33. 
 
 159 
Freund, N. (2001), “The proposed SMP-concept of the European Commission and its 
Implication on Regulation in the Member States”, Paper for the regional ITS conference 
1-3 September 2001, Dublin. 
 
Freund, N. and E.-O. Ruhle (2002), “Regulatory Concepts for Fixed-to-Fixed and Fixed-
to-Mobile Interconnection Rates in the European Union”, Paper for the regional ITS 
Europe conference 8-10 September 2002, Madrid.  
 
Frontier Economics (2003), “Market Definition Issues in the ACCC’s Mobile Service 
Review 2003”, Report prepared for Vodafone, June. 
 
Gans, J.S. (1999), “An evaluation of regulatory pricing options for mobile termination 
services”, University of Melbourne, mimeo, 9 December. 
 
Gans, J.S. and S.P. King (2000), “Mobile network competition, customer ignorance and 
fixed-to-mobile call prices”, Information Economics and Policy Vol. 12, 301-327. 
 
Gual, J. (2004), “Market definition in the telecoms industry”, in: P.A. Buigues and P. Rey 
(eds.), The Economics of Antitrust and Regulation in Telecommunications: Perspectives 
for the New European Regulatory Framework, Edward Elgar, 45-70. 
 
Haan, M. (2002), "Kartelwinsten in mobiele telefonie?", Tijdschrift voor Politieke 
Ekonomie 23(4), 97-103. 
 
Harbord, D. and G. von Graevenitz (2000), “Market definition in oligopolistic and 
vertically-related markets: Some anomalies”, European Competition Law Review 21, 
151-158. 
 
Hausman, J. (2002), “Mobile telephony”, in: M. Cave, S. Majumdar and I. Vogelsang 
(eds.), Handbook of Telecommunications Economics, North-Holland, 563-604. 
 
 160 
Hermalin, B.E. and M.L. Katz (2004), “Sender or receiver: who should pay to exchange 
an electronic message?”, RAND Journal of Economics 35 (3). 
 
International Regulators Group (2004), “Principles of Implementation and Best practice 
on the application of remedies in the mobile voice call termination market”, 1 April. 
 
Intven, H., J. Oliver and E. Sepúlveda (2000), Telecommunications Regulation 
Handbook, World Bank, Washington.  
 
Jeon, S. (2002), “Ramsey pricing in one-way and two-way interconnection between 
telephone networks”, Economics Bulletin Vol. 12, 1-9. 
 
Jeon, D.-S., J.-J. Laffont, and J. Tirole (2004), “On the ‘receiver-pays’ principle”, RAND 
Journal of Economics 35, 85-110. 
 
Kim, J.-Y, and Y. Lim (2001), “An economic analysis of the receiver pay principle”, 
Information Economics and Policy 13, 231-260. 
 
Koboldt, C. and D. Maldoom (2001), “Optimal fixed-to-mobile interconnection charges”, 
DotEcon, paper presented at the 12th European Regional ITS Conference, Dublin, 2-3 
September. 
 
Laffont, J.-J., P. Rey, and J. Tirole (1998), “Network competition: I. Overview and 
nondiscriminatory pricing”, Rand Journal of Economics Vol. 29, 1-37. 
 
Laffont, J.-J. and J. Tirole (2000), Competition in Telecommunications, MIT Press. 
 
Landgrebe, J. (2002), “The mobile telecommunications market in Germany and Europe: 
Analysis of the regulatory environment, Mobile termination charges and access for 
mobile virtual network operators”, mimeo, Ludwig-Maximilans-University of Munich in 
 161 
cooperation with the Fisher Center for the Strategic Use of Information Technology, 
Haas School of Business, University of California, Berkeley. 
 
Larouche, P. (2000), Competition Law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, 
Oxford: Hart. 
 
Larouche, P. (2002), “A Closer Look at Some Assumptions Underlying EC Regulation of 
Electronic Communications”, Journal of Network Industries 3, 129-137. 
 
Larouche, P. (2004), “Legal issues concerning remedies in network industries”, in: D. 
Geradin (ed.), Remedies in Network Industries: EC Competition Law vs. Sector-specific 
Regulation, Intersentia, 21-45. 
 
Littlechild, S.C. (2004), “Mobile Termination Charges: Calling Party Pays vs Receiving 
Party Pays”, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 0426, Dept. of Applied 
Economics, University of Cambridge. 
 
Marcus, J.S. (2004), “Call Termination Fees: The U.S. in global perspective”, mimeo. 
 
Newbery, D (2004), “Application of Ramsey pricing for regulating mobile call 
termination charges”, The Vodafone Public Policy Series 1, 11-18. 
 
Ng, L. (1997), “Access and Interconnection Issues in the Move Towards the Full 
Liberalisation of European Telecommunications”, North Carolina Journal of 
International Law and Commercial Regulation 23, 1-36. 
 
NMa (2002), “Rapportage over de Marktdefinitie van het Afwikkelen van Gesprekken op 
Mobiele Netten”, 1 augustus. 
 
OECD (2004), Access pricing in telecommunications, Report, Paris. 
 
 162 
Oftel (2001), “Use of multiple SIM cards in mobile phones, by consumers in Italy, 
Finland & Portugal - Summary of Oftel Research”, London, July. 
 
Oftel (2003), “Review of mobile wholesale voice call termination markets: EU Market 
Review”, Consultation Document, London, 15 May. 
 
OPTA (2002), Rapport van bevindingen: Reacties marktpartijen inzake de regulering van 
mobiele terminating tarieven, OPTA/IBT/2002/201816, The Hague. 
 
Pijnacker Hordijk, E.H. en Y. de Vries (2002), “Onbillijk hoge prijzen als vorm van 
misbruik van een economische machtspositie onder het Europese en het Nederlandse 
mededingingsrecht”, SEW - Tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht 50(12), 430-
446. 
 
Rey, P. and B. Jullien (2004), “Mobile to mobile call termination”, The Vodafone Public 
Policy Series 1, 19-24. 
 
Samarajiva, R., W. H. Melody and L. Srivastava (2000), Briefing Paper Fixed-Mobile 
Interconnection Workshop, Document WFMI/04, International Telecommunication 
Union, 20-22 September, Geneva. 
 
Valletti, T.M. (1999), “A model of competition in mobile telecommunications”, 
Information Economics and Policy Vol. 11, 61-72. 
 
Valletti, T. (2003), “Obligations that can be imposed on operators with significant market 
power under the new regulatory framework for electronic communications: Access 
services to public mobile networks”, mimeo, Imperial College London. 
 
Van Damme, E.E.C. (2002), “The European UMTS-auction”, European Economic 
Review Vol. 46, 846-858. 
 
 163 
Van Damme, E.E.C. (2002) “Regulering van de markt voor mobiele telefonie”, ESB 87, 
800-803. 
 
Verbon, T. (2004), “Interoperabiliteit en de nieuwe telecommunicatiewet: Technische, 
economische en juridische gevolgen van een nieuw wetgevend kader”, Afstudeerrapport 
Technische Universiteit Eindhoven. 
 
Vogelsang, I. (2003), “Price regulation of access to telecommunications networks”, 
Journal of Economic Literature Vol. XLI, 830-862. 
 
Wright, J. (2000), “Competition and termination in cellular networks”, mimeo, 
University of Auckland, January 25. 
 
Wright, J. (2002), “Access pricing under competition: an application to cellular 
networks”, Journal of Industrial Economics 50, 289-316. 
 
  
Cases referred to in chapters 3 and 4 
 
Netherlands 
• Rechtbank Rotterdam, 25 April 2003, Reg.nr. TELEC 02/2156 GERR and 02/2339 
GERR, O2 and KPN Mobile v. OPTA. 
• Voorzieningen rechter, Rechtbank Rotterdam, 29 November 2002, Reg. nr. VTELEC 
02/2675 RIP, Dutchtone et al v. OPTA.   
 
United Kingdom 
• T -Mobile (UK) Ltd and others v. Competition Commission and Director-General 
Telecommunications, High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Queens Bench 
Division), [2003] EWHS 1555 (Admin), Case No: CO/1192/03, CO/1308/03, 




• Case C-79/00 Telefónica de Espana SA [2001] ECR I-10075. 
 
